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Introduction
Tim Oliver
The future of the transatlantic relationship is rarely out of the headlines in Europe or North America, and is a perennial subject of analysis by think tanks, universities and governments. This is hardly surprising 
given no other two regions of the world are as closely connected in economics, security and politics. If the 
United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) are said to have a ‘special relationship’, then the same must 
be said of the larger transatlantic relationship of which it is a part. 
Despite the closeness, the relationship faces – as it has 
always done – new and familiar challenges. This report, 
produced as part of the work of the Dahrendorf Forum 
Working Group on Europe-North American relations, 
offers views on the future of that relationship from 
eight scholars who are at the start of their careers. 
We wanted to know what they felt the future holds for 
the relationship in the areas of defence, economics, 
values and emerging powers. 
In each of these four areas we asked an author based 
at a university or think tank in Europe or the US to give 
a European or US perspective.1 
The report begins in the area so often associated 
with transatlantic relations: defence and security. 
In his view, Jeff Lightfoot offers a clear and direct a 
message as has been heard from a growing number 
of US officials, military officers and commentators: 
that patience at European free-riding on a US security 
guarantee is reaching its limits and putting Atlanticism 
at risk. In a chapter that takes into account the full 
range of pressures facing the US’s defence and 
security commitments, Lightfoot notes how Europe’s 
deteriorating geopolitical situation – especially the 
emergence of a ‘ring of fire’ thanks to conflicts to its east, 
south east and south – has yet to motivate Europeans 
to act in a more coordinated way in areas such as 
defence. Some in Europe may take the US’s decision to 
increase its defence spending in Europe as a sign the 
country remains fully committed to Europe’s security. 
But Lightfoot is clear that this financial investment 
comes without the emotional investment that 
followed World War II, and which helped sustain US 
commitments throughout the Cold War and for a long 
time afterwards. Europeans would be wise to carefully 
watch US domestic politics, where the rise of populist 
politicians such as Donald Trump reflect a wider public 
and political unease at US engagement around the 
world. Europe is no exception, including in defence, 
where it is seen less as a strategic partner and more 
as a place increasingly divided and weakened by its 
own failings and external pressures. 
Ben Jones explores the theme of Europe’s 
demilitarisation. As he sets out, Europe’s declining 
military clout is often explained as an outcome of the 
region’s cultural and political trends best captured 
by the idea of Europe as ‘post-modern.’  This contrasts 
with a US, or other powers such as Russia or China, 
that see the world in a traditional ‘modern’ way, and 
‘pre-modern’ parts of the world such as large areas of 
the developing world; a division first set out by the 
British diplomat Robert Cooper. As Jones explains, 
arguments that when it comes to defence spending 
Europeans are motivated by radically different 
criteria from the US or other powers overlooks that 
the influence of cultural factors are more likely to 
be derived from individual state characteristics 
than some pan-European culture. As such there is 
a realist explanation for Europe’s demilitarisation. 
One of the most important is the structural weakness – 
most notably national divisions – in European defence 
industrial markets compared to that of the US. As Jones 
makes clear, the area of ‘defence industrial cooperation’ 
remains the best hope for building European defence 
cooperation. 
US views on the prospect of enhanced US-European 
economic relations are examined by Philip Bednarczyk 
and Andrew Whitworth. As their pithy title sums 
up the prospects: ‘It’s the politics, stupidly…’ As they 
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set out, the sheer scale of the economic relationship 
makes it the cornerstone of both regional economies 
and remains the heart of the world economic system. 
That economic closeness has every chance of growing, 
but even if this happens it is not guaranteed to make 
relations easier. Political leaders on both sides risk 
taking the relationship for granted, not least in Europe. 
US efforts to engage the European Union (EU) 
through geopolitical efforts such as the ‘Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership’ (TTIP) have been 
overshadowed by domestic arguments in Europe. This 
does not mean Bednarczyk and Whitworth dismiss the 
potential for populist politicians in the US to damage 
the relationship through a mixture of attacking it while 
taking it for granted. Nor is the growing closeness a sign 
that the two economies perfectly align, with a growing 
US economy contrasting with a stagnant Eurozone. 
But from a US perspective, the future of the economic 
relationship is mostly endangered by European political 
debate, sluggish growth and disunity. 
Europe’s economic problems are taken up by Tereza 
Novotna whose chapter takes a close look at the 
problems TTIP has run into in Europe. As is noted 
by several authors in the report, Europe’s leaders 
– whether at EU or member state level – may be 
squandering the opportunities TTIP offers Europe by 
allowing populist arguments to dominate the discourse 
surrounding the agreement. As Novotna makes clear, 
debate about TTIP began as quite civil and considered, 
with national and EU politicians agreeing to many of 
the ideas that they soon switched to opposing because 
of growing domestic anger. Instead of attempting to 
explain and counter the myths that built up about 
TTIP, politicians in member states took the easy route 
of blaming the EU. Meanwhile, MEPs2 turned it into an 
opportunity to fight an institutional turf-war between 
the EU’s institutions. The result has been to add to the 
EU’s transition from a Union where there has been a 
‘permissive consensus’ from the general public to one 
where there is a ‘constraining dissensus’. While this 
can vary across the EU, overall it could mean that TTIP 
fails in Europe and not, as initially expected, in the US. 
The close – if strained – defence and economic 
relationships are in no small part the product of the 
shared values and political ideas that have connected 
Europe and the US. Despite such claims as Americans 
being from Mars and Europeans from Venus, the two 
have a relationship based on values that can be traced 
back centuries and which from the rest of the world’s 
perspective can appear very close. Parke Nicholson 
provides a US perspective on whether the two sides 
are diverging over their interpretation of their common 
values. Nicholson highlights changes in the attitudes 
of Millennials (Generation Y) and in the US debate 
about immigration and asylum, a particularly fraught 
debate given the country’s changing demographics 
mean that by the middle of the century the US white 
population could be a super-minority. As Nicholson 
notes, the purpose of the transatlantic relationship 
to Millennials is not self-evident. This attitude can be 
seen as part of a wider confused political outlook that 
is yet to coalesce. However, as things stand, the mistrust 
shown by European Millennials and indifference on 
the part of US Millennials could become a serious 
impediment to the future of the relationship. As a 
result, efforts such as TTIP, whether reformed to take 
into account some of the social concerns found on 
both sides of the Atlantic, is not going to inspire a new 
generation of Atlanticists. 
In her chapter, Claire Sutherland does not hold back 
in criticising Europe’s response to the refugees from 
Syria, and other conflicts in the Middle East, who have 
sought shelter in Europe. Her critical analysis tears into 
Europe’s failure to live up to the values it purports to 
uphold. Her title draws on a September 2015 statement 
from Angela Merkel warning that “If Europe fails on 
the question of refugees, this close connection with 
universal civil rights … will be destroyed and it won’t 
be the Europe we want.”3 But it seems that the Europe 
being sought is one that tries to protect its fragile unity 
by defining itself against a group of weak outsiders 
seeking help. Refugees have found themselves turned 
into a threat to Europe’s security and the European 
project itself. As such, this is an existential crisis for 
Europe. The result is, as she quotes one author on 
the topic: ‘Not a refugee crisis facing Europe, but a 
European crisis facing refugees.’4
For several hundred years, global politics has been 
largely defined by the states of the North Atlantic. 
How then might the two sides of the North Atlantic 
respond to a shift towards a world in which economic, 
military and political power is more dispersed? In his 
US view, John Hemming looks over the literature 
analysing emerging powers and finds it reflects the 
same ambivalence shown by the Obama presidency: 
one that takes comfort in how emerging powers have 
come to symbolise the success of the Western liberal-
economic model, yet at the same time doubtful as 
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1  A coin was tossed to decide if the US or European views would go first in each of the four sections. The US – heads – won.
2  Member(s) of the European Parliament.
3  P. Oltermann, ‘EU acting like “human trafficker” of refugees, says Austrian Minister,’ The Guardian, 5 March 2016. http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/05/rebel-austria-accuses-eu-human-trafficker-sebastian-kurz-angela-merkel.
4  B. Anderson, ‘Why the EU-Turkey Migrant Deal Is a Moral Disaster’, Fortune, 17 March 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/ 
03/17/eu-turkey-migrant-crisis-deal-disaster/.
to emerging powers’ commitment to this (especially 
political liberalisation) and the relative decline of the 
US. Over the course of the chapter, he examines this 
mixture of optimism and pessimism in the West, and 
especially in the US, towards China, Brazil and India. 
A key problem he draws out is the overconcentration on 
China and how, despite the scale of the literature, there 
is a disparity of answers, a situation that points to how 
far we remain from knowing what direction the world 
is headed in. That lack of clarity and certainty opens 
up space for emotion to win out over careful analysis. 
This is also a debate where most of the analysis is about 
the implications and response of the US. What it might 
mean for the rest of the world – especially smaller 
powers – is almost entirely overlooked. 
Europe is home to a range of debates about how to 
respond to a multipolar world, although debates vary 
from state to state, and the EU itself struggles to find the 
unity to agree what needs to be done, let alone actually 
do it. One area where the EU has acted in a more coherent 
way compared to some others is on environmental issues. 
Julia Teebken’s chapter looks into how the EU and US 
have approached climate negotiations with China. 
These are negotiations where power cannot be 
measured using traditional economic, military or 
demographic ways. With the US and China as the world’s 
largest polluters, the EU finds itself with little bargaining 
power and, along with the rest of the world, facing the 
prospect of the US and China doing a bilateral deal 
that meets their needs rather than those of the rest of 
the world. However, as Teebken argues, China and the 
US have moved towards the multilateralism that the 
Europeans have long sought to further global climate 
negotiations. As she shows by looking at the Twitter 
reactions of leading EU politicians and negotiators, 
they recognise that no single partnership – including 
the transatlantic one – is sufficient to secure any 
effective deal. 
The report ends with a conclusion in which Tim Oliver 
examines a relationship that remains fundamental to 
both but is in a state of flux. In reviewing the preceding 
chapters he outlines four sets of challenges this next 
generation of authors see as defining the future 
of the relationship. Some of those challenges are 
familiar ones, some new. He summarises the policy 
recommendations each chapter offered as a way for 
the relationship to move forward. 
Finally, a note on terminology. The Dahrendorf Forum 
Working Group on Europe-North American relations 
has focused largely on US-EU relations. We hope in the 
near future to publish views from young scholars from 
both Canada and Mexico, and so include the other 
two countries of North America. When it comes to 
Europe, the focus in this report is largely on the EU, but 
we should always be weary of immediately equating 
Europe and the EU as the two are not the same. This is 
especially so with transatlantic relations, most notably 
in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), because of a number of European states who 
are not in the EU, such as Norway, and countries such 
as Turkey and Iceland whose classification as ‘European’ 
does not command universal agreement. Britain’s on-
going debate about its future membership of the EU 
serves as another reminder. In her chapter giving a 
European take on politics and values, Claire Sutherland 
quotes one source who writes about ‘EUrope.’ 
Europe’s contested unity is, as it has always been, one 
of the continuing challenges for transatlantic relations. 
The views in this report are also not those of a single, 
unified group. Nor do they represent the opinions of 
LSE IDEAS or the Dahrendorf Forum. The opinions 
expressed are those of the individual authors to whom 
we are most grateful for their contributions.
Defence and Security 
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US view:  
Atlanticism at Risk
Jeff Lightfoot  
Within the span of less than a decade, the transatlantic alliance has been forced to confront two new, external strategic challenges: an aggressive and hostile Russia and the effects of an eroding order in the Middle 
East. These challenges are likely to continue for some time regardless of the actions taken by individual allies 
and the Alliance to confront them. Yet the most serious challenges to Atlanticism - American disengagement, 
European weakness, and the rise of illiberal populism on both sides of the Atlantic – come from within. 
Here, the allies control their own destiny, as well as the fate of the transatlantic alliance. A new generation of 
leaders, led by the United States (US), must shore up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) internal 
challenges if the Alliance is to be able to defend itself against a new generation of external threats.
“Today the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat 
of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low.”1
It sounds strange that the above is a direct quote from 
NATO’s current Strategic Concept, which was adopted 
in November 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal. Needless to say, 
these optimistic words no longer capture NATO’s more 
sobering strategic environment in the aftermath of 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the traumatic 
terrorist attacks and refugee crises in Europe in 2015.
Indeed, much has changed for the worse since the 
optimistic days of the Lisbon summit a mere five years 
ago. In 2010 Europe was at peace, if a bit rattled by the 
sudden onset of the Greek debt crisis. Alliance leaders 
imagined the prospects for genuine partnership with then 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. North Africa and the 
Middle East were stagnant but stable, and NATO could 
see the end in sight to its combat role in Afghanistan. 
Fast forward to early 2016 and it is clear that many of 
the core assumptions underpinning NATO’s prevailing 
strategy document are out of date. 
The Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace, as the 
2010 Strategic Concept asserts.2 NATO sees Russia as an 
adversary to be deterred, not a partner to be cultivated. 
Since 2010, President Putin has changed European 
boundaries by force in Ukraine, thrust Russia back 
into the Middle East in an unconstructive fashion, and 
significantly invested in Russian defence capabilities 
and posture with an eye toward building anti-access/
area denial capability on Europe’s eastern flank.
The threat to Europe is not limited to Russia. 
The 2011 Arab spring and its descent into repression 
and fanaticism have destabilised North Africa and the 
Middle East. Europe stayed out of the conflict in Syria. 
But the conflict in Syria came to Europe in the form of 
refugees and IS1-inspired jihadists. French President 
Francois Hollande describes his country as ‘at war’ with 
Islamic militants who struck at France three times in 
2015. The US, United Kingdom (UK), France, and others 
in Europe are now militarily engaged in Iraq and Syria 
against the ISIS threat. A seemingly bottomless flow of 
refugees has overwhelmed European border security, 
upset European Union (EU) solidarity, and fed far-right, 
Eurosceptic politicians across Europe such that polls 
show the ‘Front National’ at parity with France’s other 
two major parties. 
Europe is encircled by a ‘ring of a fire’3 at precisely the 
moment that its defence capabilities are hollowed out 
by decades of wishful thinking, misguided assumptions, 
and defence cuts. Europe today has a limited ability 
to conduct out of area defence operations without 
American support, even in neighbouring areas such 
as the Middle East.
Meanwhile, the US is officially executing its ‘rebalance’ 
strategy to Asia. In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, 
the Obama administration has ‘surged’ back to Europe 
– with a new $3.4 billion announced in 2017 to support 
US military activities in Europe and the launching of 
negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).4 The US remains invested in 
European security, fulfilling its NATO obligations and 
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supporting European operations out of 
area in Africa and the Middle East. But 
key administration leaders close to the 
President are not emotionally invested 
in Europe’s future. And important figures 
in the US Congress, on both sides of 
the aisle, are frustrated by Europe’s 
perceived lack of burden sharing and 
investments in defence. Republican 
candidates for the 2016 presidential 
elections sneer at Europe’s social model 
and point to Europe as a failed economic 
model to avoid.
The transatlantic community faces 
serious strategic challenges – with 
the threats from within as serious as 
the threats from external sources. 
With proper leadership from the US 
and Europe, these challenges can 
be addressed and the transatlantic 
community can remain the anchor of 
peace, prosperity, freedom, and stability 
in a turbulent world. 
Failed leadership on both sides of the 
Atlantic risks a rollback of Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, enhanced Russian influence 
in Central and Eastern Europe, a gradual 
American disengagement from NATO, 
and a general erosion of the liberal 
democratic international order which 
the US has sought to develop, maintain, 
and expand since the end of World War II.
Internal 
Challenges
THE RISK OF AMERICAN 
DISENGAGEMENT 
The biggest risk to transatlantic security 
in the medium- to long-term is of 
American disengagement from, and 
disinterest in, European affairs. Changes 
in American domestic politics, driven by 
evolving American demographics and 
geopolitical upheaval, are likely to reduce 
the strategic importance of Europe in the 
eyes of future American leaders. 
Future American leaders are unlikely 
to suddenly quit NATO or refuse to 
uphold their Article 5 commitments. 
Indeed, in the short term, the US is in 
the midst of reinvesting in its deterrence 
capabilities in Europe in the short term. 
But in the medium to long term, the 
US may invest less time, energy, and 
quality personnel into the relationship 
and exert less leadership within the 
Alliance. Moreover, a new generation of 
American leaders without the Atlanticist 
instincts of their forefathers will have 
ever less patience with a Europe 
unwilling or unable to shoulder its 
share of the regional and global security 
burden. It should be a sober warning to 
European allies that in the span of two 
weeks, the GOP2 frontrunner Donald 
Trump declared NATO “obsolete” and 
called for a reduced US commitment 
to the Alliance and President Obama 
complained about “free rider” allies in 
Europe to the Atlantic’s Jeff Goldberg.
America is changing faster than 
many Europeans fully appreciate. 
Demographics  are having a 
transformative impact on American 
domestic policy and will shape future 
US foreign policy as well. By 2045, more 
than half of Americans will be non-
white, with particular growth in Hispanic 
and Asian-American communities.5 
These trends, in addition to Europe’s 
relative geopolitical decline, are likely 
to push America away from Europe and 
more toward Asia and Latin America, 
whose growing diaspora communities 
in the US will influence America’s 
relations toward those regions. 
The founding fathers of the transatlantic 
alliance were an east-coast blue-
blooded elite with strong family, 
personal, and professional connections 
to Europe. World War I, World War II and 
the Cold War confirmed Europe as the 
strategic centre of gravity for American 
foreign policy. But the Cold Warriors, and 
even their successors who led NATO’s 
A new generation 
of American 
leaders without the 
Atlanticist instincts 
of their forefathers 
will have ever less 
patience with a 
Europe unwilling or 
unable to shoulder 
its share of the 
regional and global 
security burden.
‘
’
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enlargement to the East in the decades after the Cold 
War, are retiring from the US bureaucracy and the 
Congress. In former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ 
farewell address to the Alliance – in this author’s view 
the most consequential policy statement by a US 
official on transatlantic ties in years – Gates warned 
that future American policymakers would not share 
his Cold War predisposition to European affairs.6
President Obama personifies and previews a more 
diverse American future, in terms of background, 
experiences, and outlook. He is of a mixed race, born 
to a Caucasian mother and African father. He was 
raised in Indonesia, giving him strong personal and 
emotional ties to the Pacific. President Obama sees 
his legacy as rebalancing away from past conflicts in 
the Middle East and toward a strategic future in the 
Asia-Pacific, as his strategy documents make clear. 
Europe fits into his grand strategy as an American 
partner to contribute toward advancing America’s 
global agenda – particularly on global commons 
issues like combating climate change or supporting US 
military action in places like Afghanistan. But shaping 
Europe itself has not been a major policy priority for 
the administration.
President Obama’s policies, expressed in words 
and deeds, have left some analysts on both sides 
of the Atlantic convinced that gradual American 
disengagement has already begun. The anecdotes and 
critiques are well known. The ‘reset’ with Russia left central 
and East Europeans worried that relations with Russia 
took precedence over the assurance of nervous allies. 
The Obama administration’s hesitancy to agree 
to the Franco-UK led Libya intervention in 2011 – 
followed by strange comments about ‘leading from 
behind’ from senior officials – contributed to a sense 
of disengagement, even if they were based on the 
hope that by doing so the US could encourage the 
Europeans to act more on their own. The ‘Pivot’ toward 
Asia convinced Europeans (and not just Europeans) 
that the administration was ‘pivoting away’ from 
Europe and toward Asia. Critics charge that the White 
House has outsourced major decisions on Ukraine 
to Germany, given the administration’s absence 
from the Normandy Format of Ukraine talks and the 
White House’s refusal to ship defensive weapons to 
Ukraine. And of course, the leaks of the NSA3 espionage of 
European metadata undermined European perceptions 
of the US, resulting in lingering transatlantic disputes 
about privacy and data transfers among businesses. 
In many ways, these high profile incidents of 
transatlantic discord have outshone areas of robust 
transatlantic cooperation under President Obama. The 
US remains a critical supplier of logistics, refuelling, 
and transport support for important coalition partners 
in military operations, particularly in Africa and Syria. 
Despite ‘leading from behind’, Washington was the 
dominant coalition partner in the intervention in Libya. 
The administration has launched negotiations on TTIP 
with the EU – its signature policy issue for Europe – 
which it sees as a strategic means of modernising 
American engagement with Europe. The 2014 $1 
billion ‘European Reassurance Initiative’ has added 
to important US capabilities and assets in Europe 
in response to the new Russian threat.7 And despite 
fears to the contrary, Europe maintained unity with 
Washington on sanctions against Iran’s nuclear 
programme and sanctions against Russia for its 
annexation of Crimea. 
Whether Europe is able to maintain its pre-eminent 
place in American foreign and national security policy 
despite generational and demographic changes in 
the US, will largely be predicated on Europe’s ability 
to remain a meaningful strategic partner in advancing 
American regional and global interests and upholding 
the liberal international order.
THE RISK OF EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT 
The second major risk to transatlantic ties is of European 
disarmament, disengagement and military weakness. 
The US has an interest in a strong, capable, and unified 
Europe. A robust Europe, capable of sharing the burden 
with the US in defending Europe and securing its 
periphery, enables and incentivises robust American 
engagement. 
By contrast, a weak, divided Europe in the midst of 
a defence depression incentivises budget hawks 
and nationalists in the US Congress and presidential 
campaign to advocate for cuts to US forces in Europe 
and further American disengagement from NATO. 
Given this obvious reality, it is astounding to think that 
just fifteen years ago some voices in the US and Europe 
saw each other as budding rivals to be constrained.
Europe’s defence drawdowns over the last fifteen years 
are as much a risk to NATO’s internal cohesion as they are 
to the Alliance’s defences against its adversaries such 
as Russia. In his farewell speech of 2011, US Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates warned that these defence 
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cuts threatened the emergence of a ‘two tiered’ NATO 
where the US is forced to do much of the heavy lifting 
in military operations with token European support. 
Gates warned that the present status quo – where the 
US accounts for 75% of NATO defence expenditure - 
would ultimately erode American support for NATO, 
particularly in the Congress. 
As a result, Obama administration officials have made 
hectoring allies about meeting their 2% target of 
GDP allocated to defence a signature element of their 
Europe policy. At the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, 
allies pledged that defence cuts had reached their limit. 
Since then, the results have been mixed. In 2015, the 
European Leadership Network reported that some 
countries including Hungary, Italy, Germany, Canada, 
among others, have continued cutting defence.8 
According to the Wall Street Journal, as of June 2015, 
only the US, Greece, UK, Estonia, and Poland are set 
to spend 2% of GDP on defence in 2015.9 Even these 
were difficult to secure, with President Obama putting 
pressure on British Prime Minister David Cameron to 
keep UK defence spending above 2%.10
But there are reasons for optimism. The NATO Secretary 
General’s new Annual Report reveals that the Alliance 
has mostly drawn a line under its defence cuts and is 
poised for reinvestment.11 The UK and France, NATO’s 
two most capable European allies, have announced 
new investments in defence as the threat from IS has 
worsened. In addition, Romania, Estonia, the Netherlands, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway have made increases to 
the defence spending in response to recent trends.
The US realises that all 28 allies are not going to spend 
2% of their GDP on defence. What really matters is 
that allies spend their limited dollars efficiently, in a 
cooperative manner, and on defence procurement; 
and of course, that allies show a willingness and ability 
to put them to use in actual operations when Alliance 
interests are at stake.
However, it is critical that Europe find some way to 
meaningfully respond to the Obama administration’s 
new $3.4 billion outlay as part of the European 
Reassurance Initiative. A commensurate European 
response will incentivise a longer-term American 
commitment to enhanced deterrence measures against 
a Russian threat. On the flip side, if Europe responds 
with silence – or worse, opposition – the next US 
president may decide she or he cannot care more about 
European security than the Europeans themselves.
THE RISK OF EUROPEAN ROLLBACK 
AND ILLIBERAL POLITICS
The risk of a possible rollback or dissolution of European 
institutions and a retreat from liberal political values 
on both sides of the Atlantic is a third strategic risk 
facing transatlantic ties. 
Wolfgang Munchau of the Financial Times sees the 
risk of Europe fragmenting along three fault lines: a 
prosperous North versus an indebted South, which 
played out in the Eurozone crisis; a Europhilic centre 
versus a Europhobic fringe, which is playing out in the 
UK’s ‘Brexit’ debate; and a socially liberal West versus 
an increasingly autocratic East, which has played out 
most dramatically in the refugee matter, but also in 
political developments in Central and Eastern Europe.12 
While the US may not have a direct seat at the table on 
many intra-European issues, Washington is concerned 
about the prospect that the European project could 
unravel due to a series of internal and external shocks. 
In a sign of Washington’s growing awareness of the 
crises unfolding in Europe, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee called a hearing in early February 2016 
on the implications for the US of strains in the EU.13 
At the hearing, Europe’s lack of economic growth and 
competitiveness was identified as a major strategic 
challenge and a source of Europe’s growing political 
turmoil and defence weakness.
Given the stakes, the US administration has shown 
some willingness to wade into EU affairs where it 
has a strategic interest at stake, even if it has ruffled 
feathers among European leaders. Washington has 
weighed in primarily in hopes of forestalling the actual 
departure of key members from the EU or its core 
institutions. President Obama himself has publicly 
stated his support for the UK remaining in the EU - a 
position administration officials are likely to make 
repeatedly as the Brexit referendum approaches.14 
And his administration quietly urged a compromise 
solution in the Greece crisis during the summer of 
2015 to prevent a ‘Grexit.’15 
Another particular concern in Washington is that 
uneven governance, democratic backsliding, and 
emergent illiberal political movements and parties 
could undermine the EU and offer Russia opportunities 
to enhance its influence. In Hungary, Prime Minister 
Orban’s brand of ‘illiberal democracy’ and the early 
actions of Poland’s newly-elected Law and Justice 
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Party are a source of unease not only for Brussels but 
for Washington as well. There are various reasons for 
the rise of illiberal parties in Europe – from concerns 
about immigration, to slow growing economies, 
to disillusionment with the EU. And the risk is not 
constrained to Central and Eastern Europe, as France’s 
‘Front National’ has demonstrated. 
US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland has 
identified corruption as a particular drain on public 
confidence of governments in Europe and a driver 
of illiberal, authoritarian governments, particularly in 
Central and Eastern Europe.16 Combating corruption 
and enhancing good governance in Europe and 
Eurasia is one of the State Department’s top priorities 
in Europe (particularly towards Ukraine) and has taken 
on strategic importance given the extent to which 
Russia thrives on poor governance, corruption, and 
illiberal political parties to influence politics in Europe.
Of course, the rise of illiberal or extreme political 
movements is not only an Eastern European – or 
even merely European - phenomenon. The US, too, 
has become increasingly polarised, personified by 
the strength of nationalist Donald Trump in the 2016 
Republican primary elections. Trump has lambasted 
US treaty allies, particularly South Korea and Japan, 
as free riders and economic competitors. And he has 
outraged transatlantic allies like the UK, Belgium, 
Canada, France, and the Netherlands with his critical 
comments of their handling of Syrian refugees, his 
proposal to ban Muslims from visiting the US, or his 
references to Brussels as a ‘hellhole.’17 Whether or 
not Trump really makes it to the White House, his 
rise demonstrates that political polarisation is a fact 
in America, as well as Europe, and that nationalist 
pressures on the transatlantic alliance could come 
from the US as well as from Europe.
External Challenges
A REVANCHIST RUSSIA 
The transatlantic community’s internal challenges 
are exacerbated, and in many ways linked, to its 
two greatest external challenges: an aggressive, 
revanchist Russia, and the breakdown of order 
in the Middle East. Reflective of the complexity of 
geopolitical challenges in the 21st century, these 
crises are linked to one another and to Europe: 
an assertive Russia seeks to actively divide the 
US and Europe, divide and conquer Europeans to 
enhance Russian influence on the continent, and 
generally undermine the US-led international order. 
And Vladimir Putin has taken a leading role in the 
Syrian civil war by supporting Syrian President Assad, 
which has driven migratory flow toward Europe, further 
polarised European politics, and undermined the 
prevailing order in the Middle East.
An array of senior US military officials have testified 
before the US Congress that Russia poses the greatest 
threat to US national security, given its arsenal of nuclear 
weapons, rapid military modernisation, and ‘alarming’ 
behaviour, particularly in Ukraine.18 Russia’s use of 
hybrid warfare, snap exercises, and ‘little green men’ to 
annex Crimea and destabilise Eastern Ukraine are well 
known and documented. NATO has taken important 
steps to reassure eastern allies and reinforce Central 
and Eastern European allies in response. These steps, 
such as the aforementioned $1 billion US-financed 
European Reassurance Initiative, will be enhanced to 
$3.4 billion in 2017 to allow for greater exercises and 
pre-positioning of equipment on Europe’s eastern 
flank.19 European nations, too, have been important 
participants in NATO exercises to enhance deterrence 
as part of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan.20
While this response has demonstrated NATO’s important 
resolve in the face of Russian aggression in eastern 
Europe, time will tell if NATO’s response is sufficient 
to deter further Russian aggression. Russia is in the 
midst of a 10 year, $700 billion military modernisation 
programme focused on strengthening Russia’s military 
capabilities. A significant portion of these assets have 
been invested in strengthening Russia’s anti-access, 
area-denial capabilities in Kaliningrad, Ukraine, and 
now Syria. Julianne Smith and Richard Fontaine warned 
in 2014 that the risk of anti-access area denial was 
no longer limited to Asia, a theme which has been 
repeated by senior officials, including NATO Supreme 
Allied Commander General Phil Breedlove.21 They fear 
that Russia may use a snap exercise or hybrid invasion 
to seize some portion of Alliance territory, create facts 
on the ground, and use Russia’s anti-access area denial 
capabilities to deter the Alliance from taking Article 5 
military action to retake the territory.
Present NATO readiness and reassurance initiatives are 
important insofar as they reassure nervous allies about 
the commitment of the alliance to defend against 
the Russian threat. But the capabilities and measures 
required to assure nervous allies is not necessarily 
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the same as what is required to deter a determined 
adversary. Even as the allies work to implement the 
assurance measures that were promised at the 2014 
NATO summit in Wales, more assertive steps will 
be required at this summer’s summit in Warsaw to 
properly deter Russia. The $3.4 billion in US European 
Reassurance Initiative funds is a good start. Proper 
deterrence of Russia’s threats and provocations may 
require not only updates to NATO’s conventional 
posture, but also adjustments to enhance the clarity 
of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.22
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE MIDDLE EAST
The fifth major threat to transatlantic security is the 
breakdown in order in the Middle East. The festering 
Syrian civil war in particular has produced a refugee 
and terrorist crisis that has shaken the foundations 
of Europe and drawn Russia back into a major role in 
Middle Eastern security.
No one articulated the impact of the turmoil of the 
Mid East on Europe more clearly than US scholar 
Bob Kagan. In his Wall Street Journal feature in the 
aftermath of the November 2015 terrorist attacks 
on Paris, Kagan argued that the neglect of America 
(as well as Europe) to crises in the Middle East had 
infected the European core.23 Kagan’s piece critiqued 
the Obama administration’s assumption that the US 
does not have sufficient interests in the conflicts in the 
Middle East to assume greater risk of blood or treasure 
by becoming involved in the conflicts. While his policy 
prescriptions – sending large numbers of ground forces 
to Syria – are highly debatable, his diagnosis of the 
Middle East’s contagion effect on Europe is spot on.
Since the unsatisfactory conclusion of the Libyan 
intervention in 2011, much of Europe has been happy 
to join the US in sitting out the conflicts in the Middle 
East. France was the lone voice in Europe to lament 
the lack of western intervention in the Syrian conflict 
and warn of its possible consequences to Europe and 
the international order. Paris’ warning went unheeded 
until 2015, when the Middle Eastern conflicts thrust 
themselves upon Europe in the form of refugees and 
violent jihadism. 
The refugee crisis brought about by the collapse of 
Syria has proven to be the most serious challenge of 
late to European institutions and order. The mass of 
refugees has overwhelmed European countries and 
fostered renewed political tensions, renewing tensions 
among Balkans states and pitting central and East 
European countries against Germany and the EU. 
The sheer volume of refugees has strained the logistics 
capabilities and resources of even the most welcoming 
and prosperous countries, such as Germany and Austria, 
and has further polarised politics on the Continent. 
More worrying for committed Europhiles is the 
imposition of border controls in parts of Europe, which 
portends an end to the Schengen arrangements as 
they were originally conceived.
Meanwhile, the unchecked rise of IS in Syria and 
Iraq has enabled the group to strike at western 
Europe, badly shaking the Continent’s sense of 
security. The November 2015 attacks in Paris were 
the worst acts of violence in Paris since World War 2. 
Just weeks later, Brussels was essentially shut down 
by intelligence warnings of a terrorist attack on the 
European capital.4 France has described itself as 
‘at war’ and has urged its European partners (and a 
reluctant Washington) to take a more assertive posture 
toward terrorists in Iraq, Syria, and Africa.
The breakdown of order in the Middle East has 
impacted European and global geopolitics. 
The refugee and terrorism crises have resulted in fierce 
debates within the EU over internal burden sharing, 
reflecting a similar debate within NATO about defence 
expenditures. Germany resents what it perceives as 
an unwillingness of Central Europe to take on its 
share burden of refugees, while central European 
governments seethe at moralistic mandates and quotas 
proposed by Germany and imposed by Brussels. On the 
defence and anti-terrorism front, France has complained 
at what it perceives as a lack of willingness of other 
European countries to invest in defence and support 
its anti-terrorism missions in Africa. It was precisely to 
shame Europe into greater burden sharing that France 
invoked the EU’s solidarity clause rather than NATO’s 
Article 5 after the November 2015 Paris attacks.
The refugee crisis has also shaped Europe’s relations 
with key regional powers. German-led negotiations 
with Ankara resulted in $3 billion in aid and political 
incentives in exchange for Turkey’s support in limiting 
the refugee flow to Europe. As concerns relations with 
Russia, the terrorist attacks in Paris ultimately failed 
to bring Russia closer to Europe in a common fight 
against IS, as appeared possible in the immediate 
aftermath of the Paris attacks when France sought to 
build a ‘common coalition against IS with Moscow’. 
Ultimately, Russia’s active military support for Assad’s 
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regime in Syria, and particularly its military build-up in 
Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, has been seen 
by the US and most of Europe as more of a threat 
than a possible ally in fighting terrorism. However, as 
refugees continue to flow into Europe and Chancellor 
Merkel loses her domestic popularity, European states 
could be tempted to strike an unholy compromise with 
Russia over Syria in hopes of stemming and reversing 
the refugee flow to Europe. 
NEXT GENERATION VIEWS:  
GLASS HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY?
Given the scope of the challenges listed above, the 
United States and Europe in particular are unfortunately 
less safe and less secure than they were five years ago 
during the Lisbon summit. A pessimistic reading of 
history since 2010 could easily lead one to conclude 
that the transatlantic community faces the ‘dim and 
dismal future’ which Secretary Robert Gates warned 
about in his 2011 farewell speech.
But if the last five years have shown how quickly things 
can change for the worse, the reverse is also true. In 
spite of the daunting crises facing Europe, there are 
budding reasons for optimism that the dramatic events 
of the last two years are slowly generating renewed 
political will on both sides of the Atlantic to better 
share the burden for transatlantic security and confront 
the challenges facing the Alliance. Perhaps the key 
question is whether the crises will outpace the growth 
of political will and leadership within the Alliance.
From the glass half-full perspective, there are reasons 
for optimism. Angela Merkel has emerged as the 
undisputed leader of Europe and a staunch defender 
of European norms and liberal political values, even as 
Central Europe flirts with political regression. Merkel’s 
leadership of the EU has maintained unity on sanctions 
against Russia to the surprise of sceptics. However, 
even she no longer appears invulnerable, as the 
domestic political challenges of absorbing hundreds 
of thousands of refugees threaten her political pre-
eminence in Germany and Europe.
On the security front, Franco-American military 
cooperation has reached unprecedented levels in the 
Middle East and Africa. The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review commits to important investments 
in military equipment, reversing a half decade of major 
budget cuts that threatened the ‘special relationship’ 
with Washington. NATO has proven it will not be 
intimidated by Russian threats, and plans to invite 
Montenegro to be the Alliance’s 29th member at the 
Warsaw summit in 2016 shows a will to keeping NATO’s 
‘open door’ policy alive. Washington’s quadrupling 
of its European Reassurance Initiative funding and 
the Pentagon’s strong statements identifying Russia 
as a top threat demonstrate that the US military is 
relearning the muscle movements of deterrence and 
defence in Europe.
Pessimists see 2014-2015 as the year that crises 
submerged Europe and threatened the existence of 
the EU. However, the alternative may yet prove true. 
In retrospect, future analysts may come to see this 
period of time as the moment when Europe and the US 
finally came to grips with the threat to the prevailing 
international order posed by Russian aggression and the 
chaos of the Middle East and did something about it. 
It should by now be evident to all that the transatlantic 
community’s two greatest external challenges 
will unfortunately not be resolved any time soon. 
The Middle East will remain in a period of turmoil and 
instability for the foreseeable future. The US and Europe 
can reasonably hope to set back IS in Iraq and Syria with 
Arab partners, but the West alone cannot extinguish 
the tumult and identity crisis within the Islamic world.
Similarly, Russia, the West’s other great external threat, 
will remain assertive and hostile for the foreseeable 
future. Despite the revisionist history afoot that NATO 
enlargement alone is to blame for President Putin’s 
revanchism, there is little that the West can do now to 
bring Moscow back to a more friendly posture short of 
sacrificing its own values and principles. NATO-Russia 
relations are likely to remain in a deep freeze for some 
time given President Putin’s need for an enemy to 
maintain popular support. In the words of Atlantic 
Council Executive Vice President Damon Wilson, the 
West will have to learn how to be comfortable with 
having an uncomfortable relationship with Russia.24
These external threats will require more robust 
responses from the US and Europe than we have 
seen thus far. But the essential matter for leaders in 
the US and Europe – particularly the next generation 
– is to ensure that the internal challenges facing the 
transatlantic community do not condemn the Alliance 
to a ‘dim and dismal future’ of its own making. US 
and European leaders may not be able to control 
the Sunni/Shia divide that is roiling the Middle East. 
But they can choose to take investment in defence 
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seriously and to properly share the defence burden 
within Europe and within NATO as a whole so the 
Alliance remains an anchor of stability in a perilous 
world; politicians can choose to lead voters away from 
xenophobic extremist ideologies and toward open, 
inclusive, and responsive governance consistent with 
transatlantic values; they can choose to commit to 
reforming European institutions to make them more 
responsive, rather than politicking against them and 
playing member states off against one another; and 
the next generation of American leaders can offer 
visionary leadership of the transatlantic alliance, rather 
than quietly disengaging and denigrating Europe’s 
social model.
Transatlantic leaders face a choice, which must be 
informed by the more distant lessons of the past. 
American disengagement and European chauvinism 
at Versailles in 1919 produced a quarter-century of 
depression, genocide, and carnage on the Continent. 
By contrast, far-sighted vision and leadership from the 
US, Canada, and key Europeans rescued Europe from 
both internal and external threats in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and built the foundation of the 
liberal international order. That same wise leadership 
from the US and Europe - this time with constructive 
Russian cooperation - delivered a peaceful end to the 
Cold War and a united Europe, whole, free and at peace 
which expanded that international order. 
Those gains are now at risk. The transatlantic community 
faces a new strategic moment perhaps less obvious but 
no less important than those of the last century. A new 
generation of leaders – who are the beneficiaries of 
the most prosperous and free transatlantic community 
in history – must defend, protect, and expand the 
prosperity, freedom, and liberal values that define 
the Euro-Atlantic community for future generations 
to follow. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.  The next US President must renew US leadership of 
NATO to buttress a Europe in crisis. NATO remains 
the greatest vehicle for US influence in Europe. 
The US must make a political and military 
commitment to lead a stronger, more robust, and 
nimble NATO alliance. 
2.  The US must move beyond the concept of 
‘reassurance’ and focus on the presence and posture 
necessary to establish ‘deterrence’ of Russia. The US 
should build on and enhance the commitment made 
by President Obama in the European Reassurance 
Initiative to strengthen US force posture and 
presence in Eastern Europe. The US should enshrine 
the additional funding for a European presence in 
the defence base budget to give it a permanent 
effect, but should do so on the condition European 
countries agree to match the ERI with contributions 
of their own.
3.  The risk of democratic populism is a substantial threat 
to the transatlantic order in the USA and Europe. 
The American people must reject the isolationist 
populism of Donald Trump. His election would 
represent not only a threat to the transatlantic 
community and NATO, but also to the entire liberal 
international order that the US has led since World 
War II. A non-Trump US president must renew US 
political engagement and leadership. Engagement 
and US attention – rather than isolation – are the 
best means of pushing them away from anti-liberal 
attitudes. ■
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EU view:  
Modern Dilemmas in the Old World
Ben Jones 
According to a number of analysts, scholars and decision-makers, ‘the demilitarisation of Europe’ is underway. The roots of this phenomenon are said to lie in a ‘post-modern culture’ that undermines the 
proper appraisal of security threats and inhibits the generation and deployment of military capabilities. 
Such a view has of late been given too much credence. On the contrary, the defence policies of European 
Union (EU) member states remain essentially ‘modern’ in form and function. A realist perspective provides an 
important corrective to cultural accounts, emphasising instead the effects of the vast asymmetry of military 
power at the heart of the transatlantic relationship. And it provides a better framework for explanation of 
European state behaviour in relation to the generation and deployment of military capabilities and to the 
current security crises to the East and South.
EUROPE AT THE CROSSROADS 
OF STATEHOOD
In The Breaking of Nations, Robert Cooper identified 
three co-existing forms of statehood in the post-Cold 
War world.1 There are ‘modern’ states, for which the old 
rules of Westphalian diplomacy and power politics 
still dominate. There are ‘pre-modern’ states, so-called 
because in their chaos they barely meet the criteria of 
statehood at all. And then there are ‘post-modern’ states 
that reject power politics and pool their sovereignty in 
common institutions. It might be said that European 
security lies today at the geostrategic crossroads of 
Cooper’s tripartite world. To the East, there is Russia’s 
‘modern’ realpolitik and its determination to use force 
to defend its self-proclaimed sphere of influence. 
To the South, there is ‘pre-modern’ chaos in parts 
of North Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East, with 
extremist groups thriving in the absence of state 
authority. While ‘modern’ conceptions of territorial 
defence and military balancing remain the guiding 
principle in the East, security challenges in the South 
are concerned with mass migration and counter-
terrorism. In the absence of a single European state, 
this bifurcation of security challenges and uneven 
geostrategic pressures splits the political focus of elites 
and their publics, leaving them in a quandary over how 
to deliver a common response, if at all. 
It has become a commonplace that these troubles 
are compounded by the ‘post-modernism’ of the EU 
and its member states. This cultural predisposition 
is said to undermine the ability of states to think 
strategically about their security environment and 
build the necessary military capabilities to respond. 
Indeed, Cooper’s post-modern European state is defined 
by its ‘unwarlike’ rejection of the ‘modern’ world of 
raison d’etat and security policies underpinned by 
the use of force.2 Similarly, Robert Kagan infamously 
argued that transatlantic relations faced a cultural 
divide between Venusian Europe and Martian America.3 
And in his last months as US Secretary of State for Defence, 
Robert Gates argued that “cultural and political trends” 
were leading to a widespread risk-aversion to the use 
of force and to the gradual “demilitarisation of Europe.”4 
More recently, citing Gates and Cooper, Christopher 
Coker concurs that this shift away from the military 
instrument is “pre-eminently a cultural phenomenon.”5 
And Nick Witney and Anand Menon argue that 
“Europeans should perhaps cease to believe in their 
myths about having created a peaceful, postmodern 
world for themselves.”6
There is, however, something of a contradiction in this 
view that the post-modernism of the EU undermines 
its capacity for strategic thought and action. 
When, for example, the EU draws on its competence 
over external trade policy and places economic 
sanctions on Russia, it wields a hefty foreign policy stick 
in large part because of its ‘post-modern’ construction. 
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By contrast, the defence policies of individual member 
states are perhaps the least open to being by shaped by 
the post-modern construction of the EU. According to 
one scholar, defence remains “the first and last bastion 
of national sovereignty” in Europe, a field in which the 
EU plays a faint second-fiddle to its larger member 
states and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).7 And the notion that there is any identifiably 
‘European’ culture as regards the use of the military 
instrument, post-modern or otherwise, is greatly 
undermined by the fact that some EU member states, 
notably France, retain a high tolerance for military risk 
while others, notably Germany, do not. This suggests 
that the influence of cultural factors, such as it is, is more 
likely to be derived from individual state characteristics 
than a pan-European culture. 
Even at the state level however, the notion that culture 
is ‘pre-eminent’ sidesteps awkward questions as to 
the role of non-cultural factors in creating national 
dispositions towards the generation and use of the 
military instrument. Above all, this emphasis on a form 
of culture derived from the apparently post-modern 
nature of the EU risks neglecting the explanatory 
insights of the other interpretations of international 
politics, particularly as regards the role of relative 
power and interests in state relations. Realism, broadly 
conceived, is based on concepts of system polarity, 
relative military capability and the convergence 
and divergence of interests. As such, it provides an 
imperfect but valuable alternative lens through which 
to assess the causes of European ‘demilitarisation’ 
and critique the argument that cultural factors are 
pre-eminent.
A REALIST PERSPECTIVE
Seen from a realist perspective, culture is at best a 
secondary cause of the decline in the military capacity 
of European states. Indeed, cultural factors may reflect 
deeper structural causes. Realism directs us instead 
to the effects of the vast asymmetry of American and 
European military power. 
These effects are manifest in two significant ways. 
First, in its suppression of historic security dilemmas, 
particularly between France and Germany, American 
military power has enabled the ‘pacification’ of relations 
between European NATO states, in itself a rather 
welcome demilitarisation.8 
Second, this highly asymmetrical distribution of 
military capability means, as Kenneth Waltz argued, 
that NATO is better viewed not as an alliance of 
aggregated capability to balance rival power, but 
rather as a “treaty of guarantee” by a dominant power 
over weaker allies.9 Because of this asymmetry, the 
scale of the European military contribution to NATO has 
always been one step removed from strategic American 
interests in Europe, and perhaps will always be so.10
Glenn Snyder’s work on alliance politics, and his 
dilemma of ‘entrapment or abandonment’, remains 
the best framework for explaining the constraints and 
opportunities facing states under an asymmetrical 
alliance.11 Under a multipolar alliance there is a high 
tension between the fear of abandonment and the 
fear of entrapment by allies. Fear of abandonment is 
mitigated through greater commitment to an ally, but 
this in turn increases the risk of entrapment into the 
ally’s other interests, hence the dilemma. By contrast, 
in an asymmetrical alliance like NATO, this dilemma is 
much weaker because the risk of abandonment is seen 
to be low. The bipolarity of the Cold War meant that 
the American commitment to Europe was “structurally 
ordained” and abandonment thus extremely unlikely.12 
Even in the absence of bipolarity, however, the United 
States (US) has continued to view the security of Europe 
as vital to its own strategic interests.
Subordinate states mitigate abandonment 
through political loyalty and military contributions. 
While they may contribute relatively little in capability 
terms, participation can still be very costly in terms 
of life and limb, public spending and domestic 
political authority. And, given the asymmetry of 
capabilities, the US needs little more than this level 
of commitment to meet its strategic goals, which are 
the political and economic stability of European states 
and their loyalty and support for American policy.13 
A higher level of European military capability is not, 
of course, inconsequential or undesirable for the US. 
Americans want to see Europeans spend more on 
defence because it helps reduce their own considerable 
costs and enables their allies to fight by their side on 
operations. Beyond enabling a symbolic expression 
of political loyalty, however, the extent to which any 
particular level of European military capability is really 
a prerequisite of the alliance is decidedly ambiguous. 
A transatlantic bargain on the basis of ‘burden-sharing’ 
has never really been struck. 
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Why then do Europeans have armed forces at all? 
Although weak, the fear of abandonment by the US 
does arguably put a floor under the resourcing of 
European military capabilities. Existential fears over 
US commitment and a strong dose of diplomatic 
obligation partly explain why, as some theories might 
predict, European states do not disband their armed 
forces entirely.14 And France and the UK continue to 
have overseas defence commitments and an aspiration 
to a degree of autonomous action. This helps to explain 
their retention of the significant defence industrial 
capacity needed to underpin operational autonomy. 
Other reasons, however, are required to explain 
why European states dedicate significant military 
capabilities to NATO and US-led operations. To explore 
these reasons it is necessary to consider the other side 
of Snyder’s dilemma, which is the fear of entrapment. 
Snyder argues that entrapment is the principal concern 
for subordinate states in an asymmetric alliance.15 
While a certain amount of unilateral action is tolerated 
on all sides, European states cannot consistently refuse 
to support the interests of the US. As such, short of 
withholding their support in extremis, there is little 
that European states can do to prevent their political, 
if not always their military, entrapment into wider 
US policy. Instead, they seek to mitigate the risks of 
entrapment by pursuing what Robert Jervis describes 
as a “struggle for influence.”16 Military contributions 
serve to balance loyalty with a means to mitigate the 
risks of entrapment through presence and attempted 
influence. It is this struggle to maximise influence that 
explains the high loyalty, high contribution of the UK to 
US operations since the Suez crisis, and the evolution 
of French defence policy in the post-Cold War period 
towards re-integration into NATO command structures 
and a more ‘Atlanticist’ approach.17
This brief conceptualisation of the dynamics of the 
transatlantic defence relationship is not intended to 
give a definitive explanation for every defence policy 
choice of every European NATO state. It does, however, 
provide a critical lens through which to consider the 
long-running ‘burden-sharing’ debate, and to frame 
the balance of risks that shape decisions to generate 
and deploy military capabilities. With this in mind, the 
remainder of the chapter will consider the reaction of 
European states to contemporary security challenges 
and their decisions to maintain, deploy and cooperate 
over military capabilities. It asks whether the current 
European security crisis is really significant enough to 
change the terms of the transatlantic relationship as 
described above.
CAUSES OF EUROPEAN 
‘DEMILITARISATION’ 
The difference between the military capacity of the 
US and European NATO states has grown ever more 
asymmetrical in recent years; the US share of spending 
is now around 75 per cent.18 While the response to 
9/11 pushed up US spending following a post-Cold 
War decline, European spending continued largely 
on a flat or downward path. No event since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall has been deemed serious enough 
to significantly reverse this trend. Given that prior to 
Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine few European states 
feared a state-on-state threat to their security, this is 
perhaps understandable. Even against a latent Russian 
threat, the American security guarantee remains in 
place and thus acts as a dampener on European 
defence spending. The absence of a higher benchmark 
of threat to encourage Europeans to spend more may 
frustrate the US, but it has not prevented Europeans 
from providing strong political and often significant 
military support.
The downward pressure on European capabilities is not, 
however, a function of the asymmetry of US military 
power alone. It is compounded by another systemic 
factor, which is inflation in the cost of military capability. 
According to one UK estimate, defence inflation runs 
at 3% above the general rate.19 With this kind of trend, 
even those European states that maintain broadly ‘flat 
in real terms’ budgets will see a significant decline in the 
breadth and scale of their capabilities over a decade. 
These pressures, particularly apparent in the acquisition 
of high-tech equipment, are acute for all states with 
advanced armed forces. And yet because European 
states lack the vast scale of US defence industrial 
production, the problem is more pressing, and pushes 
particular capabilities and the industrial base that 
supports them towards a tipping point of credible 
scale. For all European states, but particularly those that 
attach most importance to exerting influence on US 
operations, i.e. the UK and France, the broadest possible 
spectrum of capabilities offers the best means to ensure 
participation and presence across US operations. Yet 
the attempt to maintain capabilities at sufficient scale 
was already being labelled a ‘chimera’ by former senior 
British officers over a decade ago.20 And given that 
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under an asymmetric alliance much of the justification 
for these capabilities is to pursue ‘the struggle for 
influence’ rather than to directly balance rival power, it 
is not easy for politicians to make the case for increased 
defence spending against other domestic priorities.
This crisis in military capability is not going completely 
unchallenged, however. Indeed, the response to it 
underpins the logic of a range of bilateral and small 
group cooperative initiatives, including the Franco-
British Lancaster House treaties of 2010.21 Seeking 
economies of scale in critical technologies and 
sovereign industries, particularly aerospace and 
complex weapons, France and the UK have come 
together to attempt to maintain a relatively high 
degree of operational sovereignty, broad spectrum 
of capabilities and, if they wish to act together, a greater 
scale in their expeditionary forces. Other bilateral 
cooperative projects can be seen across Europe with a 
similar rationale. In some cases cooperation runs even 
deeper, with Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation using 
specialisation in support services to preserve the very 
existence of their capabilities.22 Other notable examples 
include specialisation in particular Army capabilities 
through Dutch-German cooperation.
Structural political and economic factors provide 
an alternative to culture as an explanation for the 
‘demilitarisation’ of Europe. On the one hand, enduring 
strategic American interests in Europe ensure that 
the fear of abandonment remains low, and need 
only be met with relatively small levels of military 
support. On the other hand, even for those states that 
seek to mitigate entrapment through influence, the 
maintenance of a broad range of capabilities at scale 
is becoming increasingly untenable and pushing them 
to cooperate more closely. 
If cooperation is difficult, however, it is not because a 
post-modern culture stands in the way of a more unified 
and efficient approach to European defence spending. 
Rather, it is because European states remain strongly 
‘modern’ in their souverainiste or sovereignty based 
approach to defence policy. Even the smallest states 
seek to maximise their freedom of action and autonomy. 
In principle, specialisation or sharing of military 
capabilities can provide significant financial 
and interoperability benefits. And yet such 
interdependencies could also create potentially 
acute risks of abandonment and entrapment between 
European states, the fear of which significantly 
constrains the depth and breadth of cooperation. In 
many ways the recent wave of bilateral cooperation 
is driven by a desire to reinforce national freedom of 
action for influence, particularly the ability to influence 
the US, rather than to underpin collective European 
action. 
Given the declared US strategy to ‘pivot’ towards Asia 
and the parlous state of security to the East and South 
of Europe, however, some may argue that the analytical 
framework outlined above is no longer appropriate. 
Indeed, it has been argued that for today’s Europe it is 
the risk of US abandonment rather than entrapment 
that is now, or should now be, the main concern of 
Europeans.23 If this is correct, then we ought to expect 
to see such a fear of abandonment pushing Europeans 
to work together far more deeply and/or to increase 
their budgets in order to prepare to meet much more 
of their security needs autonomously in the absence 
of US power. 
THE US ‘PIVOT TO ASIA’ 
The US Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG) of 2012 set 
out to draw a line under the post 9/11 era and shift US 
attention towards Asia-Pacific and the rise of China. 
The DSG was followed by a further drawdown of US 
forces in Europe, which left just 34,000 troops and 
closed a number of supporting bases. Recent events 
in Ukraine have seen this trend partially reversed with 
a firming-up of the US military presence to three Army 
brigades.24 Partly in reaction to the direction of the DSG, 
however, a report prepared by EU High Representative 
Baroness Ashton for the European Council in 2013 
argued that in response to shifting US priorities, ‘Europe 
must assume greater responsibility for its own security 
and that of its neighbourhood.’25 And yet the degree 
to which the US ‘pivot’ will impact on Europeans, and 
the degree to which they will respond remains unclear. 
The DSG continues to recognise the ‘enduring interests’ 
of the US in Europe. And, as Luis Simon has argued, 
the increasing instability in the Middle East and the 
actions of Russia only serve to highlight such interests.26 
Perhaps most importantly, the recent boost to the US 
Army presence in Europe demonstrates that the US will 
adjust its forces in response to Russian policy and will 
not expect Europeans to fill the gap entirely.
The ‘pivot’ has, however, raised the perennial question 
of the extent to which the US might abandon Europe, 
even if only partially. Simon argues that, “While the US is 
unlikely to abandon Europe to its own luck, its increasing 
strategic interest in Asia will unavoidably result in less 
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attention towards Europe and its surroundings.”27 
If true, this raises a difficult question. What scenario is 
sufficiently serious for Europeans to engage in high-
intensity military operations alone but not serious 
enough to be of any strategic concern to the US? 
The fairly low-level military tasks undertaken by the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy perhaps provide 
a partial answer. The military action led by France and 
the UK in Libya in 2011 perhaps provides another. In 
future we may see more from European ‘coalitions of 
the willing’ together with a ‘supporting’ but still vital 
role for the US. The Franco-British Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force (CJEF), which will be available 
from 2016, may have a role in future circumstances 
such as these.
The crisis in Libya in 2011 underlined, however, the 
fact that Europeans lack the capabilities to mount 
such an operation autonomously with any great 
confidence. Neither can all European states be 
expected to consistently rally around France and/
or the UK, as the abstention of Germany from the 
operations in Libya demonstrated. In order to create the 
scale and sustained political will necessary for such an 
autonomous European capability, cooperation would 
need to go much deeper. As yet, although a few EU-
level programmes for deeper cooperation are bearing 
fruit, there seems to be limited enthusiasm among 
member states, as Witney and Menon bemoan.28 
This is in part because it remains difficult for European 
states to agree a set of baseline ‘European interests’ 
against which to plan autonomous action, as this 
is complicated by the geographic divergence of 
threats to European states.29 But, seen through the 
prism of an asymmetric alliance, it is also because 
the expeditionary elements of Europe’s most 
capable armed forces are to a large degree shaped 
around influencing interests that are identified and 
defined in Washington, not in any European capital.30 
And while the US is now encouraging deeper European 
defence cooperation, it might still be expected to show 
some ambiguity about the autonomous projection of 
European military power, were such a thing to come 
about in any significant form. Such signals from the US, 
together with its enduring European interests mean 
that Europeans do not, in general, appear to have a 
deep fear of American disengagement. If they remain 
sceptical about the US abandoning them for Asia, 
what impact do actual threats have on their thinking?
RUSSIA’S RETURN TO REALPOLITIK 
Russia’s occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
appeared to come as a shock to some EU/NATO 
member states, although it may have been less 
surprising to others.31 Concern over events unfolding 
in Ukraine quickly led to worries about the security of 
the Baltic states and the credibility of NATO’s Article 5 
mutual assistance clause. Following the end of the Cold 
War and the pursuit of ‘out of area’ operations, NATO 
has let its territorial defence preparations deteriorate; 
the absence of permanently stationed NATO troops 
in Eastern Europe has thus become an issue for those 
states in close proximity to the Russian border. 
NATO’s 2014 Summit in Cardiff announced the creation 
of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) to 
sit within the NATO Response Force as a ‘spearhead’ 
brigade.32 The VJTF concept has echoes of a previous 
NATO multinational brigade, the Allied Command 
Europe Mobile (ACE Mobile), which provided a highly 
flexible conventional force to act as a ‘trip-wire’ that 
could invoke Article 5. The VJTF provides a standing 
response on forty-eight hours notice, which can be 
prepared for deployment on the orders of the NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander with final approval resting 
with the North Atlantic Council. The robustness of this 
decision-making process in the face of possible Russian 
aggression remains a matter of some controversy.33 
Furthermore, to avoid being seen as too provocative 
towards Russia, the VJTF will not be based permanently 
in Eastern Europe, although it will be able to draw on 
certain pre-positioned facilities and infrastructure. 
Its aim is to provide sufficient deterrence to prevent 
any Russian ‘miscalculation’, which would trigger a 
further escalatory response from NATO.
In 2015 Operation Trident Juncture, NATO’s largest 
exercise in over a decade, involving 36,000 personnel, 
was undertaken. It was intended to provide American 
reassurance to Europeans and demonstrate allied 
resolve to Russia, showing for example, that US 
paratroopers could be flown in directly to operations in 
Europe from their home bases. Some question whether, 
in the absence of pre-positioned troops, the VJTF 
provides for sufficient deterrence, although the relative 
military weakness of Russia suggests that the threat 
ought to be containable by NATO’s superior forces.34 
Europeans will provide the forces for the VJTF, which 
is not in itself a large force and as such ought not to 
present immediate concerns over European capacity. 
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Europeans understand their self-interest in helping 
ensure the credibility of NATO’s responses to Russia’s 
actions in the East. Indeed, for some European 
governments a return to the importance of territorial 
defence provides for a more compelling justification 
for defence spending to their voters than NATO’s more 
controversial ‘out of area’ operations. There has also been 
a modest budgetary response to the crisis in the East. 
In the Netherlands and Germany, and to a degree in 
the UK, spending has increased, albeit marginally. 
More broadly, the actions of Russia appear to have 
prompted a pause in the downward trending 
defence spend of European states. And yet, there 
is no really significant uplift. These small shifts 
would suggest that, in line with behaviour in an 
asymmetric alliance, Europeans are keen to be seen 
to be contributing more, but are not assuming 
significantly greater responsibilities in response to 
a greater threat from Russia.
THE ‘PRE-MODERN’ THREAT 
It may at least be said that concern over Russian 
intentions in the East has a long history. The upheaval 
in the Middle East and North Africa represents an 
unprecedented and very different challenge for 
European security. And while deterrence remains a 
guiding principle for relations with Russia, the utility 
of military force is much more questionable when 
dealing with the disintegration of states into ‘pre-
modern’ conditions. 
Both American and European experiences in Iraq 
and Afghanistan cast a long shadow over the use 
of the military instrument, particularly as regards 
the deployment of ground forces. The 2011 Franco-
British-led operation in Libya was launched primarily 
on humanitarian grounds but did not deploy troops 
on the ground. It failed to provide the foundations for 
a secure and stable Libyan state, which had been the 
national interest component of the case for action. 
And while Europeans and Americans share an interest 
in stability in the region, the US does not suffer from 
the immediate consequences or political ramifications 
of mass migration. Because the political stability of 
Europe is a strategic interest for the US, however, 
Europeans would hope that Americans could not 
ignore serious destabilisation in Europe even if they 
were less immediately affected. 
While influential when acting together for concerted 
diplomacy, as over talks with Iran, European states take 
their foreign policy lead from the US on the Middle 
East, particularly where security matters are concerned. 
As such, for France, and most agonisingly for the UK, the 
Syrian crisis has reiterated the importance of deploying 
even relatively small-scale military force alongside 
the US to ensure presence and attempt to influence. 
Such an approach is, of course, in line with the model of 
behaviour in an asymmetric alliance. Would Europeans 
be more influential with the US if they could aggregate 
their military contribution to operations such as those 
on-going in Syria and Iraq? Perhaps they would. 
And yet, as has been argued, it is not the presence of 
a post-modern culture that prevents them from doing 
so, rather it is a distinctly ‘modern’ understanding of 
autonomous foreign policy decision-making and the 
inevitable divergences in national policy and interests 
that flow from this autonomy.
PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE 
EU-NATO COOPERATION
A final challenge facing Europeans is how better 
to manage their institutional security architecture. 
Security in the East and stability in the South cannot be 
achieved by military means alone. Indeed, the EU has 
a different but equally strategic role when it comes to 
relations with Russia, due to its ability to deploy a wider 
array of tools for diplomatic and economic leverage, 
as exemplified by recent economic sanctions. As such, 
better NATO-EU cooperation has for many years been 
viewed as the elusive key with which to unlock a more 
comprehensive approach to regional security. If the 
Cyprus-Turkey dispute can be resolved soon this will 
help to bring the two organisations together. 
The pre-existing aggregation of power in EU policy 
areas other than defence - notably trade and 
development – also needs to be better integrated 
into a more strategic approach, over which the EU’s 
European External Action Service has a key role to 
play. And France and the UK – sometimes alone, 
occasionally together and often drawing on supporting 
US assets – may still provide Europe with some form of 
expeditionary capability in the region. This capability 
could, in principle, be backed-up with a more coherent 
EU policy using the non-military levers available to 
its institutions.
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CONCLUSION
It has been argued that European states are not 
particularly ‘post-modern’ when it comes to the 
generation and deployment of their military 
capabilities. But when they do act together through 
their ‘post-modern’ institutions they can pursue their 
interests collectively through a kind of quasi-statehood. 
That Europeans struggle to do so more often, 
particularly in the effective aggregation of their military 
capabilities, is because of their ‘modern’ attributes. 
They are focussed on balancing risks and still see 
the US as vital to their security. Collective European 
military action remains extremely problematic, hence 
the recent focus on bilateral agreements and small 
groups that can work together to maintain capabilities 
in line with national policy goals. Given that they can 
never draw on economies of scale comparable to 
the US, it is perhaps unfair to argue that Europeans 
ought to simply spend a great deal more on a national 
basis. Resources are scarce and European states also 
need to invest in their infrastructure and their citizens. 
Under Cooper’s typology, the future of European 
military capabilities is perhaps one caught in a dilemma 
between a ‘modern’ conception of sovereignty and 
a ‘post-modern’ conception of collective EU action.
This brief analysis of recent shifts in US policy and 
European security threats demonstrates that the fear 
of US ‘abandonment’ remains weak, as suggested by 
Snyder’s model of an asymmetric alliance. Moreover, 
the analysis suggests that, beyond largely symbolic 
military contributions, the ‘struggle for influence’ will 
remain the dominant motivation for European armed 
forces, particularly for the UK and France. This has 
important ramifications for transatlantic relations. 
First, in the medium to long-term, the sustainability of 
a broad spectrum of European military capabilities will 
depend in large part on deeper defence cooperation. 
If those European states that want to influence the 
US wish to continue doing so, they will need to work 
together to sustain the necessary capabilities; it is 
important that the US gives its full support to such 
cooperative endeavours. 
Second, the analysis suggests that the best way 
for the US to support military capability in Europe 
is not necessarily to remind Europeans of the need 
to be grateful for American power, but to find ways 
to demonstrate to European elites and publics that 
investment in military capabilities (and their use) does 
achieve some national influence, has a wider security 
benefit and that allies that make contributions are 
rewarded with a fair hearing. Finally, both Europeans 
and Americans need to consider how the more 
comprehensive foreign policy toolkit of the EU can 
be used to back up the military capability of NATO and 
its more capable leading nations. The US and Europe 
may never have a symmetrical military capability 
relationship, but if Europeans can more effectively 
combine their military and non-military tools of 
influence then the broader foreign and security policy 
relationship can aspire to be more of a partnership than 
simply a transactional treaty of guarantee.
The analysis above is not intended to prove a kind of 
rational determinism in the behaviour of European 
states and thus to justify low defence spending or a 
reticence to use military force under any circumstances. 
Neither is it to argue that cultural differences play 
no role, or that Europeans should do no more than 
they are doing already. It is instead to critique the 
tendency to ascribe a decline in European military 
capabilities to a form of ‘post-modern culture’, which 
implies that Europeans are motivated by radically 
different criteria from the US or other powers. 
There are serious concerns over the on-going reduction 
of European military capabilities. But analysis of the 
causes of this decline should not neglect the effects 
of fundamental disparities in power between NATO 
allies. A realist perspective suggests that the cultural 
aspect is secondary to the structural factors that place 
constraints on European state actions. This, however, 
still leaves considerable room for the agency of states 
and thus for good and bad decision-making.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  EU and European NATO states should re-double 
their efforts to maintain military capabilities with 
greater efficiency through deeper industrial and 
operational cooperation, including through pooling, 
specialisation and sharing.
2.  The US should give strong support to such European 
defence cooperation initiatives aimed at maintaining 
and improving military capabilities at the bilateral, 
small group, NATO and EU level.
3.  As a priority, the EU and NATO should focus on 
ensuring that both organisations are able to deploy 
mutually reinforcing strategies towards security 
threats, both in the East and South. ■
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US View:  
It’s the politics, stupidly…
Philip Bednarczyk and Andrew Whitworth
The United States (US) – European Union (EU) trade and economic relationship is the cornerstone of both the US and EU economies and of the modern international system. It is already close and 
current trade policies look set to make it closer. The main threat is a political one. There are currently 
major domestic issues with economic and trade policy on both sides of the Atlantic, and the transatlantic 
economic and trade partnership is liable to become an easy scapegoat. This chapter identifies the top 
five threats, but comes to an ultimately optimistic view of the relationship: it is more vulnerable than 
in the past but it would take a concerted effort by politicians on both sides to pull it apart. This does 
not seem to be likely. 
The US-EU trade and economic relationship is the 
cornerstone of both regional economies and of the 
modern international system. This is no coincidence. 
The transatlantic economic relationship represents 
35% of global GDP, $5.5 trillion in commercial sales, 
15 million jobs in both regions, 30% of global trade 
in goods, 40% of the trade in services, and 57% of 
global foreign direct investment (FDI).1 The economic 
importance of this relationship to each bloc is not in 
doubt.2 Despite the growing role of China and other 
emerging markets in the global economy, as well as 
current US and EU economic challenges, the US and 
the EU (as a bloc) remain each other’s largest trade 
and investment partners. The Congressional Research 
Service has calculated that the US-EU trade in goods 
and services amounted to $1 trillion in 2013, making 
a US trade deficit to the EU of $106.5 billion. 
Although transatlantic trade flows are sizeable, the 
importance of the US-EU relationship is even greater 
from the FDI perspective. The US and EU are each 
other’s largest investors, and FDI often serves as a major 
driver of transatlantic trade flows. In 2013, the US FDI in 
the EU totalled $2.4 trillion (or about 56%) of total US 
direct investment abroad. Conversely, EU companies 
accounted for $1.7 trillion (or about 62%) of direct 
investment in the US.3 Despite the growth of emerging 
economies, which have been faltering recently, the two 
blocs’ economic relationship remains robust.
The ability of the USA to promote and defend the 
international system through and beyond the Cold 
War has depended on the strength of the American 
economy. European reconstruction and integration 
has likewise been founded on the ‘European dream’ of 
the post-war years, known as the trente glorieuses, or 
glorious thirty, and the ability of the EU to offer ever-
increasing prosperity to its ever-increasing number of 
nations and citizens. There is no surprise, therefore, that 
weak economic performances since the 2008 financial 
crisis has caused US dominance of the international 
system, the stability of that system, and European 
integration to flounder. 
The transatlantic trade and economic relationship has 
therefore always been about more than economics. 
At different times the different sides have focused on 
the different aspects of the relationship according to 
their priorities and the wider circumstances. What is 
not in doubt is that both the US and the EU see the 
trade relationship as one way of confirming the two 
regions’ commitment to each other and of imposing 
themselves on the rest of the world. Thus in a moment 
of relative weakness we should expect to see a renewed 
bout of trade negotiations in some form to bolster 
economic integration. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis which shook the US economy and the Eurozone 
crisis from 2009 which continues to undermine the EU 
economy, there has been a renewed push to improve 
the transatlantic trade relationship. This has come in 
the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).
From the US perspective, the geopolitical aspects of the 
relationship are clearly predominant at the moment. 
Partly this reflects the already close integration 
27New Challenges, New Voices: Next Generation Viewpoints on Transatlantic Relations  |
between the two economies,4 partly 
the poor economic performance of 
the Eurozone,5 and partly the similar 
needs of each economy. Because of this 
downplaying of the economic side of 
the relationship, the political side has 
come to the fore. This is clear in the 
aims of TTIP, which acknowledges that 
tariff barriers are already so low that the 
benefits of tariff reduction will come 
through indirect effects rather than a 
direct increase in trade ; for the EU a 
boost to demand, for the US this comes 
through setting international rules while 
still part of a declining ‘pre-eminent’ 
club.7 Through TTIP, the US and the EU 
hope to continue to assert dominance 
in the international economic system, 
even while their relative economic and 
geopolitical influence wanes.
Broadly speaking the reasons for the 
trade agreement can be put into three 
categories: economic, systemic, and 
domestic. It goes without saying that 
TTIP aims to boost growth in both 
economies, but with already historically 
close trade links and unspectacular 
growth on both sides of the Atlantic 
(to say the least), it seems that other 
reasons are more important. 
Systemically we have already noted how 
TTIP and closer economic cooperation 
between the US and EU is seen in the US 
as a way to ‘lock-in’ a dominant position 
in the international order. But what of 
domestic politics? 
As we make clear, what looked like a 
win-win proposition by politicians on 
both sides of the Atlantic to create a 
‘historic’ agreement that would ‘find 
a way to growth’ while ‘affirming 
friendship’ between the heartlands 
of liberal democracy has come to be 
framed – again, on both sides – as an 
elite project that will harm workers’ who 
have already been hardest-hit by the 
economic crises of the last eight years.8 
The US finds itself in an uncomfortable 
position of railing against the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) for its loosening 
of workers’ protections and regulatory 
standards while being assailed in the 
EU for the exact same thing with TTIP. 
The irony – while amusing – does not 
make the transatlantic relationship 
any easier. The popularization of 
trade policy is beginning to cast a 
noticeable shadow over the future of 
US-EU economic relations: the exact 
opposite of what this new push was 
intended to do.
We should be clear: TTIP is not the entire 
transatlantic trade relationship, let alone 
the economic relationship. It is, however, 
the current focus. There was a trade and 
economic relationship before TTIP; 
there will be one afterwards. This is true 
whether TTIP is finally agreed or not. 
But for the US both TTIP in the short-term 
and the wider economic relationship 
are both now more about asserting 
leadership in the world, and working out 
domestic political change, rather than 
trying to find ways to boost economic 
growth at home. For this the US now 
looks towards Asia. The US-EU trade and 
economic relationship is old and deep; it 
has boosted growth in both economies 
for many decades; it continues to 
provide economic and political benefits 
to both sides. Whether or not this strong 
foundation will allow the relationship 
to weather an unprecedented storm 
of economic sclerosis, international 
decline, and domestic anxiety depends 
on the political will of leaders on both 
sides of the Atlantic. This conclusion is 
not heartening.
THE TRANSATLANTIC 
INTERNATIONAL 
PARTNERSHIP
As noted above, Washington sees 
the relationship with Europe as a 
strategically beneficial one, especially 
in terms of economic interests and 
advancing geopolitical goals. The US’s 
much-flaunted ‘Pivot’ to Asia is real 
TTIP is not the 
entire transatlantic 
trade relationship, 
let alone the 
economic 
relationship. It 
is, however, the 
current focus.
‘
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and rational, but relies on a solid relationship with 
its traditional allies and partners in Europe. Even as 
the US negotiates the TPP and builds a larger military 
presence in Asia, Europe remains its closest partner in 
the liberal world order; something sometimes taken for 
granted in Washington. In the geopolitical sphere, for 
example, it can be argued that the EU’s participation 
in the sanctions regime on Iran brought the Iranians 
to the negotiating table for the nuclear deal. 
Whatever one thinks of the US-EU trade relationship, 
the US needs the EU as an effective and cooperative 
partner on the world stage to support the US’s 
leadership position. The US can no longer go it alone – if 
it ever could – and the EU remains its partner of choice. 
As Russia actively touts a different set of values in its 
sphere of influence, the EU and NATO become ever 
more important. Separately, the EU is concurrently 
negotiating bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
with countries in the Americas and Asia (Japan). 
Nevertheless, the efforts to accomplish the economic 
and aforementioned liberal geopolitical goals set forth 
by TTIP represent a deep understanding from both 
sides of the Atlantic that the relationship’s economic 
health is in need of a boost and formalisation in today’s 
changing world. The success of TTIP and the ideals 
it represents, therefore is a net positive for America. 
The negotiations recognise this, but the political 
undercurrent risks undermining meaningful progress. 
Failure in the TTIP negotiations would severely limit the 
transatlantic partners in shaping the world according 
to liberal, democratic values. 
DOMESTIC ANXIETIES
The populist and isolationist views that have been 
heard in the rhetoric of many of the US presidential 
candidates suggest a desire amongst some in the 
US to pause and reflect on the globalisation process. 
Bernie Sanders’ surge in the polls on the left is a direct 
result of this while on the populist right, Donald Trump 
has been advocating for tariffs to combat an ‘unfair 
system’ where America is ‘losing out’, not the free 
trade argument one might expect from an ostensibly 
right-wing plutocrat. Nevertheless, the numbers show 
that the US economy is growing again at a time of 
attempted American retreat from the world stage. 
The risk for the transatlantic economic relationship is 
that populist presidential candidates manage to imply 
causality in this coincidence and promote further 
isolationist tendencies among the American public.
In the US, candidates from both sides of the aisle are 
stoking ideas that the world is a dangerous place, 
America is better off alone, and we must get our house 
in order before we open the doors to deeper world 
trade in Asia or Europe. Given the political strategic 
goals of the relationship (symbolised by TTIP), domestic 
politics are playing a destabilising role in tense times. 
Through the TPP paradigm, the American left sees Asia 
as the low labour cost and deregulated destination 
for all of American jobs.9 The American populist right 
views TPP and TTIP as deals that give up American 
sovereignty.10 On the other hand, Europe is seen as a 
sick and aging agent on the world scene. 
In Europe, politicians from the left (GUE/United Left) 
and right (FN) use America, and on a smaller scale 
the EU, as symbols of everything bad in the world. 
TTIP is anathema to this worldview and in the lead 
up to presidential elections in the US and multiple 
elections in Europe, the relationship will be attacked 
and affected.
Examples of these anti-globalisation threads are 
numerous. A popular petition being spread by 
the European Green party,11 which calls to stop 
TTIP negotiations, has gathered and over 3 million 
signatures EU-wide with the largest number being 
from Germany. From the right, France’s Front National 
consistently rails against TTIP and US influence in the 
EU, all while promoting an anti-EU message, as the 
supreme threat to French sovereignty.12 On a less 
important but symbolically significant level, even 
the UK parliament was forced by popular demand 
to debate whether or not to ban Donald Trump from 
the country – despite the UK being historically and 
ideologically the European country most committed 
to the transatlantic relationship and liberal economic 
and political ideals.
These populist political trends pose substantial 
problems to attempts to solidify the transatlantic 
economic relationship, an already strong relationship, 
but one that is at risk of fraying and weakening. It is 
our assessment that politicians from both Europe and 
America should note the changing nature of the world 
and realise that a strong transatlantic relationship, 
solidified by an ambitious trade deal, would make 
our societies more prosperous and, by extension, our 
values safer than ever in an era of global flux.
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DIVERGING ECONOMIES
The populist politicians are, however, just exploiting 
a widening rift between the European and American 
economies: they have not caused it. The gaps between 
the two economic blocs are growing, as shown by a 
number of relevant indicators. Most significantly, the US 
has been experiencing successive years of growth after 
the global economic crisis, while the EU continues to 
struggle to exit the crisis and achieve stable economic 
growth. Although the American economy’s future 
positive growth trajectory faces significant hurdles, 
the general consensus acknowledges its relative health 
compared to Europe. 
Other important indicators underlie the growth divide 
and should be noted. The divisions in trade, energy 
policy, and monetary policy, are creating different 
paths for the two economic blocs. More specifically, 
the US has consistently seen its trade deficit with 
Europe widen and with a strengthening dollar this will 
continue. In energy policy, the US has benefited from 
the much touted shale boom and recently lifted its 
crude oil export ban, making it an even larger player in 
the energy markets and less reliant on energy imports.13 
Finally, the Federal Reserve recently reversed its policy 
of monetary easing and signalled a long-term path 
towards higher interest rates. 
In all three cases, the EU is experiencing the post-crisis 
era differently. With a weaker Euro, Europe still relies 
heavily on exports with Germany being the main 
benefactor. In the energy sector, Europe is still overly 
reliant on Russian imports and is only slowly working its 
way towards a more efficient and independent future. 
And on monetary policy, the European Central Bank 
only recently began its version of quantitative easing, 
with no sign of rising interest rates in the near future.14
Above all, in both continents, the atmosphere 
of sluggish economic growth has led to generally 
pessimistic feelings towards the political class, as 
surveys consistently show that citizens name the 
economy as one of the most important concerns facing 
their countries.15 
In this environment of diverging economies, political 
populism, and the pull of illiberal democracy, an 
ambitious TTIP agreement will be difficult to reach. 
A divided EU and a divided transatlantic community 
is a dangerous prospect for the post-WWII order and 
plays into the hands of those with other plans for 
global norms, such as Putin’s Russia. Nevertheless, 
even an agreement that postpones or leaves out 
contentious issues such as defence articles, agricultural 
subsidies, and rules of origin, while finding resolution 
over tensions surrounding the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement mechanism, will be a healthy step forward 
for both sides of the Atlantic both economically and 
geopolitically. Using the economic relationship to 
overcome domestic political troubles across the Atlantic 
is the best hope of stabilising and strengthening the 
international system, which is in the US’s national 
interest.
THE TOP FIVE THREATS
Five potential pitfalls can be seen along the road to a 
closer and popularly accepted trade regime. 
The first is inherent: if the trade relationship is there to 
bind the economies together, what if these economies 
simply are moving in opposite directions? 
Far from trade linking the two economies, economic 
divergence could simply break the trade relationship 
apart.16 It is not merely that the aggregate EU economy 
seems to be diverging from the US, as we noted above, 
but divergence within the EU is extreme. Even leaving 
aside extreme cases such as Greece, or semi-detached 
member-states such as the UK, the economic prospects 
of the engines of Europe, France and Germany, look 
very different. When we talk about the US and EU 
economies converging, or the benefits of further trade 
integration across the Atlantic, it is no longer obvious 
what exactly we are talking about. The consolidated 
figures for the EU economy no longer tell us a very 
useful story. Economic divergence within and between 
the Atlantic economies could also lead different states 
to try to find support in different quarters, as we have 
already seen with Cyprus and Russia during the crisis 
and Greece and China. All this undermines the historic 
link between the transatlantic economies.
As the two economies continue to change shape and 
gaps between the two grow, a clarification of the 
trade and regulatory agreements would ensure that 
our values and business are protected, a case made 
particularly by Dan Hamilton.17 Hamilton has been 
and continues to energetically make the argument for 
TTIP in and around both the EU and the US. Recently 
Ben Bernanke outlined his analysis on what the EU’s 
decision makers have gotten wrong and how the EU 
is diverging from the US18 Interestingly, Bernanke 
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calls for the EU to address the large and consistent 
trade imbalances within the Eurozone, not just the 
external ones.19 
The second threat is the domestic political problems 
facing transatlantic trade. 
Most observers feel that TTIP is generating more heat 
than it ought to. Long-term, structural benefits are 
losing out politically to short-term concerns. This is 
normal enough in a democratic nation, but usually 
some form of elite-thinking or ‘establishment’ can be 
prevailed upon to get its way: especially on technical 
and international issues. Will this happen again this 
time around? 
The current populist rhetoric that is gaining traction 
in all states is not encouraging. We can see examples 
of this in US recalcitrance to respecting European 
‘geographical indication’ (designations of protected 
origin), e.g. Champagne from France and Parmesan 
cheese from Italy (Parmigiano Reggiano). At heart 
these are all fairly simple examples of hidden 
protectionism, but ones bound up with highly salient 
political expression. 
The domestic political situation in the US is driven by 
the election cycle and in this presidential election year, 
it can be difficult to differentiate between the noise the 
campaigns are creating and what is actually possible 
given the politics on the ground. The two are not 
separate, but the campaigns, along with the ads and 
primary campaigns that are designed to consolidate 
the base in each party, clog the airwaves and dominate 
the political conversation. Such is the nature of US 
democracy. 
As the populist wings of both the left and right surge 
in the primary races, their rhetoric is fuelled by the 
belief that international trade, and therefore TTIP and 
TPP, represents a huge net loss for American workers. 
Senator Sanders referred to the Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) as “a disaster for America”,20 stressing 
the negative impact on the working class, while Mr. 
Trump sees America as losing to China and the TPP 
as “a horrible deal…designed for China to come in, as 
they always do, through the back door and totally take 
advantage of everyone.”21 Although these candidates 
do not represent the mainstream or the Congress, they 
are revealing and stoking fears of the outsider, causing 
American voters to look inwards. 
Furthermore, consumer protection groups and labour 
have been vocal about their anti-TPP stance. Voices such 
as trade union federations like the AFL-CIO have driven 
the scepticism surrounding international trade.22 Paired 
with the presidential election, the consumer and worker 
protection organisations form a powerful force, even if 
their message is predictable. Even though TTIP may be a 
deal between two largely aligned economies, TPP is first 
on the calendar and it is important for the sitting Congress 
to work with President Obama to pass TPP within 2016.
Third, from a US perspective one of the biggest threats 
to the US-EU trade relationship now comes from threats 
to the EU’s coherence and capacity to act. 
The potential for a hollowing out of the EU so that 
its form remains but member states take back ever 
more and diverse competencies would render the 
EU effectively useless as an international interlocutor. 
Already, the Single Market is threatened by the 
breakdown of Schengen and the attempt in some 
member-states (e.g. the UK) to slow down the free 
movement of people through restricting what welfare 
they can access. Capital has had a hard time flowing 
freely through the Single Market since the financial 
crisis because financial institutions have not been 
convinced that, ultimately, a euro in Greece is worth 
the same as a euro in Germany. The European Central 
Bank has spent a lot of time and effort to reassure 
financial markets – largely with success compared to 
the apocalyptic scenarios that seemed imminent – 
but persistently significant government bond spreads 
within the Eurozone show that the pre-crisis consensus 
assumptions about financial convergence within the 
single currency has been cut to shreds. Two of the three 
pillars of the Single Market – the free movement of 
goods, capital, and people – are under significant threat. 
The challenges facing the EU – migratory, political, and 
economic – are manageable separately, but amongst 
a rising tide of populism and in the face of referenda 
concerning nations’ relationship with states and the 
EU, a perfect storm may be brewing. The Eurozone will 
be forever changed after Greece walked back from the 
brink in the summer of 2015. George Soros generally 
captured the sentiment in America,23 arguing that the 
current EU is not sustainable but the EU’s breakup is by 
no means inevitable. Rather, policy makers see the EU 
as a body that needs to adjust to fast moving issues that 
can have dangerous political consequences from both 
the right and left, putting the project’s success at risk. 
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The potential exit of member states such as the UK 
raises a host of questions. Can TTIP move ahead 
(or survive) without the UK inside the EU? Would a 
British exit plunge the EU and UK into years of internal 
negotiations and navel gazing, and might the loss of 
the UK make the EU less open and more protectionist. 
Would a British exit begin the EU’s unravelling? 
The potential for destructive or transformative changes 
unleashed by a British exit are generally heard in the 
US from those who have a personal preference for 
the end of EU in its current form, for example at the 
DC-based right-wing Heritage Foundation.24 Others, 
such as the Cato Institute, the American Enterprise 
Institute, or Brookings are more circumspect as to the 
impact this would have on the transatlantic economic 
relationship. It is no coincidence that particular views 
on the relative likelihood and desirability of the EU’s 
break-up tend to fall down along partisan lines, given 
the argument that this relationship is largely driven by 
politics rather than trade. The US government’s own 
worries about the break-up of the EU are clear in the 
increasingly frequent warnings to the UK not to leave 
as made by US officials and by the President himself.25 
Finally, frustrations leading to intransigence within 
the negotiations could easily scupper the deal. 
Frustration in negotiations is normal; what is not 
normal is the political salience of the topics on both 
sides of the Atlantic, something being exacerbated by 
electoral politics. Within the US Congress, the pro-trade 
movement has been able to rely on support from the 
likes of Republican House Speaker Paul Ryan. Speaker 
Ryan was instrumental in getting Congress to grant 
President Obama Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
and will be key in getting any trade deal, trans-Pacific 
or trans-Atlantic, to the floor for a vote prior to 2017. 
Support for the deal will also need limited, but crucial, 
support from a small group of Democrats in Congress. 
In the Senate, Senator Pat Murray of Delaware has 
represented an important group of pro-trade Senators, 
while in the House, Congressman Steny Hoyer has 
been an effective pro-trade voice amongst a small 
group of Democrats. 
LOOKING AHEAD
From the US perspective, most risk to the trade 
partnership comes from the EU – either economically 
or politically. Partly this is due to the nature of politics 
on both sides and we should not forget the significant 
risk to the relationship from US populism. More to the 
point though, from the US point of view, the greatest 
risk is the current fragility of Europe. What kind of 
partner can the EU be to the US globally if it is riven 
by internal fault-lines and teetering on the edge of 
collapse itself? For that reason we argue that the future 
fate of the transatlantic economic relationship lies in 
Brussels more than Washington. 
The risks to the relationship are not insurmountable, 
but they are problematic, and they need to be dealt 
with. Unfortunately at the moment it seems that both 
sides of the Atlantic take their economic and trade 
relationship so much for granted that it can be used 
as a domestic political football (spherical or oval). 
This is unedifying, but it is unlikely – at least in the 
short-term – to be fatal. 
The relationship has a long and successful history, 
and is already so close that it would take concerted 
political effort to pull the two economies apart. 
Most likely, looking forward, is that it will drift until 
another crisis, political or economic, comes along 
on either side of the Atlantic and revives politicians’ 
waning interest in their closest international partners.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  Complete TTIP as quickly and thoroughly as possible. 
This is not so much for the trade benefits themselves 
(as we have seen, the trade relationship is already 
close) as for the political signal it will give to each 
partner about the value placed on the Transatlantic 
economic relationship. 
2.  Success in TTIP could profitably lead to a regular 
(annual or bi-annual) trade and economic forum 
between the US and EU where problems can 
be discussed in a transparent manner, solutions 
found, and improvements sought, as a way to 
institutionalise the relationship.
3.  US and EU politicians should avoid impractical 
populist approaches. The transatlantic economic 
and trade relationship is close but could be blown 
apart by intemperate, short-term politics. The best 
defence against political risk to the economy lies in 
moderate pro-trade politicians. ■
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EU View: Four Reasons Why TTIP May Fail 
and Why It Will be Europe’s Fault 
Tereza Novotná 
Despite clear economic and geopolitical advantages, TTIP has become one of the most controversial agreements to ever be negotiated by the European Union (EU). In contrast to initial expectations, it 
might be the ratification process within the EU which proves to be more difficult than that in the United 
States (US) Congress. This chapter focuses on how we got to where we are now in the public debate on 
TTIP from a European perspective and explains that a potential failure to ratify TTIP in Europe would be a 
result of weaknesses in the EU’s system of governance created by the Treaty of Lisbon. The chapter argues 
that the public discourse among national leaders born from a sense they are not responsible for TTIP may 
eventually block the agreement. Secondly, various actors, including the European Parliament, are using 
the TTIP debate and aspects of it, such as questions over transparency and the investor-state-dispute-
settlement (ISDS) mechanism, to their advantage in the institutional turf wars rather than as a matter 
of common good. Finally, the chapter points to a lack of ‘throughput legitimacy’ of TTIP being the cause 
for why public opinion has shifted from ‘permissive’ to ‘constraining’ and how this is likely to shape TTIP’s 
destiny. In other words, if TTIP fails, it will be Europe’s fault. 
Terrorists attacks in Europe, Da’esh1 threatening peace 
and stability in the Middle East, Russian aggression 
on the Eastern flanks of the EU, immigration inflows 
causing tense debates on both sides of the Atlantic 
and the rise of China and other emerging economies 
in Asia, all mean that more than ever there is a need 
for a strong transatlantic partnership. Although it 
tends to get overshadowed by headline-grabbing 
events, negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) might prove to be the 
most significant development that could shape the 
transatlantic partnership for the foreseeable future.
From an economic perspective, with one notable 
exception,1 scholarly studies2 predict that TTIP will 
boost the GDP growth in the US and Europe as well 
as worldwide, increase mutual exports and FDI3 and, 
in Europe, have a positive impact on economies of 
individual EU member states.4 Moreover, even though 
TTIP is primarily a trade deal, if concluded it will have 
far-reaching global implications for both the US and 
the EU.5 A successful TTIP will not only strengthen the 
transatlantic alliance internally but also reinforce the 
standing of the two partners, together and individually, 
vis-à-vis third countries. A comprehensive TTIP, along 
with its partner, the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) deal, 
would allow the US and EU to set global trade standards6 
and extend their mutually agreed rules across borders.7
Yet despite these clear economic and geopolitical 
advantages, TTIP has become one of the most 
controversial agreements to ever be under negotiation 
in Europe. From anti-TTIP public demonstrations in 
various European capitals through to online and 
social media campaigns to vocal ‘TTIP-skeptics’ in the 
European (and some national) parliaments, opponents 
of TTIP portray the agreement loudly as a catastrophic 
scenario which will dismantle the European social 
model, lower environmental, health, and food 
protection standards, and sell off the European 
regulatory systems to the hands of multinationals. 
Meanwhile, TTIP’s supporters remain largely silent. 
This is however not to say that the EU negotiators should 
accept any American proposal on the table or that some 
of the concerns voiced by the critics do not have their 
merits. Nonetheless, in contrast to initial expectations 
that the final TTIP deal would have a hard time passing 
through the US Congress, it might in the end be the 
ratification process within the EU which proves to 
be more difficult and even lead to TTIP’s rejection. 
If this happens it will not be due to the power of the 
arguments put forward by the anti-TTIP campaigners, 
since many of them have been repeatedly refuted as 
grossly exaggerated or even unfounded.8 Rather, a 
potential failure to ratify TTIP in Europe would be a 
result of weaknesses in the EU’s system of governance 
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that were supposed to be solved by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Although the Lisbon Treaty did alleviate some 
problems, TTIP exposes Lisbon’s remaining deficiencies 
and, in fact, intensifies them. In other words, if TTIP 
fails, it will be Europe’s fault.
This chapter focuses on how we got to where we are 
now in the public debate on TTIP from a European 
perspective and explains why a TTIP deal may fail in 
Europe. To do so the chapter assesses the role of EU 
leaders, their public discourse on TTIP and how a lack in 
sense of national ownership may eventually block the 
agreement. The chapter then looks at the institutional 
turf battles between various EU institutions and actors 
who are using TTIP to their advantage rather than as 
a matter of common good. Throughout the chapter 
we examine several aspects of TTIP, such as questions 
of transparency and the investor-state-dispute-
settlement (ISDS) mechanism; issues that have been 
taken hostage by various groups in order to press for 
their own interests. Finally, the chapter points to a lack 
of ‘throughput legitimacy’ of TTIP being the cause for 
why public opinion has shifted from ‘permissive’ to 
‘constraining’ and how this is likely to shape its destiny. 
NATIONAL LEADERS, PUBLIC 
DISCOURSES AND OWNERSHIP OF TTIP
For direct observers, TTIP “has been from the outset, is 
at present and will have to continue to be a Chefsache”9 
(a ‘matter for the boss’). This has been on display in TTIP 
negotiations where the high level of engagement by 
European national leaders has distinguished it from 
previous trade negotiations that were conducted 
by the EU.10 However, because of the post-Lisbon 
Treaty institutional arrangements of the EU, member 
states have no direct control over the TTIP negotiation 
process and, therefore, have less desire and fewer 
means available to them by which they can ensure the 
negotiations are a success. Indeed, if TTIP negotiations 
fail, national leaders can then blame the ‘faceless’ 
European Commission bureaucrats. 
From the EU-US summit establishing a High-Level 
Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) in 
November 2011, TTIP-related meetings at the margins 
of G7/G8 summits and through to several successive 
European Council Conclusions,11 the attention of 
EU member states and their leaders paid to TTIP, 
particularly in contrast to other trade negotiations, 
has indeed been extraordinary. It is also true that the 
impetus to initiate TTIP negotiations with the US came 
from EU member states, in particular because European 
leaders were keen on using a free trade deal with the 
US to boost jobs and growth after a protracted financial 
downturn. The influence of EU member states was 
therefore very high, easily overriding the concerns of 
trade experts on both sides of the Atlantic.12
Yet, TTIP has run into problems because of the peculiar 
system of power and competence-sharing within the 
EU. Because the EU’s ‘common commercial policy’ is 
an exclusive power of the EU,13 once the process of 
negotiations is set off it is the European Commission, 
and DG Trade in particular, which sits at the negotiating 
table with the American counterparts on behalf of all 
‘EU-28 Member States’. In practical terms, EU member 
states can voice their views and concerns as well as 
obtain regular detailed debriefs by Commission officials 
on the outcomes of the TTIP negotiating rounds 
through the Council of the EU’s weekly Trade Policy 
Committee (TPC), and bi-weekly Working Group on 
Transatlantic Relations (COTRA) meetings. Despite this, 
throughout the negotiation process, EU member states 
have been more or less passive receivers of information 
rather than active agents. Given the massive impact of 
a transatlantic deal, TTIP could increase the clout of the 
EU’s supranational institutions, and the Commission in 
particular, vis-à-vis EU member states more than any 
other trade agreement.14 
Although the Lisbon Treaty clarified the EU’s powers 
and strengthened the influence of the Commission 
(as well as the European Parliament, see below) in 
the trade and investment areas, in effect, due to lower 
input by member states, it decreased national leaders’ 
sense of ownership of the trade negotiation process 
and their willingness to risk their political capital on 
its outcome. This was particularly so since other big 
issues and crises often loom large at the same time. 
This would be much less of a problem in other Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations that create nearly 
no public reaction, such as that currently ongoing with 
Japan or the 2011 FTA agreed with the Republic of 
Korea. However, due to the heated debate surrounding 
TTIP, and the Commission’s limited ability to conduct 
its own public diplomacy, the Lisbon set-up has dis-
incentivised European leaders to get engaged, explain, 
and publicly support TTIP, while making them more 
prone to disown what they have themselves previously 
agreed ‘in Brussels’. 
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The Commission itself pointed this out in 
2013, saying that it would need to work 
closely together with EU member states 
to “collectively manage and coordinate 
our communication and outreach 
strategies.”15 In 2015, Commission 
President Juncker complained that 
member states should “stop the ‘double-
speak’ between what is said during 
meetings in Brussels and what is said in 
public, and make sure they commit and 
stick together in the process…talking 
about the benefits, listening to people’s 
concerns, responding to them.”16 
This complaint has been supported by 
others around the EU, most notably by 
the House of Lords. The European Union 
Committee of the British Upper House2 
concluded in a report on TTIP that the 
Commission “cannot be expected to 
make the case for the TTIP… EU Member 
States are not bearing their fair share 
of responsibility for transparency and 
communication around the project. “17
In a sense, the EU faces an ‘enlargement 
paradox’: during an EU enlargement 
it is the member states that lead the 
accession negotiations, while the 
Commission stands in the background 
providing wider objectivity to 
the process through its technical 
expertise.18 In TTIP, as with any other 
trade negotiation, the situation is the 
reverse: the Commission conducts 
negotiations but legitimacy of the 
process is provided by EU member 
states and it is their politicians who are 
now reluctant to do so over TTIP. 
From an academic perspective, the 
TTIP negotiations and debate are good 
examples of ‘discursive institutionalism’ 
and the difference between two types 
of public discourse: a coordinative 
discourse among the elites and a 
communicative discourse between the 
elites and masses.19 In the EU, it is often 
the case that national leaders agree 
amongst themselves on an issue at an 
EU summit only to then condemn the 
same decision when back home and so 
shift the blame by saying ‘Brussels made 
me do it.’ As a result, the gap between 
the coordinative and communicative 
discourse leads to low legitimacy for 
the decisions taken jointly with other 
member states and within a context 
of ever more critical domestic publics. 
The question of transparency and, 
in particular, the agreement on and 
publication of the TTIP negotiation 
mandate provides an illustration. 
Between March and June 2013, the 
Commission launched procedures 
to obtain a negotiating mandate. 
The Commission’s draft was approved 
unanimously by the Council (and 
received an input by the European 
Parliament) within just four months, 
a record time by EU standards.20 
Despite this short stretch of time, 
those member states who were 
keen on certain issues were able to 
exert pressure on their colleagues 
to achieve changes to the draft. 
For example, at France’s insistence, 
audiovisual services were removed 
from the mandate and have thus 
been considered ‘non-negotiable.’ 
The Council’s unanimous vote on the 
mandate allowed TTIP negotiations to 
begin on 14 June 2013.21
At the time of the mandate’s approval 
by the Council, no national leader 
protested against inclusion of ISDS.22 
Yet, public opinion on ISDS (if not 
TTIP as such) has become increasingly 
contested, in no small part thanks to civil 
society activists particularly in Austria 
and Germany.23 Austrian Chancellor 
Faymann, who has been in the office 
since 2008 and therefore during the 
period leading up to the launch of TTIP 
negotiations, experienced a change of 
his heart and became one of the fiercest 
opponents of ISDS, condemning it as 
an outdated institution which benefits 
corporations.24 Despite agreeing to the 
mandate, Faymann threatened to file a 
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lawsuit with the European Court of Justice should ISDS 
become a part of TTIP, and made the unusual move of 
making a unilateral declaration to this effect during 
the March 2015 Council meeting.25 More recently, 
Faymann declared himself to be opposed to the 
Investment Court System (ICS), the reformed ISDS 
tribunal proposed by the Commission.26 
In a similar vein, growing dissatisfaction with ISDS and 
TTIP in Germany saw SPD3 Vice-Chancellor Sigmar 
Gabriel prevaricate over the old ISDS system.27 
While he seems content with its newest version, this 
may be because TTIP is a part of the coalition treaty 
with Angela Merkel’s CDU28 and thus torpedoing TTIP 
would have consequences for the unity of the German 
grand coalition. A legitimate debate on the possible 
reforms of the arbitration system which, in contrast to 
the proposed scale of EU-US regulatory cooperation, 
is not the most important aspect of TTIP has therefore 
become a magnet for other political interests, such 
as the quest for popularity within the political elite 
and anti-globalisation sentiments among the activist 
public (see below).
It has not only been ISDS but also a lack of transparency 
that have been one of the key criticisms levied by 
various civil society organisations against TTIP. 
The demand to publish the negotiating mandate 
became the first target of public pressure. Aware of 
the increasing public backlash against TTIP, it was 
Commissioner De Gucht and DG Trade who early 
on advocated publishing the mandate.29 Yet, the 
Commission received most blame for keeping the talks 
out of public scrutiny despite the fact that this was due 
to a blocking minority of 11 member states30 who at a 
Council meeting in May 2014 prevented the mandate 
from being published, a particularly ludicrous decision 
given the fact that the mandate had been leaked and 
had been available online for several months.31 It took 
several more months and growing public pressure to 
reach a unanimous Council decision to publish the 
mandate in October 2014.32 
The incoming Juncker Commission, appointed in 2014, 
included Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström who 
made transparency of TTIP negotiations one of her 
flagship initiatives. This included publishing all the 
EU’s textual proposals, i.e. specific proposals for legal 
texts for individual TTIP negotiation chapters that set 
out the EU’s negotiating positions, with the first batch 
made public on 7 January 2015 and the latest set of 
documents published on 21 March 2016. However, 
the damage over an alleged lack of transparency had 
already been done, even if the negotiations were 
now rightly described, including by some of those 
who are unhappy with certain aspects of it, as a 
trade negotiation with an unprecedented degree of 
transparency.33 
The impression of a lack of transparency, of TTIP as 
a ‘behind the closed door’ deal and hence a lack of 
legitimacy, has continued to stick since it is not possible 
to make the consolidated texts (i.e. legal textual 
proposals that include concessions and compromises 
of both sides) public before all the chapters are agreed 
upon in the expectation that ‘nothing is agreed until 
all is agreed’. As evidenced above, this is exacerbated 
by two facts: firstly, in line with the contradiction 
between coordinative and communicative discourses, 
national leaders are not willing to invest much of 
their political capital into defending what has been 
negotiated within TTIP at home, but are happy to 
absolve themselves from any accountability while 
shifting responsibility to the Commission. Secondly, 
the topic of transparency has been taken up by other 
actors, such as the European Parliament, as a means 
of establishing itself as an equal partner to the Council 
within the interinstitutional ‘several level game’.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
THE NEW ACTOR ON THE SCENE 
AND THE BATTLE OF TTIP
Following the Lisbon Treaty, where the European 
Parliament received more or less an equal standing 
with the Council as a co-legislative body through the 
ordinary legislative procedure within the EU, any EU 
FTA must be ratified by the Parliament.34 No matter 
whether the Commission eventually judges that TTIP 
falls under the exclusive Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP), (and thus will be voted at the EU level only) or 
that TTIP represents a ‘mixed agreement’ interfering 
with Member State competences (in which case the 
national ratification processes will take place as well 
mostly through national parliaments), the European 
Parliament will approve or reject it on a simple 
majority vote.35 
In fact, TTIP will be the first EU-US agreement that will 
be ratified by both the European Parliament and the 
US Congress.36 Because the Obama Administration 
managed to secure a fast-track Trade-Promotion 
Authority (TPA) from Congress in 2015, Congress has 
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in effect moved from a body that was allowed to add 
amendments both to the TPP and TTIP agreements 
to the same position as the European Parliament: 
they can both either say yay or nay to the final deal.37 
The European Parliament’s role has therefore been 
likened to a ‘permanent TPA’38 due to the caveat that 
either the US House of Representatives or the Senate 
may under certain conditions withdraw their consents 
to the TPA, while the European Parliament does not 
have such a power.39
Nevertheless, the fact that the European Parliament 
enjoys the ‘hard power’ of thwarting any final 
arrangement has been portrayed as the basis of its 
political clout,40 its ‘ex-ante power’41 or even its ‘trump 
card’.42 The European Parliament has shown that it can 
exploit its newly accorded competence by voting down 
the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) and ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement) agreements.43 What is perhaps new 
with TTIP is that the European Parliament have tried 
to exert influence over TTIP from a much earlier stage 
than during the ratification period, as was the case 
with SWIFT and ACTA. 
During the period of obtaining the TTIP negation 
mandate, MEPs more or less copied the approach 
of national leaders. In May 2013, a month before 
launching the negotiations, the European Parliament 
voted on a resolution that emphasised two main points: 
exclusion of audiovisual and the Parliament’s insistence 
on being ‘immediately and fully informed at all stages’ 
of the TTIP negotiations.44 As with national leaders, the 
European Parliament did not express any objections 
to ISDS being included. Yet once ISDS turned into one 
of the most controversial issues of the negotiations, 
the newly elected MEPs from both the Left and Right 
seized on it as the opportunity to show that they were 
the main guardians of the publics interests. It took 
them two years to realise this, but they did so with 
all the more force. 
Before voting on a second resolution on TTIP in July 
2015,45 MEPs submitted nearly 900 amendments 
through 14 European Parliament committees, making 
it the most contested European Parliament resolution 
of all time.46 In an unprecedented move, the initial vote 
was postponed and amendments that were largely 
related to ISDS were sent back to the International 
Trade (INTA) committee. In the end, a compromise was 
produced in order to satisfy primarily the Socialists and 
Democrats groups. This agreed that the Parliament 
would approve TTIP only in the case of a revised version 
of ISDS was a part of the deal. Even so, about a third of 
the Socialists voted against the resolution47 which, in a 
way, parallels the divide within the US Congress that is 
split on TTIP (and even more so on the TPP) not along 
party lines but across the aisle with mainly Democrats 
being against it.48 In any case, TTIP may eventually 
lose a majority vote in the European Parliament if the 
Commission’s revised ISDS (or ICS) proposal is rejected 
or watered down due to the objections by the US. 
Even though the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role 
of the European Parliament as the only directly elected 
body in the EU’s decision making-processes, MEPs 
have to some extent started behaving similarly to 
their national counterparts. They have been quick 
to drop previously held views once they see they no 
longer correspond with popular demand back home, as 
opposed to trying to explain and defend their original 
positions. The contradiction between the coordinative 
and communicative discourse is thus being replicated 
in the European Parliament as well. Moreover, even if 
pressure by the Parliament to change ISDS might be 
considered a victory by the Parliament over the Council 
(and the Commission), paradoxically, it was achieved 
by using the same ‘double speak’ method that national 
leaders practice. As such they have done so through 
the means that the Lisbon Treaty should have reduced. 
For the future of the transatlantic relations it is a shame 
that the ISDS, and TTIP in general, might be the first 
victim of these post-Lisbon developments. 
The European Parliament’s tendency to use contentious 
subjects for its own institutional gain is well illustrated 
on another issue: transparency and the so-called 
‘reading rooms’. In contrast to the US Congress 
where, even under the TPA, the USTR must consult 
the individual members of Congress at any time they 
wish and provide them with all classified documents, 
the European Parliament is in a more passive position 
in which it is to be ‘informed’ rather than consulted. 
Although the Commission has been willing to provide 
more information than previously,49 by using public 
pleas for more transparency the European Parliament 
has pushed for increased access to the consolidated 
texts through the opening of specially secured ‘reading 
rooms’ in the Commission and Parliament buildings. 
Since spring 2014, select MEPs (for example, the 
Parliament’s leadership, chairs of key committees 
and rapporteurs) have been able to access the 
consolidated texts of TTIP. After several more months 
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of pressing both the Commission and the US, all MEPs 
were granted access in December 2015.50 As a result, 
the European Parliament successfully changed the 
‘institutional asymmetry’ that favoured the EU member 
states who had more access than MEPs. Nonetheless, 
public criticism directed at the reading rooms as a 
‘sham transparency’ persists, particularly because 
of complex security rules allowing for handwritten 
notes but no photocopies that could be taken away.51 
Given the high number of actors involved, it is probably 
only a matter of time before one of the classified 
documents is leaked. 
National parliaments joined the European Parliament’s 
demands for better access to the consolidated texts. 
That was initially allowed to a small group of MPs 
in each Member State at special premises in the US 
embassies in each capital. However, together with 
the European Parliament, national parliamentarians 
eventually received the same level of access as 
MEPs and, for instance, the German Members of the 
Bundestag may view the documents in a secured room 
at the German Economics Ministry.52 It is one of the 
few instances where national parliaments have teamed 
up with the European Parliament in pressuring the 
governments of the member states. 
It remains to be seen whether this level of access will 
lead MEPs or MPs to better communicate TTIP to the 
general public. As the Committee of Regions (whose 
key members may also access the classified documents 
in the Commission’s reading room) pointed out, it is 
not clear how this information can be used to improve 
communication on the ground.53 Moreover, some 
MEPs such as a Swedish Green MEP started calling 
for opening up the consolidated texts to all citizens, 
which is impossible to permit if there is to be anything 
left for the US and EU to negotiate over. 
All in all, there are two lessons that TTIP can teach us 
about the role of the European Parliament. First, in 
contrast to the US Congress that voluntarily limited 
its control through agreeing to the TPA, the European 
Parliament has used TTIP as a way to increase its powers. 
In a way, we are witnessing two opposite processes 
across the Atlantic: in the US TPA contributed to a shift 
from the congressional to executive actors in handling 
TTIP, in the EU we have seen a shift from the executives 
towards the European Parliament. Second, actors who 
are not formally involved in the negotiations are those 
who can eventually ditch the deal, particularly if they 
have the public on their side.
TTIP, THROUGHPUT LEGITIMACY AND 
A CONSTRAINING PUBLIC DISSENSUS
TTIP negotiations demonstrate how public opinion 
can matter in areas of European integration where 
previously public views were either ignorant or 
were ignored by elites. Although from the American 
perspective we can say that TTIP shows nothing much 
new and Europe is simply experiencing its ‘NAFTA 
moment’,54 from a European perspective however there 
has been a significant change. TTIP represents a clear 
example of Hooghe’s and Mark’s55 post-functionalist 
argument of the EU and EU policy making moving 
from a ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ 
among European publics. 
Moreover, these developments differ across EU 
member states. In the Czech Republic, for instance, 
where general support for TTIP is relatively high at 
around 62%,56 the ‘permissive consensus’ still prevails: 
around 78% of the Czechs have never heard of TTIP 
or do not know what TTIP is about and, equally, 76% 
of the Czech citizens are not interested in knowing 
more.57 On the other hand, in EU member states where 
anti-TTIP campaigners are particularly active through 
social media,58 such as Twitter,59 and which do not 
experience the same level of online engagement 
from TTIP advocates, the public ‘dissensus’ becomes 
constraining and is translated into the lowest levels 
of support for TTIP: Austria with 39%, Germany with 
39%, and Belgium with 40%.60 
This is perhaps in line with wider frustrations and 
feelings of disconnect between ordinary voters and 
politicians. TTIP’s weak support is therefore in part 
the result of the so-called ‘80:20 society’61 where 80% 
of the population do not see any direct benefits of a 
trade deal like TTIP, as much as they do not see any 
benefits that the European integration brings them in 
general. We can also look at it from a positive angle 
and see in the anti-TTIP civic activism the creation of 
a true Europe-wide public sphere and civil society. 
Or, it can be dismissed as a ‘proxy war’ by those who 
fight against globalisation corporate influence, and 
are anti-American.62 
Nevertheless, there is a silver lining to the problems TTIP 
faces. Paradoxically, some of those who protest against 
TTIP do so to defend the rules and regulations that have 
been achieved throughout the last seventy years of 
European integration: it is the EU’s environmental, health 
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and safety standards that they want to uphold rather 
than dismantle. The VW scandal also points to another 
paradox between reality and faith in EU standards. 
In 2014, 91% of Germans trusted EU standards for car 
safety more than American standards.63 But it was the 
US environmental agency that detected the German 
car manufacturer’s cheating of emission rules.64
Therefore it is ‘throughput legitimacy’ which is needed 
to make sure TTIP is agreed in Europe. In other words, it 
is not enough to focus either on the output legitimacy 
from delivering the goods (such as ‘TTIP will bring jobs 
and growth’, a position advocated by Commissioner De 
Gucht), or input legitimacy (whereby ‘all stakeholders 
are consulted’ in the decision-making process, as often 
emphasised by Commissioner Malmström). We also 
need ‘Throughput’ legitimacy65 of the negotiation 
process as such, i.e. that both national leaders and 
politicians at the EU level make clear that they take 
part, trust in and support what goes on in the ‘black 
box’ of EU governance. This throughput legitimacy 
depends however on them resisting the temptation 
of caving in to public pressure at home by blaming 
‘the EU’ for a bad TTIP deal. 
If TTIP fails in Europe, the EU will be blamed but, in fact, 
national politicians will be responsible. On the other 
hand, the EU’s institutions, especially the European 
Parliament, should avoid using TTIP and its various 
aspects, such as transparency and ISDS, as part of the 
power struggles between themselves. All sides in the 
EU need to recognise that if TTIP is not ratified but TPP 
is, it will allow the US to set global trade and regulatory 
standards with Pacific allies such as Japan, leaving the 
EU to play catch up at a later date.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  EU member states, and their national leaders in 
particular, need to get involved in the public debate 
about TTIP in their home countries, explaining and 
defending what they have agreed ‘in Brussels’ and 
what has been negotiated at the EU level with 
the United States. The Commission’s DG Trade 
communication unit should better coordinate its 
work with national ministries, thereby increasing 
the sense of member states’ ownership of the TTIP 
process. 
2.  The European Parliament and national parliaments 
should use their increased access to negotiating 
texts to inform their voters about the costs and 
benefits of TTIP. Both European and national 
parliamentarians should familiarise themselves 
with fact based advantages and disadvantages of 
various aspects of TTIP, such as ISDS and regulatory 
cooperation, through consultations with experts. 
They should avoid using TTIP for turf wars with 
other EU institutions. 
3.  All actors, from EU member states and European 
Commission through to European and national 
parliaments, should focus on an informed debate 
on the geopolitical aspects of TTIP and consider the 
consequences for the EU and its member states of 
TTIP failing. ■
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US View:  
A Most Valued Relationship?
Parke Nicholson 
Many fear the transatlantic partnership is drifting apart. Disputes over policy, privacy, and security make it seem like the community of common values has eroded. Populism in the United States (US) 
and Europe has further unsettled the political landscape. However, the emergence of a more global, diverse 
generation is an opportunity for policy makers seeking to reframe and strengthen relations to confront 
common challenges.
The 21st century has been awkward thus far for the 
transatlantic community. Terrorism, the digital revolution, 
the financial and refugee crises, and changes to the 
global order have all become sources of anxiety. At the 
same time, American and European political leaders 
too often repeat empty platitudes to ‘common values’ 
instead of contending with real policy differences. 
The successive economic and political crises of the 
day have only brought to light these tensions in US-
European relations.
It should thus be no surprise that the discussion of 
transatlantic values has taken on an earnest tone in 
recent years. US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria 
Nuland gave a speech in 2013 on a ‘transatlantic 
renaissance’, an optimistic vision following the uproar 
over Edward Snowden’s revelations of NSA activities in 
Europe. She referred to the European Renaissance as a 
great opening towards humanism and called upon the 
transatlantic community to continue to advance “the 
universal values that bind us as free nations” including 
“justice, peace and freedom.”1 Europe and the US needed 
to work together to mentor other countries struggling 
with democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of 
civil liberties.2 
Others have been less sanguine about the state of 
values in the transatlantic relationship. Writing for 
Foreign Affairs online, University of North Carolina 
Professor Konrad Jarausch has argued that although 
the US-European relationship “is based on common 
Enlightenment-era human values, their interpretation 
has started to diverge.”3 He highlights several areas of 
difference including the use of force, the role of the 
state in social policy, and government intrusion in the 
private sphere. Jarausch asserts these divergences will 
continue as the US population with European heritage 
declines, European studies courses diminish, and the 
‘transatlantic media’ reinforces stereotypes.4 
From a historical perspective, however, there is little 
that divides Europeans and Americans when it comes 
to core political values. The constitutions of Western 
democracies enshrine very similar goals for society and 
laws have been shaped by similar impulses. Though our 
historical experiences diverge on social and economic 
policy, they more often than not converge when it 
comes to the advancement of democratic ideals such as 
liberty and equality. Thus, tensions between the US and 
Europe do not stem from fundamentally different world 
views (i.e. Mars and Venus), but more from “different 
interpretations of common values.”5 
This chapter highlights several US perspectives on 
politics and values with respect to transatlantic 
relations. I do not focus on the divisive US politics 
of today, but two trends that will shape US politics 
and relations with Europe in the coming decades 
- the attitudes of Millennials (Generation Y) and 
the US debate about immigration and asylum. 
Finally, I suggest a few policy areas that will continue 
to complicate transatlantic discussions over politics 
and values. 
A VALUES GAP?
Europe and the US have long had different social 
models. Despite the recent push towards universal 
health care under the Obama administration and 
deregulation in several major economies in Europe, 
American capitalism still stands in stark contrast to 
European social democracy. The financial crisis only 
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exposed these differences as American commentators 
criticised European constraints on economic growth 
and Europeans criticised rising economic inequality 
and America’s laissez-faire approach to economics. 
These disagreements are nothing new. Over a decade 
ago, European historian Tony Judt made note of the 
transatlantic divide that went beyond the divisions 
over Iraq policy: 
“What Europeans find perturbing about America…
is precisely what most Americans believe to be their 
nation’s strongest suit: its unique mix of moralistic 
religiosity, minimal provision for public welfare, and 
maximal foreign market freedom – the “American 
way of life” – coupled with a missionary foreign policy 
ostensibly directed at exporting that same cluster of 
values and practices.” 6
Europeans have long felt estranged from a US 
society seemingly obsessed with consumerism, gun 
ownership, and religion. Judt’s critique focused on 
the era of President George W. Bush, but he thought it 
likely that the differences between the US and Europe 
would deepen over time as they are “highlighted and 
reinforced by policy disagreements” on other issues. 7 
A Pew Research Center poll in 2012 suggests there 
indeed remains a persistent values gap – though it 
is smaller than Judt would have guessed and will 
likely narrow with the younger generation. Questions 
about religion and individualism showed a clear divide 
between the Americans surveyed and most Europeans. 
A majority in the US maintain that “belief in god is 
necessary to be a moral person”, while Europeans are 
much more secular.8 In contrast with Europeans, most 
Americans agree with the view that “everyone should 
be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference 
from the state.”9 Yet when it comes to the role of the 
state, slightly more than half of US liberals would like 
the state to take a more active role to help the needy. 
The poll also revealed two popular misconceptions 
about Americans: that the US thinks itself superior to 
other countries and that its people care little about 
the plight of marginalised groups. There was a surge 
in nationalist pride in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
but Americans’ patriotism has faded over time as the 
country has become increasingly aware of its limits. 
Whereas 6 in 10 respondents believed the US was “not 
perfect, but our culture is superior” in 2002, less than 
half believed this to be the case in 2012 – roughly 
equal to German and Spanish nationalist sentiment.10
Besides religion and nationalism, American perspectives 
on sexual orientation are also shifting. Public opinion 
concerning homosexuality and same-sex marriage 
has shifted to a considerable degree. While support 
for homosexuality in Europe has long exceeded 80% 
in most countries, a majority of Americans over the 
past decade have now come to accept that same-sex 
couples have a fundamental right that is protected 
by the constitution. This cultural shift was solidified 
by the Supreme Court’s ruling legalising same-sex 
marriage in June of 2015. 
Adding to this complex picture are two broad 
demographics trends that will shape the American 
electorate and, thus, have an impact on the transatlantic 
relationship in the coming decades. The Millennial 
generation will have a prominent role in shaping the 
country’s values and policies and is now larger than the 
retiring Baby Boomer generation. At the same time, the 
US ethnic white majority will become a super-minority 
by 2050 with one in five children being foreign born.
NARROWING THE DIVIDE 
During his first visit to Washington D.C. as Foreign 
Minister under German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed concern about 
the next generation’s attitudes towards transatlantic 
relations. The relevance of the transatlantic relationship 
is “in no way as self-evident” to the current generation 
as it seemed to be for his.11 He referred to a conversation 
he had with his teenage daughter who expressed a 
familiar refrain to parents – “Why should I care?”12 
Steinmeier inferred that simple appeals to common 
values like freedom or ‘openness’ sound empty to 
younger audiences who question whether that is true 
or even relevant. 
There has been much hand-wringing about the 
political values of the millennial generation in 
the US. Pundits have characterised the millions 
born after 1980 variously as “cynical do-gooders”, 
“generation ‘me,me,me’”, “excellent sheep”, and “morally 
inarticulate”.13 However, the sizeable adult population 
of millennials is not nearly as homogeneous as these 
labels imply. 
Millennials are the generation born after 1980 and 
came of age in the late ‘90s and the first decade 
of the new millennium. They now comprise more 
than 30% of the adult US population (18 to 35 years 
old). They are clearly concerned about global issues 
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and generally more socially progressive than older 
generations. According to reports by Nielsen, an 
agency that researches consumer trends, the top issues 
for Millennials include education, poverty, and the 
environment and many desire to work for non-profit 
organisations in these areas.14
Social and economic inequality has been a particular 
concern for younger Americans. Millennials are often 
stereotyped as having grown up in relative privilege 
during the 1990s economic boom, benefiting from 
the fruits of globalisation and the introduction of new 
technologies. Since the financial crisis, however, the 
median income for young adults today is estimated 
to be 10% less than the similar age group in 1995.15 
Millennials increasingly expect to see no Social Security 
benefits by the time they retire, so it should be of little 
wonder then that one of their primary concerns is 
economic security.16
Senator Bernie Sanders’ surprising resilience in the 
US presidential campaign owes much to his appeals 
to this demographic. A self-proclaimed ‘democratic 
socialist’, he has long held strong positions on 
the inequities of the US financial and tax system. 
His idealism appeals to a younger demographic of voters 
who face persistently high rates of unemployment. 
The economy has recovered during President Obama’s 
administration and many of Sanders’ own policies are 
unrealistic in the current political environment, but his 
campaign has nonetheless successfully played to a 
lingering sense that Wall Street and major corporations 
did not pay a high enough price for the financial crisis. 
Yet US politicians will continue to face challenges in 
securing the Millennial vote. Many share the general 
public’s disenchantment with ‘politics as usual’. 
A Pew poll in 2014 came out with the headline ‘Adult 
Millennials – detached from institutions, networked 
with friends.’ It showed that 50% of the respondents 
under the age of 35 described themselves as politically 
independent, which was the highest total in 25 years 
of polling.17 The young and politically-engaged 
may thus be more interested in participating in 
demonstrations and protests (e.g. the movements 
‘Occupy Wall Street’ and ‘Black Lives Matter’) than 
voting and voicing their political interests through 
formal, traditional platforms. Young people are also 
more interested in directly serving their communities 
than participating in traditional forms of politics, due 
in part to their frustration with established institutions’ 
slow capacity for change.18 
The strong domestic focus of younger US voters does 
not necessarily mean that their interest in foreign affairs 
will diminish, but it will become important to find new 
justifications for the practical value of the transatlantic 
relationship. Is Europe relevant to young Americans who 
did not experience the Cold War and whose focus is 
drawn to other parts of the world - particularly the Middle 
East after 9/11 and increasingly Asia? Do Millennials 
believe in defending and advancing Western values? 
Unequivocally yes. However, the young generation has 
only just started to articulate clear answers in its own 
voice. A report in 2015 produced by young, US-German 
leaders under the age of 35 sought to clarify how their 
generation saw the world through its own ‘prism’: 
“They have a natural understanding of diversity, 
a passion for equality, and a demand for equal 
representation. They believe in many of the previous 
generations’ values such as freedom, democracy, and 
individual expression. And they are connected through 
social networks, where they debate current global 
challenges in order to find their own solutions.”19
The authors of the report concluded that such a 
perspective could help set German-American relations on 
a path towards “less mistrust and less indifference.”20  This 
could apply to US-European relations more generally. 
However, the mistrust on the part of young Europeans 
and indifference on the part of young Americans could 
still become a serious impediment to improving 
transatlantic relations. Arguments are magnified when 
neither side listens or seeks to understand the other’s 
position. This may be more a matter of mechanics than 
substance. Societies’ goals shift over time and there 
will always be policy differences between different 
countries. However, the permanent loss of cultural 
exchanges and European/American studies courses 
would leave leaders with few means to prevent the 
rise of anti-European or anti-American sentiment. 
They would also lose the opportunity for young 
Europeans to engage with an American generation 
that is more pragmatic, secular, socially liberal, and 
open to new forms of interaction. 
LAND(S) OF IMMIGRATION
If millennials have a greater tolerance for diversity 
and are generally more liberal about issues such as 
immigration, are they representative of American 
attitudes towards the refugee crisis in general? 
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European leaders’ commitment to an open society and 
the rule of law is being severely tested by the refugee 
crisis. Anti-EU, anti-immigration, and anti-austerity 
political groups are not yet capable of up-ending the 
European order (nor are populists in the US), but their 
machinations will exhaust political leaders seeking 
to respond to a public weary of globalisation and 
whose compassion for refugees is not inexhaustible. 
Many in Europe look to the US as the archetype of 
a ‘land of immigration’ for answers and inspiration.
Even though it accepts more than one million legal 
immigrants each year, the US has not always welcomed 
mass migration. Over the past 150 years, America has 
only gradually adjusted to new waves of people from 
Europe in the late 1880s through the 1930s, Southeast 
Asia in the 1970s, and South America most recently 
despite periodic restrictions and quota systems. 
The American people have largely agreed with the 
idea that the country is a ‘melting pot’ of cultures 
and ethnicities, but they have not always followed 
through on the Statue of Liberty’s promise to 
accept the world’s “huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free.”21
Integration in the US has been a continuously evolving 
process. Newly diverse communities have not always 
been peaceful as strangers trust each other less and 
choose not to work on joint projects for the common 
good. New communication technologies have made 
it easier to connect with each other, but also allow 
immigrants and natives alike to remain tethered to 
their homelands or chosen identities. It has perhaps 
been easier for foreigners to find their place and 
avoid conflict with others in the vast expanse of 
North America. 
The US is not considered a ‘land of immigration’, 
however, simply because of its size and prosperity. 
It offers both a path to citizenship (though arduous) 
and adaptive institutions like the school system 
(though imperfect). These help establish a common 
language and history, give space to even the most 
extreme perspectives, and help form a political identity 
as ‘Americans’ that supersedes class, race, or ethnicity. 
As Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam suggests, 
the long and hard process of integration can lead to 
a “more welcoming and a more capacious sense of 
this new, diverse ‘we’.”22 
The American electorate’s view of Europe’s migration 
crisis today is a reflection of this mixed historical 
experience. The US continues to have heated debates 
over admitting more highly-skilled immigrants, reducing 
illegal immigration, and legalising the more than 
11 million unauthorised immigrants already in the 
country. Other lingering issues such as bilingual 
education, an overloaded immigration court system, 
and migrants’ access to basic services, does not however 
prevent hundreds of thousands of individuals and 
families from finding legitimate work and contributing 
to the ‘American way of life’. 
The US and Europe have much to share in addressing 
the migration challenge. According to a recent report 
by the Migration Policy Institute, Germany and Sweden 
received nearly 30,000 unaccompanied minors in 2015; 
nearly as many as during the child migration crisis 
in the US in 2014. This poses urgent questions for 
the transatlantic community about how to support 
municipalities, schools, and employers faced with 
using already limited resources to provide instruction 
and work for refugees of varying skill levels who have 
recently experienced significant trauma or violence.23 
The US political debate over refugees is also similar to 
that in Europe. Approval of the Obama administration’s 
recent decision to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees 
splits along partisan lines. The evangelical Christian 
community is sceptical, while a majority of most self-
identified Catholics or Protestants approve of the 
decision. According to the most recent Pew Poll on 
this question, a third of American respondents say we 
were doing enough to help Europe while nearly half 
of the respondents said that the US should do more.24 
American pundits and politicians are worried about 
how Europe is handling the crisis, though often 
for different reasons. The attack in San Bernardino, 
California in 2015 by a Chicago native and Pakistani 
immigrant has sparked a fierce debate among 
conservatives, with some pointing to the supposed 
danger from Muslims and mass migration in general. 
A few US presidential candidates and others have 
cynically used the bully pulpit to relentlessly stoke 
the anxiety and fears of the moment. 
Many mainstream conservatives oppose mass 
migration because of the perceived threat to national 
identity. The journal American Conservative makes 
the broad claim that mass immigration in Europe and 
the US “obliterates” national culture and is a threat to 
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the values and livelihood of “native” populations.25 
Nonetheless, polls show most Americans would be 
much more concerned with a self-described socialist 
or atheist in the White House (regardless of ethnic 
background) than they would be by a Hispanic or 
Muslim President.26 
Liberals are much more supportive of Chancellor 
Merkel’s defence of ‘European values’ and the 
continuation of an open and tolerant Europe. 
In responding boldly to the refugee crisis, Roger 
Cohen argues that Merkel “stands tall, a European 
leader of immense stature”, whose decision to accept 
over a million refugees prevented a humanitarian 
catastrophe.27 Similarly, Time magazine anointed 
Merkel as the person of the year in 2015 for her “moral 
leadership in a world where it is in short supply.”28
By 2050, the US will become a country of minorities 
with Hispanics and Asians among the fastest growing 
populations. American perspectives on Europe and 
its migration crisis today will likely echo our domestic 
debate on immigration. The sheer scale and speed 
of the migration crisis in Europe is not an immediate 
concern for Americans and in the context of a US 
Presidential campaign, Europe’s troubles seem a 
faraway phenomenon. 
STILL AN OCEAN BETWEEN
These long-term demographic shifts will have 
an important impact on transatlantic relations. 
Official ties between the US and European governments 
remain close, but the governments themselves are 
as of yet not broadly representative of their people. 
As this changes, so too will the level of interaction and 
substantive exchange between ‘elites’ and the average 
citizen across the Atlantic.
Regardless of the evolving identity of the US and 
European electorate, however, the political values and 
policy priorities that form the transatlantic relationship 
will continue to be shaped by three broad trends: 
DIGITISATION
The dominance of US technology companies and US 
global surveillance capabilities has threatened more 
than it has reassured European citizens. Throughout 
the Cold War, half of Europe was effectively governed 
to varying degrees by a surveillance state. Americans 
on the other hand, still perceive a greater threat 
from terrorism than from government intrusion. 
Even a year after Snowden’s revelations, seven in ten 
Americans said that it is more important “for the federal 
government to investigate possible terrorist threats, 
even if that intrudes on personal privacy.”29 Only a third 
of respondents thought privacy should be prioritised 
regardless if that limited the government’s ability to 
investigate potential terrorist attacks.30
This issue will also continue to impact the US-European 
commercial relationship. US companies worry about 
being locked out of European government contracts 
and being targeted by strict EU privacy laws. The US-
EU Safe Harbour Agreement recently struck down by 
the EU’s Court of Justice is only the latest instance of 
a larger dispute about privacy, the open internet, and 
security in a digital age.
GLOBALISATION
There is now deep scepticism on both sides of the 
Atlantic about the mutual economic benefits of trade 
and investment. This is perhaps unusual as both the 
US and Europe have benefited enormously over 
the past half century from Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) and the opening of markets around the world. 
On the other hand, there are deepening anxieties about 
inequality, unemployment, and the consequences of 
the rapid change in technology for the future of work. 
For Americans, the ‘pursuit of happiness’ seems to be 
heavily qualified depending on one’s place of birth or 
education. In Europe, the cleavages wrought by the 
Eurozone crisis between debtor and creditor nations 
will remain even if economies recover in the short term. 
Nonetheless, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) remains one of the most significant 
initiatives to preserve Western prosperity and influence 
a changing global economic order.
INTERVENTION
After his election in 2008, President Obama’s 
administration quickly became bogged down 
in a number of security challenges from closing 
Guantanamo Bay to ‘exiting’ from Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The US response to these challenges highlighted 
differences in European and American perceptions of 
the role of morality and the rule of law in international 
affairs. The experiences of the 20th century have long 
been perceived very differently on both sides of the 
Atlantic. While both shared in the military defeats 
and victories of the World Wars, the civilian costs and 
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the repressive regimes that followed ‘total war’ left 
deep impressions on the politics and values in Europe. 
In contrast, post-war America rose to prosperity, 
was never invaded, and had both the resources and 
inclination to take a leading role in shaping the world 
order – ensuring a relative peace that was not shaken 
by the slow demise of the Soviet Union, but by the 
shock of the terrorist attacks on September 11th. 
The transatlantic alliance will continue to face hard 
questions regarding the use of force in the 21st century. 
The credibility of US assurances against the use of 
torture and the legitimacy of its military actions will 
continue to face great scrutiny. Issues such as Russia’s 
assertive foreign policy, stability in the Middle East, 
and reducing tensions in East Asia will take up a 
considerable amount of policy makers’ time. The US will 
likely continue to push Europe to consider the use of 
coercive power, maintain modern defence capabilities, 
and more closely align US and EU security priorities. 
SAME BED, DIVERGENT DREAMS? 
Transatlantic relations is neither in a ‘renaissance’ 
nor are the divisions between the US and Europe 
unbridgeable. We are instead in a period of adjustment 
as our democracies focus on the internal challenges 
of sustaining economic growth, integrating refugees, 
and reforming political institutions. At the same 
time, Europe and the US are reassessing their 
respective priorities in promoting a liberal, democratic 
world order. 
No single policy success will miraculously turn 
Americans into Europeans or Europeans into Americans. 
It should especially be doubted that a trade agreement 
alone will inspire a new generation of Atlanticists. 
They will be shaped more by their response to the 
crises of the day, discovering that liberty, freedom, 
and the rule of law are more than vague theories; 
they are defended and reframed by every successive 
generation. 
Incorporating the diverse perspectives of a new 
generation and minorities might begin the process 
of forming a new understanding of Atlanticism. In the 
21st century, the values that have shaped the outlook 
of US and European leaders will inevitably be derived 
from more than just a common European heritage. 
Millennials/Generation Y may not remember the Cold 
War or have close familial ties across the Atlantic, 
but this does not preclude this cosmopolitan and 
socially-engaged bloc of voters from understanding 
common values. Americans of European descent are 
not necessarily wedded to their lineage and have a 
worldview informed by their knowledge of cultures 
well beyond the Atlantic. Thus, the future of the 
transatlantic relationship does not belong to North 
America and Western Europe alone. 
The challenges posed by digitisation, globalisation, 
and intervention will require far-reaching cooperation 
among many countries. Too often, however, the 
US and Europe have given rhetorical support to 
initiatives without tangible, sustained commitments. 
The conspicuous absence of EU-US engagement except 
when there is a major disagreement reinforces the 
perception that transatlantic tensions have become 
permanent. Instead, both should use new formats to 
think freely about the global order and the institutional 
changes that are needed to preserve it – not simply 
recite carefully practiced scripts. 
The policy divergences that have emerged between the 
US and Europe are less signs of an inevitable break up, 
but the periodic ups and downs of a close relationship 
with high (and often unrealistic) expectations. 
Forestalling a ‘weak Europe’ or ‘indifferent America’ 
will take more than simple appeals to ‘common values’. 
A mature transatlantic relationship between Europe 
and the US requires that we better understand and 
accept our differences. Despite the acrimony and 
demagoguery of the day, transatlantic relations will 
continue to prosper even as we emphasise different 
aspects of our common history.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  Top-tier European and American studies courses 
and policy institutions should more rigorously 
incorporate the perspectives of younger scholars 
in their publications and events. 
2.  Parliaments and grant-giving institutions should 
sustain funding for professional exchange 
programmes, especially those that prove they serve 
a diverse pool of applicants.
3.  Political leadership should shift from ad-hoc 
crisis management to creating sustained, inter-
governmental policy dialogues on a full range of 
issues relevant to the transatlantic relationship. ■
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EU View: ‘The Europe We Want’:  
Migrants and Europe’s Failure of 
Imagination
Claire Sutherland 
Europe’s approach to the values it purports to hold dear has been shown wanting in the tendency of all European Union (EU) member states, including Germany, to take unilateral action with regard to 
welcoming or stemming refugee flows since summer 2016. An agreement to redistribute asylum seekers 
across Europe has remained all but a dead letter, the Dublin convention has been suspended in practice, 
and the failure of German chancellor Angela Merkel’s calls for a collective response raise fundamental 
questions about the question of EU solidarity. Yet the European Commission is doggedly sticking to its aim 
of lifting all border restrictions in the Schengen area by November 2016, despite a creeping reintroduction 
of controls. At the heart of this is a colossal failure of imagination; a failure to imagine a European project 
that does not simply replicate the ‘us’ and ‘them’ logic of bounded national communities.
In mid-February 2016, Ai Weiwei, the renowned Chinese 
artist and political dissident, clad the neoclassical 
columns of Berlin’s Konzerthaus with 14,000 life jackets 
transported from the Greek Island of Lesbos. This was 
one response to the time he had spent on the island. 
Another was a photograph of him lying on a beach in 
a pose reminiscent of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian toddler 
whose lifeless body was washed up in November 
2015. Ironically, the lifejackets were whisked directly to 
where many of their erstwhile wearers would like to be. 
They cling to a symbol of Europe’s Greco-Roman 
heritage, just as their wearers clung to overcrowded 
boats and the hope of freedom and security. 
But another reading of Ai Weiwei’s work suggests 
itself; perhaps the lifejackets are keeping the 
European edifice afloat. Perhaps they are somehow 
stopping it from crumbling under the weight of its 
own inadequacies and inconsistencies. 
In recent months we have heard voices at the very 
heart of the EU, including those of Federica Mogherini 
(the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy) and Martin Schulz (President of the European 
Parliament), warn that the EU’s future hangs in the 
balance. Commentators echo the gravity of the 
situation for the EU’s raison d’être: 
“three of its fundamental principles are at stake: 
that the continent’s problems can be best solved 
by cooperation; that freedom of movement across 
the EU is in the public interest; and a belief in 
European values and respect for human rights.”1 
The title of this chapter – ‘the Europe we want’ – is 
taken from a statement by Angela Merkel in September 
2015 warning that “If Europe fails on the question of 
refugees, this close connection with universal civil 
rights ... will be destroyed and it won’t be the Europe we 
want.”2 Similarly, in late February 2016, Merkel criticised 
Austria’s current stance of limiting daily intakes of 
refugees with the words “When someone starts to 
define limitations [to immigration], others have to 
suffer. That is not my Europe.”3 
The tendency of all EU member states, including 
Germany, to take unilateral action with regard to 
welcoming or stemming refugee flows has been clear 
since summer 2016. An agreement to redistribute 
asylum seekers across Europe has remained all but a 
dead letter, the Dublin convention has been suspended 
in practice, and the failure of Merkel’s call for a collective 
response do indeed raise fundamental questions about 
the question of EU solidarity, which are rendered all 
the more poignant as continental European politicians 
worry about making potentially counterproductive 
contributions to the Brexit debate. At the same time, 
however, the European Commission is doggedly 
sticking to its aim of lifting all border restrictions in the 
Schengen area by November 2016, despite a creeping 
reintroduction of controls. At the heart of this is a 
colossal failure of imagination; a failure to imagine a 
European project that does not simply replicate the 
‘us’ and ‘them’ logic of bounded national communities. 
A failure to justify why the movement of those who 
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happen to live inside this prized Schengen construct 
should be made ever easier at the same time as the 
barriers against those in Europe’s ‘backyard’ grow ever 
more murderous.4 
When the price of preserving Schengen as the EU’s 
supposed greatest achievement is barbed wire, teargas 
and criminal inaction as men, women and children 
drown daily in the Aegean, does that not devalue the 
achievement?  When the price of preserving European 
wealth and privilege is to lambast and prosecute 
people smugglers as a demonstrably ineffectual 
migrant deterrent, or play a deadly cat and mouse 
game of interception and pushback, whilst turning 
a blind eye to the massive and morally questionably 
profits of the refugee industry, is that price worth 
paying? And when people pile up outside the EU’s 
‘gated community’, turning the EU’s own territory into 
a humanitarian disaster zone, what does that really say 
about ‘us’ and ‘them’?5 At the very least, it questions the 
EU as a bordered zone of ‘airbrushed achievement’ to 
be protected – and this appears to be the EU’s aim – at 
all costs.6 As Adam McKeown put it with the evolution 
of US migration law in mind; 
“the series of concepts used to project North 
Atlantic history as the trajectory of world 
history: natural rights, civilization, family of 
nations, modernization, the community of 
liberal states, and, as often as not, globalization 
itself…helps naturalize global difference and 
justify new projects of expansive regulation.”7 
The logical and ethical incoherence of the EU’s 
current position can be distilled into the following 
three questions: What is ‘the Europe we want’? 
What is ‘my Europe’ and what does it stand for? 
And most importantly, who are ‘we’? This chapter 
addresses these questions in turn, and considers 
the importance for Europe - with its desire to set an 
example to the rest of the world - of moving beyond 
the dichotomy of insides and outsides.
WHAT IS ‘THE EUROPE WE WANT’? 
The foreword to Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson’s book 
Eurafrica, though written only in 2014, evokes a very 
different era, when the EU’s stability and rule of law were 
a great prize to be shared with Ukraine and Ukrainians. 
As at the end of the Cold War, and on the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, the EU offered the tantalising prospect of 
membership, or at least partnership, and thus a share in 
what Ukrainians apparently wanted. As Manuel Barroso, 
President of the European Commission, made clear: 
“They want freedom, they want prosperity, they want 
stability.”8 European flags waved in the streets of Kiev 
were greeted as ‘stars of hope’ and signs of their being 
‘part of the European family’, a sentiment even echoed 
by UK prime minister David Cameron.9 
Fast forward to 2016 and it could be argued that the 
migrants at the gates of Europe want nothing different, 
regardless (for once) of whether they are classed as 
economic migrants or asylum seekers. Nor do those 
European citizens travelling freely to teach English in 
Bulgaria, service boilers in the UK or retire to Spain. 
What makes the EU’s interpretation and facilitation 
of these pretty universal human desires so different 
from place to place? 
What is the moral justification for the further 
securitisation of ‘Fortress Europe’ in order to save the 
Schengen agreement? Why is Schengen worth saving 
more than the souls shoring up in Greece and the many 
hundreds more who have drowned, predictably and 
avoidably, since and despite the short-lived moral 
outrage caused by Alan Kurdi’s death? Why is this 
so called ‘crisis’ repeatedly presented as a zero-sum 
game of either stability or humanity, suggesting that 
‘having it all’ is impossible? Few things in the world 
today appear more nationalistic than the discourse 
about the security of the EU’s borders. The sole basis 
of EU solidarity on this issue is to keep the ‘Other’ out 
and erect a solid barrier between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ while 
the in-fighting continues unabated. Hence the idea 
evoked by Ai Weiwei’s work that the lifejackets are all 
that is keeping the EU afloat.  
Nicholas de Genova highlights how the German anti-
immigrant movement ‘Pegida’ (Patriotische Europäer 
Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes - Patriotic 
Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) describe 
themselves in terms of a ‘patriotic Europeanism’, partly 
to distance themselves superficially from Nazism and 
partly in order to connect with like-minded groups 
across the continent.10 In January 2016, the former 
leader of the far-right English Defence League launched 
a UK Pegida movement, a sign of how an appeal to 
this discourse is to be found across the EU. Migration 
and asylum became part of EU affairs as a result of 
the Tampere European Summit in 1999. Significantly, 
this prompted one of the first protests by the ‘No 
Borders’ collective in Europe, part of a wider movement 
campaigning against border controls.11 
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The Tampere summit signalled a diplomatic move 
from low to high politics that – as the EU’s ongoing 
difficulties in agreeing and enforcing a common 
response to unabated migrant arrivals show - is not 
reflected in the reality of current immigration policy 
or crisis management. Clearly, the EU’s overriding 
emphasis on securing its external borders is a form of 
Europeanism, or nationalism writ large. At the end of 
August 2015, as Chancellor Angela Merkel temporarily 
opened Germany’s borders to those fleeing Syria’s 
civil war, her statements suggested that ‘the Europe 
we want’ is one that upholds human rights and noble 
values. At the same time, the use of the first person 
plural ‘we’ denotes an imagined community at the EU 
level, which necessarily excludes its constitutive ‘Other.’ 
Confronted with that ‘Other’, variously imagined as the 
poor, the persecuted, or the supposedly cultural alien, 
EU countries have proved either openly xenophobic 
or singularly unwilling to articulate the ethical and 
economic imperatives of accepting migrants into 
Europe. Neither is there clear evidence of long-term 
structural planning in order to ensure that pressures 
on housing, health and education caused by new 
residents are not felt disproportionately by already 
disadvantaged households.12 
As Peter Nyers notes, the ‘body politic’ tends to be 
a starting point for political analysis, one against 
which waves wash and migrants bump up.13 
Though clearly not a nation-state, the EU is nonetheless 
a ‘geo-body’ which defines and polices ‘irregular’ 
migrant flows.14 In other words, its strictures, such as 
the Dublin Convention, deem who is ‘irregular’ and its 
agency, Frontex, enforces the EU border on land and 
on sea, sometimes far from the EU’s own territory and 
territorial waters. Nick Vaughan-Williams has argued 
that critiques highlighting the inconsistencies between 
the EU’s humanitarian principles, enshrined in the 
EU’s 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 
and border practices like pushback and ignoring 
distress calls amounting to ‘lethal modes of political 
abandonment’ do not go far enough.15 In his view: 
“situations in which some ‘irregular’ migrants 
are endangered precisely by the authorities 
associated with humanitarian border security 
are not a question of improper implementation 
of the EU’s humanitarian principles, but are 
part of the very logic of border securitization.”16 
The EU’s current rhetoric surrounding its management 
of migrants clearly pits everything the EU stands for 
against the migrant as a threat to those achievements. 
It draws a line between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in the starkest 
terms. For example, the EU Commissioner for migration, 
Dimitris Avramopoulos, has stated: 
“All that we have achieved in the last 60 years 
is at stake and we have to do what we can to 
uphold and safeguard these achievements […] 
We cannot have free movement if we cannot 
manage our external border effectively.”17 
It is useful to consider the EU using Bridget Anderson’s 
concept of ‘community of value’.18 This she defines as:
“composed of people who share common ideals 
and (exemplary) patterns of behavior expressed 
through ethnicity, religion, culture, or language 
– that is, its members have shared values.  
They partake in certain forms of social relations, 
in communities.”19 
To scholars of nationalism, this definition clearly 
overlaps with some common attributes of nations, 
and Anderson acknowledges this. 
The EU itself claims to be a community of shared values, 
as seen in the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the 2007 Berlin 
Declaration, the 2011 Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM) framework, the Copenhagen 
criteria for accession, and the conditionality it imposes 
on trade agreements with third countries. It is this 
community of value on whose behalf President Jose 
Manuel Barroso accepted the Nobel Peace prize in 
2012 and to which Angela Merkel doggedly refers. 
Phrases like ‘Europe’s disgrace’ and ‘shame’ to describe 
the humanitarian situation in Greece, Idomeni, Lesvos 
and along all of Europe’s borders explicitly refer to 
these putative shared values. Values that member 
states now only honour in the breach of previous 
resettlement agreements or by recognising, in this case 
by Lithuania’s president, Dalia Grybauskait?, that a deal 
with Turkey “will be very difficult to implement and is 
on the edge of international law”.20 So, Europe’s refugee 
crisis goes hand in hand with a crisis in European values. 
In the words of EU migration commissioner Dimitris 
Avramopoulos on visiting Idomeni, “The situation is 
tragic, an insult to our values and civilisation.”21
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The EU has been gripped by a prolonged series of so-
called ‘crises’. The latest crisis, focused on the situation 
with Turkey, has led to a ‘one in, one out’ bargain 
that has been presented as a way of undermining 
smugglers’ business model. Surely, a more effective way 
of undermining their business model would have been 
to ensure migrants safe passage to European shores. 
A simple ferry ticket is the failsafe way to disrupt the 
market in ropey dinghies and useless lifejackets. Instead, 
the EU and member state leaders stand by in the full 
knowledge that men, women and children will die, 
whilst heaping moral opprobrium on the smugglers. 
The hypocrisy is quite breathtaking. The European 
ideal has sunk to the bottom of the Mediterranean 
with those lives lost. An organisation and union much-
maligned for its bureaucracy has failed to organise, 
failed to cooperate and failed to save lives. The recent 
decision to repurpose EU humanitarian aid that was 
ring-fenced for areas outside the EU to within its own 
borders is a not inconsiderable acknowledgement of 
its own failure to act, but even this has not addressed 
the shocking suffering in Idomeni and elsewhere. 
Meanwhile, the Brexit campaign cranks into gear 
regardless, a combination of economic calculation and 
pantomime patriotism; It is woefully self-referential, 
self-aggrandising and self-centred. Boudicca for Brexit, 
anyone?22
WHAT IS ‘MY EUROPE’ AND 
WHAT DOES IT STAND FOR?
Nation-states still dominate our understandings of 
political community, including in Europe.23 Physical 
borders between European states might have – in 
some cases – disappeared, but that has not disrupted 
the monolithic, static nature of the state they serve. 
Borders still underpin the enduring hegemony of the 
nation-state and its creation, the EU. Peter Nyers argues 
that the ‘refugee question’ is not a problem to be solved 
or a crisis to be mastered, but a more fundamental 
challenge to rethink the political: 
“It is not that there are no other ways of being 
or acting politically but rather that the success 
of statism as a social movement has rendered 
these alternatives either unacceptable or 
unthinkable”.24 
The grim determination of migrants who continue to 
die in the Channel Tunnel, doughtily march around 
the fences erected before them, or who cross fast-
moving, freezing waters with babes in arms to continue 
their journey north, testifies to their resilience in the 
face of periodically opening and closing borders and 
crude categorisations in terms of nationality, not need. 
The violence inherent in border securitisation and 
enforcement has become more visible, no longer 
confined to the watery realms of the Mediterranean. 
Not content with barbed wire and inaction in the name 
of deterrence, the EU has begun to defend its fortress 
with tear gas and riot police. From a classic International 
Relations (IR) perspective, “the violence involved in 
securing the external borders of the state are justified 
as a necessary precondition for civil political relations 
to flourish within the political community”.25 In the EU’s 
case then, internal harmony is clearly dependent on 
keeping foreigners at bay, and the two are explicitly 
linked in its rhetoric. 
Nick Vaughan-Williams has shown how the EU has 
‘co-opted’ humanitarian principles and thereby 
made it difficult to hold it accountable for human 
rights abuses from an independent vantage point.26 
Add to this the outsourcing and offshoring of border 
practices; including to private security firms, to 
coastguards enforcing territorial sovereignty on the 
high seas, to detention centres in North Africa and 
through bilateral deals with Turkey.27 It is important to 
place the quandary facing Europe in its wider historical 
context, in order to show that the EU is merely repeating 
the well-trodden nation-building path of bordering, 
forgetting and exclusion found in imperial attitudes 
towards (un)civilised society. As Antoinette Burton 
noted, postcolonial historians of Empire “question 
the legitimacy of a national history that views the 
non-white populations of the late twentieth century 
as fallout from the disintegration of empire rather than 
as the predictable outcome of centuries of imperial 
power and engagement.”28 Similarly, Adam McKeown’s 
account of nineteenth century controls on migration 
from Asia to the United States (US) sounds remarkably 
familiar to the present day.29 
McKeown examines how the US reconciled restrictions 
on immigration with democratic, liberal values of 
freedom and progress, a process the EU is engaged in 
right now. He shows how border controls themselves 
served to create and entrench a racist hierarchy 
between the civilised West and the backward rest, 
which in turn justified the mission civilisatrice (civilising 
mission), rendered in the US context as its ‘manifest 
destiny’ to colonise the Philippines, for example. 
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The nineteenth century process of differentiation in 
matters of migration and representation has directly 
shaped the ‘common sense’ basis on which the EU 
tortuously tries to base its distinction between 
European ‘insiders’ – who should benefit from free 
movement and progressive policies – and outsiders, 
who are not even deserving of safe passage to the 
‘hotspots’ that will determine their (safe) return to a 
(questionably safe) third country such as Turkey. 
The ultimate twist is that the price of Turkey’s 
cooperation is to reopen the prospect of Turkish 
accession and allow visa-free travel for a population 
that may open another front on the ‘migration issue.’ 
In this instance, it is not only the country’s leadership 
that is unpalatable to the EU, but the potential for 
unwelcome Gastarbeiter (guest workers) alongside 
temporary tourist and business travellers. The latest 
plan purporting to take migrants to Turkey in return 
for seaborne arrivals, an example of what has been 
called Überrealpolitik (surreal politics), is another 
nail in the coffin in Europe’s community of value.30 
As Bridget Anderson has recently commented, it is 
clear evidence of the EU’s existential, identity crisis; 
“not a refugee crisis facing Europe, but a European 
crisis facing refugees.”31 The one thing the EU has done 
collectively is fail. 
WHO ARE ‘WE’?
Press coverage of migrants seeking to enter the EU 
has been increasingly subverted by the rise of online 
citizen journalism and the intervention of migrants, 
activists and artists. The advent of digital news media 
has arguably enhanced a cosmopolitan perspective, 
that ‘has long been associated with the capacity of 
journalism to bring ‘home’ distant realities and to 
inspire a sense of care and responsibility beyond our 
communities of belonging.’32 Indeed, we can find a 
greater emphasis in some professional journalistic 
practice on bearing witness to suffering, complete 
with its moral and emotional connotations, as opposed 
to adopting a detached and supposedly objective 
perspective.33 This has been accompanied by the 
emergence of a ‘new solidarity’ which has helped 
challenge traditional national media.34 The media 
is clearly key to mobilising feelings of empathy, 
compassion, identification and solidarity in response 
to refugees, but evidence suggests that these feelings 
are unstable and subject to reversal.35 For example, the 
image of the dead toddler Alan Kurdi washed up on a 
Turkish beach “produced a “seismic shock” in terms of 
change of opinion (from being inimical to “migrants” 
to empathic to “refugees”).”36 However, its impact was 
brief and the impetus for political change was limited. 
By contrast, the consolidation of a German backlash 
to Angela Merkel’s refugee policy can be linked to the 
media impact of the sexual assaults that took place in 
Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015 and the subsequent 
spike of the anti-immigrant Alternative für Deutschland 
in the German regional elections of March 2016.37 
The ever-growing number of migrant deaths at sea 
has also led to legal and commemorative movements. 
There have been attempts by activists and victims’ 
families to pursue justice, offer a dignified burial, 
or at least mark the failure to provide a ‘welcoming 
Europe’.38 There have been many commemorative 
interventions that have sought to show solidarity 
with migrant victims and thereby create an ephemeral 
sense of community across conventional borders.39 
This so-called ‘grief activism’ rejects preordained 
national solidarities. One German artists’ collective 
was widely criticised in Germany for moving crosses 
commemorating East Germans who died trying to 
cross the Berlin Wall to the EU’s external borders, which 
it characterised as far more murderous ‘death strips’ 
(Todesstreifen). Its defiant retort included the claim 
“Every society only mourns its own victims.”40 
The ringing phrase repeated in migrant struggles, 
‘We are here because you were there’ encapsulates 
the postcolonial, nationalist context of the European 
crisis playing out today.41 Benedict Anderson wrote 
of the “skein of journeys through which each state 
was experienced” initially by colonial functionaries, 
increasingly by indigenous intelligentsia and today 
by migrants.42 The EU’s failure of imagination lies in 
its inability, despite its supposed supranationalism, 
to put skeins before states. McKeown’s description of 
a “modern world where states were taken for granted 
more than mobility” still stands.43 In other words, the 
EU is never less of a super-state than when it comes 
to migration, as demonstrated by the simple refusal 
of its members to honour the migrant redistribution 
agreement. 
This is not just a failure of imagination but a failure to 
reflect historical fact. As Benedict Anderson suggests 
and Antoinette Burton shows, the well-documented 
movement of colonised people to the imperial 
centre represents a “critical challenge to traditions of 
Western history-writing dependent on the progress 
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of the territorially bounded nations out of which such 
narratives have been produced.”44 In other words, 
official nation-building in Europe has still not embraced 
the postcolonial critique of ‘imagined communities’ 
premised on the fiction of longue durée (the long term 
view of history), organised in bounded serialities and 
existing in homogenous, empty time.45 
As Michael Herzfeld has noted, “the absurdity of 
the human condition surely comes to a head with 
official claims to everlasting nationhood.”46 The EU 
is hamstrung by the same failure to acknowledge its 
imperial influences, the spurious distinction between 
mobility and migration and, understandably for a 
world order organised as it is, an inability to imagine 
human relations as skeins rather than states. More than 
twenty years on from the publication of Edward Saïd’s 
Orientalism, the lessons of history have yet to have any 
impact on European imaginings of ‘us’ and ‘them’.47
CONCLUSION
The Nobel prize-winning EU presents itself as a beacon 
of democracy, human rights and values that Angela 
Merkel can conjure simply as ‘my Europe’ and the 
‘Europe we want’ despite “the most egregious human 
rights abuses in the context of Europe’s border crisis.”48 
Bridget Anderson paints a picture of the Good Citizen 
in this community of value as firmly ensconced in 
an unreflective liberal worldview, produced from a 
“history and culture that does not acknowledge its 
own particularity.”49 However, as Peo and Hansen have 
shown in their book Eurafrica, the European integration 
project is a very particular product indeed.50 As they 
carefully document, the EU grew from imperial states’ 
post-war concern with retaining soon-to-be former 
colonies within their sphere of influence. The European 
project remains riddled with racialised, hierarchical 
assumptions that shape its border and migration 
policy along parallel lines to the US in the nineteenth 
century.51 
I myself have uncritically taught students the founding 
myth of European integration, consisting in the post-
war consensus to bind France and Germany, the 
Schuman declaration, the creation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community to control the raw materials 
of conflict, and so on in a litany of treaties from Rome, 
to Maastricht, to Amsterdam and to Lisbon. I shall 
never do so again. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  Establish a Mediterranean ferry ticket system for 
refugees to disrupt the people smuggling market 
that forces refugees to use dinghies and useless 
lifejackets instead of being able to claim asylum 
safely. 
2.  Stop relying on volunteers and NGOs to carry out 
humanitarian work in Greece (and France, and 
Italy) that the EU is funded and equipped to do, 
and immediately air-lift all those languishing in 
inhuman conditions at Idomeni and other closed 
borders (including Calais and Dunkerque) to safety, 
using the EU’s existing quota distribution system. 
3.  Urgently end and investigate the prison-like and 
catastrophic living conditions at the ‘Vial’ ‘hotspot’ 
detention centre on the Greek island of Chios, and 
the ‘hotspot’ system as a whole. ■
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THE RISE OF THE OTHER POWERS
The end of the Cold War seemed to herald the triumph 
of liberal capitalism as an ordering principle for the 
global system.1 The 1990s were preoccupied with 
development, human security, and failed states; all 
focused on shoring up rather than replacing the liberal 
international order. 
However, a series of financial crises in Asia, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe hinted at the difficulty of 
western-style financial reform. The debate on emerging 
powers coalesced around the ‘BRICs’-term in November 
2001, when Jim O’Neill, Head of Global Economic 
Research at Goldman Sachs Economic Research 
Group, coined the acronym in a report describing 
the four fastest growing emerging markets over the 
previous decade.2 Brazil, Russia, India, and China were 
all revealed to be dynamic and exciting emerging 
markets whose GDP growth would exceed that of 
G7 nations by 2002 and make up 10% of the global 
economy by 2010. A follow-up paper, produced by 
Goldman Sachs in November 2007 claimed that the 
BRICs had out-performed expectations: equity markets 
had seen a remarkable increase in value; Brazil rising 
by 369%, Russia rising by 630%, India, by 499%, and 
China by 201%. The combined weight of all four had 
already reached 15% of the global economy. 
The implication was that the emergence of these new 
powers would impact global governance, reflected in 
a growing vein of academic writing linking economics 
and security with global governance architecture.3
The writing on these rising economies quickly developed 
a distinctly geopolitical flavour, highlighting North-South 
divisions, capitalists-developing nation distinctions, and 
Western-non-Western political cultures.4 The Chinese 
People’s Daily (Beijing) exemplified this new apparent 
shift, represented by the BRICs: 
“The rise of the BRICs is also changing the 
world order. This is happening not only because 
of the BRIC’s robust economic growth, but 
also because of their role as an initiator and 
motivator of the new international order. The 
four countries advocate the democratization 
of international relations, oppose hegemony, 
and call for respect for global diversification. 
As developing nations, they have had the 
opportunity to learn from others and offset 
their own weaknesses.”5
In some writings the emerging powers were rising to 
challenge Western dominance, and in other examples 
to challenge American dominance. Naturally, this 
impacted how American academics and policymakers 
viewed the ultimate evolution of the BRICs and their 
potential to reshape the preferred world order of the 
United States (US). This has led to debates around the 
future of the global order and the future of American 
power by international relations theoreticians. Some 
like Joseph Nye have written in Foreign Affairs that 
American decline has only been relative, and that the 
United States still has the capacity to lead.6 Others like 
Fareed Zakaria, have implicitly accepted American 
decline, as in ‘The Post-American World’, arguing instead 
US View:  
Selective and Ambivalent Thinking
John Hemmings 
As we approach the end of the Obama presidency it is clear that the American approach toward emerging powers over the past 10 years has been marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, emerging 
powers have come to symbolise the success of the Western liberal-economic model and a natural part of 
globalisation; on the other hand, the rise of new powers has occurred in the background of relative decline 
of American power and a concern that political liberalisation has not always accompanied economic 
liberalisation within the emerging powers. Therefore, American policy and academic writings have viewed 
emerging powers as both opportunities and as new geopolitical challenges to both American power and 
to the future of the liberal international order.
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for a new strategy as an “honest broker” 
in dealing with “the rise of the rest”.7 
This debate has also focused on the 
future of the global system, argued 
between liberals and realists. 
American liberal thinkers like John 
Ikenberry have argued that while the US 
and the West are experiencing relative 
decline, liberal internationalism is not, as 
the rising powers increasingly embrace 
institutions and other sovereignty-
eroding forms of cooperation.8 Rather 
than contesting the system, he argues, 
they are merely attempting to gain 
more authority and leadership within 
that system. China’s Asian Investment 
and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) is a case 
in point: it seeks not to supplant the 
methods or principles of the liberal 
order, merely to raise China’s profile 
and interests in that order. 
These views contrast with the pessimism 
of Charles Kupchan and Walter Russell 
Mead who argue that the decline of 
Western power is also about the decline 
in liberal international norms and 
values9. Mead’s argument that Russia 
and China in particular are authoritarian 
states who seek to undo the post Cold 
War liberal victory has gained resonance 
since Russia absorbed Crimea through 
military action and subsequent 
referendum, and since China began 
building islands in a contested maritime 
space in the South China Sea. 
Not all thinkers that accept decline have 
been so pessimistic, however. Some 
works have focused on the benefits to 
the US, such as Charles Kenny’s ‘The 
Upside of Down: Why the Rise of the 
Rest is Good for the West’, where he 
sought to explain why no longer having 
the world’s largest GDP would actually 
advance American exports.10
Finally, there has been a discussion on 
whether many rising economies are 
still on track to overtake the US and 
the West. This has been particularly 
prevalent since 2014, when the US 
economy saw real improvement while 
the BRICS have suffered serious set-
backs, or felt the competition from the 
MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and 
Turkey.)11 
The term BRICs has taken on geopolitical 
connotations, which do not serve 
intellectual clarity. For that reason, 
this article deals primarily with newly-
risen powers China, India and Brazil 
and leaves out Russia. This is party 
because until 1990 Russia was itself a 
superpower and does not really fit as 
an ‘emerging economy’. Indeed, since 
the mid-2000s, there have been serious 
doubts that Russia constitutes a ‘rising 
power’; despite all the hard power 
elements of Russian interference in 
Syria and revanchism in Ukraine, Russia 
is declining in all the important long-
term ways that count. Demographically, 
its population is decreasing; its 
economy is in tatters, overly-
reliant on low-cost oil exports, with 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating agency 
downgrading Russia to ‘junk’ in 2015. 
It is sanctioned by two of the largest 
economies in the world, the US and 
the European Union (EU), and domestic 
governance is looking less positive. 
The geographic dislocation of the 
BRICs label, their differing economic 
models (two are resource-driven, two 
are export-reliant) and different regime 
types (two are democracies, while two 
are authoritarian) raise serious questions 
about the long-term use of the BRICs as 
an academic term or political grouping.12 
THE RISE OF CHINA
No other power excites debate about 
emerging powers among American 
policymakers and academics quite 
like China. Its incredible economic 
growth and military modernisation has 
increasingly defined American foreign 
policy in the post-Iraq space, promoting 
No other power 
excites debate 
about emerging 
powers among 
American 
policymakers and 
academics quite 
like China.
‘
’
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an increasing preoccupation with Asian and maritime 
security. It has raised both day-to-day policy challenges, 
as well as deeper theoretical challenges on the peaceful 
rise of powers in history. This debate has often pitted 
those within the realist tradition against neoliberal 
institutionalists. 
The history of China in American policy has an 
interesting arc. Following the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown in 1989, Sino-American ties underwent 
a deep freeze. Despite this, the George H.W. Bush 
presidency (1989-1993) encouraged the resumption 
of high-level political ties and vetoed attempts by 
Congress to link the political relationship to progress 
in human rights. There was a belief that economic 
liberalisation would lead to political liberalisation. 
Until that time, American policy would hedge against 
two outcomes: a friendly, liberal China and a strong, 
challenger China. 
This binary reveals itself in the varying articles about 
China in the early 1990s. Was Asia ripe for rivalry? 
Aaron Friedberg’s pessimistic 1993 International Security 
article thought so.13 Others, like David Shambaugh, 
wondered if the US should enact an engagement 
policy or containment policy.14 Some like Patrick Cronin, 
Kenneth Lieberthal, and James Shinn have argued for 
various forms of engagement, which deeply coloured 
Clinton policy on China. Others like Arthur Waldron, 
Gideon Rachman, and Gerald Seagal recommended 
‘constrainment’ or varying forms of containment. 
This debate spilled over into the policy community, 
in what became known as the ‘Red Team/Blue Team’ 
debates. ‘Blue Team’ members included congressional 
staffers, journalists, and policy academics who were 
hawkish on China, while ‘Red Team’ members preferred 
engagement and accommodation. Blue Teamers 
painted the 1996 campaign finance controversy 
(in which the Chinese government was alleged to 
have been trying to influence US domestic politics 
through donations to political campaigns) as a 
sign of growing Chinese influence in Washington. 
In Congress, they publicised accounts of Chinese 
defence-related espionage – as described in the 1999 
Cox Report – and sought to show how growing Chinese 
military capabilities would make it a threat one day, 
requiring from 2000 annual reports from the Defense 
Department and the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission. The 1995-6 Taiwan Crisis and 
1999 Belgrade bombing seemed to raise China’s threat 
profile, though trade was delinked from security issues. 
The incoming G.W. Bush administration in 2001 was 
deeply sceptical of China, seemingly justifiably after 
their first crisis; the P-3 Incident off of Hainan Island 
(in which their was a mid-air collision between a US 
Navy signals intelligence aircraft and a Chinese Navy 
fighter jet). The administration’s attitude softened in 
its second term as Robert Zoellick attempted a charm 
offensive from the State Department, initiating the 
‘responsible stakeholder’ approach. 
In the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the Obama 
administration seemed to follow the Zoellick approach, 
with James Steinberg emphasizing the management of 
tensions as China underwent what Chinese President Xi 
Jinping called ‘the great revival of the Chinese nation.’ 
A growing perception in Washington and regional 
capitals that Chinese ‘assertiveness’ had risen in the face 
of accommodation led to a backlash in the second term. 
The Rebalance to Asia, or ‘Pivot’, rolled out in 2011 is 
intended to invigorate American leadership in the 
region and while it is not aimed at China, there is no 
doubt that China’s rise plays a part in its conception. 
It’s built around the three pillars of economic, security, 
and political engagement, and have seen a large uptick 
in activities between the US and its allies, between 
the US and China, and between the US and ASEAN 
member-states. 
American writing on China has increased immensely, 
commiserate with its standing as the world’s next 
largest economy and military power. Writers have 
tended to come from two groups: China-watchers and 
IR scholars/security experts. China watchers like Iain 
Alastair Johnston, Harry Harding, David Lampton, David 
Shambaugh, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael Pillsbury 
have tended to adopt culturally nuanced approaches 
to policy, basing their analyses on cultural, linguistic, 
and network familiarity within China. Their tone varies 
widely between Shambaugh’s, ‘The Tangled Titans: the 
United States and China’, and Pillsbury’s book, ‘One 
Hundred Year Marathon’.15 Others ponder the efficacy 
of American policymaking, like Harry Harding’s ‘Has US 
China Policy Failed?’ Those who have a more general 
IR background focus on the US-China relationship or 
rising power debates. This includes a wide range of 
academics and practitioners, including Henry Kissinger, 
Henry Paulson, James Steinberg and Evan Medeiros, 
who advocate a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. Others like 
Aaron Friedberg, John Mearsheimer, Ashley Tellis, 
Robert Kaplan and Peter Dutton predict or seek to 
explain growing tensions and competition.
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Over the past decade, much of the debate has 
been on whether the engagement policy vis-à-
vis China has been successful in the long-term. 
Harry Harding’s Washington Quarterly piece, ‘Has US 
China Policy Failed?’, traces the reasons for American 
disappointment in China, looking at Washington’s 
hopes for political liberalisation inside China as 
well as the expectation that Beijing would become 
an active supporter of the international system.16 
The fact that under Xi Jingpin, political control has 
been tightened over the media, over universities, 
and NGOs has played into this disappointment. 
As for a global role, China’s willingness to create 
regional organisations like Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the AIIB are seen as 
challenging to American interests, while its maritime 
disputes with American allies Japan and the Philippines 
are dramatically increasing regional insecurity. 
INDIA
No factor about India has excited more interest and 
debate in US writing on India than the fact that it is 
a fellow democracy. Its history as a British colony, 
its Hindu culture, and its place in the non-aligned 
movement during the Cold War have all become less 
important to American international relations scholars 
than the fact that it is the world’s largest democracy. 
This says as much about American ideological 
preferences and the nature of the global order, the 
desire for a continued liberal democratic order, and the 
hope that India might serve as a balance to China’s rise. 
Ultimately, both literatures merge through the 
debate on the future of the liberal order; as India 
is seen as friendlier to liberal values than China, it 
plays a large role in both neoliberal arguments and in 
geopolitical, realist-style arguments. A recent Council 
on Foreign Relations Task force reported, “A rising India 
offers one of the most substantial opportunities to 
advance American national interests over the next 
two decades.”17 
Notably, Indian views of this development are 
rather dour: 
“’There is a hysterical sense, encouraged by the 
West, about India’s rise.’ A top-level official in 
India’s foreign ministry echoed the sentiment: 
‘When do we Indians talk about it? We don’t.’”18
Nevertheless, US policy has tried to balance its concerns 
over India’s nuclear weapons programme and human 
rights infractions towards India’s Muslim minorities with 
this larger strategic narrative. However, the US is not 
the only state to view India in this geopolitical manner. 
Shinzo Abe, the current Japanese Prime Minister, 
has made stronger ties with India a key point in his 
global strategy. This has led to some new geopolitical 
groupings, as the US and Japan held naval exercises 
with India and recently upgraded their trilateral 
strategic dialogue with India to the ministerial level 
in 2015. 
For much of the early 1990s, American academia and 
policymakers focused on either India’s environmental 
issues or with India’s role as a nuclear power (it tested 
its first bomb in 1974, as the US was attempting to 
negotiate the non-proliferation treaty). The US 
decision to impose sanctions on India in the wake of 
the 1998 nuclear tests, which followed the Pakistani 
test, defined bilateral ties for much of the early 2000s. 
It was difficult for American policymakers to square their 
preferences for non-proliferation with the triumphant 
and often defiant tone of Indian writings on the issue. 
While canvassing against the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Geneva, for example, Indian 
former foreign secretary A. P. Venkatsewaran stated 
that some of India’s “own analysts are guilefully 
Uncle-Tomming such a course of action on the 
servile argument that we should not displease the 
great powers.”19 Given the dominant place the late 
Clinton administration gave to stopping the spread 
of dangerous technologies, US-India ties seemed 
frozen. The 1999 US National Security Strategy 
explicitly mentioned strengthening the CTBT, the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, and the IAEA safeguards system.20 
The 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement was a 
significant geopolitical event, though perhaps this has 
only become evident in hindsight. For one thing, the 
agreement allowed the United States and India to move 
past the nuclear split, agreeing on a framework for 
cooperation and continued Indian non-membership 
to the NPT and CTBT. It is perhaps no surprise that 
one of the lead negotiators on the deal, Ashley Tellis, 
views the deal very much through the prism of US 
geopolitical strategy vis-à-vis China. He defended the 
deal in the 2006 ‘Atoms for War? US-Indian Civilian 
Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal’, and 
considered the future of US-Indian partnership in 
‘What Should We Expect from India as a Strategic 
Partner?’ in Henry Sokolski’s ‘Gauging US-Indian 
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Strategic Cooperation’.21 Daniel Twining, an influential 
voice in American policy, has predicted closer ties 
between Washington and New Delhi to balance Beijing. 
His writings include ‘Not a Chinese Century, an Indo-
American One’.22 Working at the German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, he and colleague Dhruva 
Jaishankar look at the intersection between Indian 
foreign policy and American grand strategy. This has 
increasingly spilled over into the maritime sphere, 
looking at India’s growing naval capabilities and forces.
Naturally, the perception of India’s growing strategic 
importance for American writers has led to a surge 
in writing on Indian domestic and foreign policies, 
particularly the impact of the election of Narendra 
Modi - a far more outgoing leader than his predecessor 
Manmohan Singh. Recently, American writers have also 
begun to look to India’s role in shaping future global 
institutions and its place in the climate change debate. 
BRAZIL
Brazil is the fifth most populous country in the world 
and occupies nearly half of the South American 
continent. However, Americans write substantially 
less about Brazil compared to India and China. 
Despite the fact that the two share continental 
proximity, there is simply not the same strong interest 
in academic and policy literature and American Latin 
American policy seems decentralised. In many ways, 
this is due to the on and off again nature of the political 
relationship, which has waxed and waned for the past 
60 years. 
Much American writing that does focus on Brazil 
examines its foreign policy in a South American context, 
its trade and investment relations, and its general 
part in the BRICs phenomenon. Often, it has danced 
between playing a bridging and a countervailing role 
between the US and other powers. For example, it has 
often played a bridging role between Washington and 
other South American regional states – such as when 
President Lula befriended both Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez and President George W. Bush; it has 
also sought to negotiate between Tehran and the 
West (as it did alongside Turkey in 2010), and more 
recently, tried unsuccessfully to mediate between 
Western powers and Russia over the Syrian Civil War. 
Because of the delicate nature of these diplomatic 
efforts, American writings on Brazil have struggled to 
understand Brazil’s global role. 
In the 1990s, the regional integration project Mercosur 
began to attract more attention in American academic 
circles.23 Reflecting the growing global trends in 
regional integration projects, like the EU and ASEAN, 
Mercosur seemed the South American answer. The fact 
that Brazil’s population and economic size was so much 
larger than the other member states also raised the 
question of whether Brazil would become the group’s 
leader – and by extension a regional leader. Samuel A. 
Arieti, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Carl Meacham have all 
written about Brazil’s regional political and economic 
profile in this light and sought to predict the course 
of Brazil’s regional leadership. 
Naturally, interest in Brazil’s trade and political profile 
has only grown stronger, as Brazil has joined new 
groupings such as Union of South American Nations 
(UNAUSUR), Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), BRIC and the G20 over the 
last 10 years. Despite – or perhaps because of – high 
expectations, a growing number of American experts 
have begun writing on Brazil’s inability to reach its 
own goals. Harold Trinkunas and David Mares book, 
‘Aspirational Power: How Brazil Tries to Influence the 
International Order and why it so Often Fails’ is a case in 
point.24 Both Trinkunas and Ralph Espach have written 
on aspects of defence and security for Brazil and region 
for some decades, often focusing on civil-military 
affairs, defence policy, and the relationship with the 
US.25 As can be imagined, there is a long tradition of 
disappointment in American inattention of US-Brazil 
relations. Well known examples, include Julia E. Sweig’s 
‘Global Brazil and US-Brazil Relations’, and Monica 
Hirsts’ ‘The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of 
Unmet Expectations’.26
CONCLUSION
As we approach a confused and contentious 
presidential campaign in the US, it is uncertain how 
easily it will maintain its soft power leadership over 
the liberal international order in the coming years. 
It must reaffirm its commitment to the norms and 
ideals that gained European and East Asian support 
in the first place, resisting either churlish isolationism 
or populist approaches to foreign policy. One facet 
of US leadership has been its strong hold over soft 
power, something that will be badly needed as a 
number of rising powers consider authoritarianism 
and democracy as credible alternatives. 
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It is clear that in considering emerging powers, 
American academia and policy writings do not consider 
all powers equally. China has garnered by far the most 
analysis and writing. One might argue that its long 
history and ancient culture drive this interest, but 
much the same could be said about India. More likely, 
it is China’s place as a question mark in the minds of 
American policy makers which drives the large need 
for analysis and writing. 
China’s rise has been far more prevalent than the others, 
and its potential to re-order the global system that 
much more credible, and its growing implicit reliance 
on force – as in the South China Sea – that much more 
unnerving. The fact that its regional aspirations are 
hemmed in by the American network of alliances in the 
Asia and Pacific indicate that American political elites 
will have to find the line between accommodation and 
appeasement. Security does drive research. 
On the other hand, size matters. Everyone does China 
now, one might say churlishly. With that said and done, 
it is also true that a great many Americans thinkers have 
sought to place the rise of emerging powers into a grand 
strategic or theoretical framework. Unfortunately, while 
much work has been useful, fascinating, and thought-
provoking, the disparity of answers indicate how far 
we are from knowing what will eventually occur. 
The debate between Ikenberry, Measheimer, and 
Kupchan is a case in point. All have different predictions 
for how emerging powers will affect American power. 
All would seem to base their analyses on sound 
modelling. However, not all can be right. 
Cooler heads must prevail in dealing with such an 
emotionally charged battlefield. The rhetoric that 
emanated from newly-emerging powers in the post-
BRICs period seemed full of schadenfreude about the 
power transition that seemed set to take place, which 
has in turn provoked overly-fearful predictions of 
Western eclipse. One senses that the narratives around 
emerging economies played into older North-South/
Cold War post-colonial narratives. However, in drawing 
on these narratives, many have made wildly incorrect 
or overly-linear predictions. 
The fall of the BRICs label, upon which this paper was 
partially based, is a case in point. A swift search of the 
global press brings up the following headlines: ‘The 
Failure of the BRICS reveals the Folly of Fuzzy Acronyms’ 
(The Telegraph); ‘Why 3 or the 4 BRICs are Failing to 
Meet the World’s Expectations’ (BusinessInsider); 
‘Whatever Happened to the BRICs?’ (Financial Times); 
‘The BRICs Fallacy’ (CSIS); ‘Think Again: the BRICs’ 
(Foreign Policy), and; ‘Broken BRICs’ (Foreign Affairs). 
Clearly, these titles are as guilty of over-simplification 
as those predicting the dawning of a new age. 
Whatever the case, it is clear that American thinkers 
have some way to go in realising how the US will 
function in the new age. The term ‘decline’ implies that 
it will simply disappear into the political landscape, 
but as Joseph S. Nye as pointed out, the sources of 
American demographic and economic power will 
remain for some time. While no longer hegemonic, the 
nation will have to adjust to a new role of ‘first among 
equals’, of go-between, facilitator, and perhaps almost-
indispensable nation. Whatever the case, American 
academics and policy writers will have to continue 
trying to frame the global environment in a way that 
is meaningful for policy elites. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  The US should frame the challenges of authoritarian 
states to the rules-based liberal order, rather than 
as a challenge to American hegemony. A relatively 
weaker US will have to rely on deft diplomacy and 
appeals to the collective interests of its partners 
and allies.
2.  The US should provide idea leadership and promote 
a liberal approach to the future of the international 
order among like-minded states. It should, for 
example, seek to uphold UN-related rules and 
institutions – and should ratify The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a 
sign of its commitment.
3. The US should continue to welcome newly-
empowered responsible stakeholders into the 
system, and seek to impose collective costs on those 
who resort to the use of force in their international 
disputes. Ignoring geopolitics and the use of force 
can only lead to more fragility in the system. ■
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EU-US-China relations and climate deals:  
a threat to transatlantic relations? 
Julia Teebken 
Is the recent United States (US)-China climate engagement an historic milestone that can positively shape US-European relations, or does it pose a threat to the transatlantic relationship? The US-China climate 
agreement has created suspicion amongst some European politicians that the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia has left 
them in the shadows cast by emerging powers. However, recent bilateral US-China climate engagement 
offers fruitful grounds for a strengthened transatlantic partnership, newly empowered triangular relations 
between China, the European Union (EU) and US, as well as greater environmental cooperation internationally. 
European politicians’ reactions – analysed here through their tweets – to the US-China engagement 
were positive, pointing towards an empowered transatlantic relationship that is part of multilateral 
climate cooperation.
Opinions diverge as to how the end of the Cold 
War and the era that followed it changed the 
transatlantic relationship and what factors were 
decisive. Undeniably, the rise of emerging powers 
such as China and India has played a significant 
role. Their economic development became a crucial 
determinant in explaining new geopolitical power 
constellations globally. Whereas some opinion leaders 
believe contemporary geopolitics is best explained 
by the rise of developing countries and ‘Asian tigers’ 
causing a decline of ‘Western influence’, others have 
emphasised increased hegemonic rivalry between 
great powers such as China, Russia, and the US as 
central to understanding global power. The bulk of 
the academic literature has emphasised a shift from a 
bipolar (in some cases unipolar) to an interdependent 
multipolar world order.1 Whereas the former bipolar 
order was determined by a strong US-European alliance 
that “provided the core of the international order”,2 the 
new world order is characterised by more nuanced 
distributions of power, with multiple state and non-
state centres of power. 
Overall, there is a tendency to define power in the 
context of economic, military and political strength. 
Closely intertwined are factors such as the size of a 
territory and/or population. Through an environmental 
lens, power, at least to some degree, ironically rests on 
a country’s level of pollution, which is connected to the 
leverage it has in the international climate negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Based on their share of 
global CO2 emissions, China, the US, India, Russia and 
Japan were the top five emitters in 2015. When looking 
at the total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of a region 
or country, the EU ranks third after the US and China. 
In the context of climate change, therefore, emerging 
powers such as China, India, Indonesia and Brazil have 
clearly become important players.3 Nonetheless, with 
regards to their fossil fuel emissions, China and the US 
outrank other rising as well as industrialised countries. 
In 2014 both contributed approximately 43% of the fossil 
fuel emissions globally, totalling 35,890 Metric tonnes 
of CO2 (MtCO2) emissions, China being responsible for 
9,680 MtCO2 and the US for 5,561 MtCO2.4 
By keeping in mind what power can mean from an 
environmental standpoint, this chapter seeks to analyse 
how the transatlantic relationship was influenced by 
the bilateral climate cooperation that China and the US 
have built in recent years. It asks whether their recent 
climate engagement can be considered a historic 
milestone that positively shapes US-European relations, 
or whether it poses a threat to the transatlantic 
relationship. To do so the chapter examines European 
and Chinese views of the transatlantic relationship, 
focusing on climate policy. It then takes a closer look 
at the international and transatlantic implications of 
the November 2014 US-China climate agreement, 
paying particular attention to European perceptions. 
To explore these perceptions the chapter looks at 
the Twitter reactions to the agreement of European 
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politicians. Twitter has proven to be a useful instrument 
for perpetuating a rhetorical narrative of the EU as a 
role model and indispensable leader in environmental 
politics. As will be shown, Twitter fulfilled a range of 
different political functions, which were of advantage 
for communicating European environmental policies. 
The final section looks at how developments over 
addressing climate change have created opportunities 
for a reinvented transatlantic relationship as part of a 
triangular relationship between China, Europe and 
the US. 
CHINESE AND EUROPEAN VIEWS 
OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
Chinese views of European attitudes to the transatlantic 
relationship have highlighted the tensions that have 
developed since the end of the Cold War. David 
Shambaugh outlines five principal sources, which, 
from a Chinese perspective, explain US-European 
differences: the end of the Soviet Union, which meant 
the basis of the transatlantic alliance was gone; the 
consequences of 9/11 and Bush’s ‘war on terror’ marking 
the end of transatlantic solidarity in 2002; the invasion 
of Iraq; the European desire to ‘be independent’ of the 
US; and differing world views.5 
Shambaugh critically reflects on many of these. 
The first explanation partially neglects the “historical, 
cultural, ethnic and political foundations of transatlantic 
relations”.6 The second explanatory angle looks at the 
lack of transatlantic harmony through emphasising 
European resentment towards the Bush administration. 
Closely connected with this is the third reason: the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, which remains a 
prominent justification for distance from the US. 
Whereas the fourth explanation reflects China’s own 
desire for national independence (a poor judgement 
according to Shambaugh), the fifth reason provides an 
interesting analysis by contrasting a European model 
with an American one.7 Shambaugh concludes that 
although some explanatory angles are overstated by 
those in China who follow Europe and the transatlantic 
relationship and are examples of ‘cognitive dissonance’, 
some do help to explain potential underlying dynamics 
of transatlantic tensions that remain in place today. 
In examining Obama’s conception of multilateralism, 
Bruce Jones offers a more nuanced view of the ‘traumas’ 
that transformed the transatlantic relationship. 
Overall, Jones describes the pattern of US-European 
cooperation in the post-Cold War period as mixed, given 
both phases of alienation and intensified collaboration. 
In the case of international development, Jones states, 
US-European relations deepened. In line with Chinese 
European theorists, most European transatlantic 
analysts seem to agree that the Bush era marked a 
phase of alienation and growing anti-US sentiment. 
However, according to Jones, it was particularly 
the first term of the Bush administration that led to 
growing alienation of European elites. Although the 
second term of the Bush era is said to have been more 
cooperative,8 the aftermath of the Iraq war marked the 
beginning of a new phenomenon: “namely the gradual 
rebalancing of international order to encompass the 
‘emerging powers.’”9 In his critical analysis of potentially 
clashing US-Europe relations, Jones makes two central 
arguments: first, Europe and the US have different 
versions of multilateralism, and second, the centre of 
gravity may gradually shift away from transatlantic 
relations with growing attention on emerging powers. 
The initial European delight when Barack Obama 
took over as President with a different foreign 
policy emphasis in 2009 gave hope for a different 
conclusion. However, according to Jones, European 
perceptions of the Obama administration were 
later on negatively influenced by disappointment 
at continued climate change inaction by the US. 
Although the Obama administration declared 
climate change a high priority on the policy agenda, 
particularly in his second term, this had not had 
any impact at the time of Jones’ analysis in 2009. 
Thus, tensions on climate change and diverging 
approaches to wars such as that in Afghanistan 
were given as the primary reasons to explain 
severe differences between the European vision of 
multilateralism and the American approach. 
The ‘Regent’s Report’ on transatlantic relations likewise 
emphasises climate change and energy security as 
important new areas of multilateral cooperation.10 
At the same time, these areas have the potential 
to undermine transatlantic relations thanks to the 
rising energy demands of emerging markets in Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. In particular, 
inertia by the major emitters China and the US in 
international climate change negotiations has played 
a crucial role in defining and limiting Europe’s position 
in environmental politics. It has cast doubts on the 
possibility of the transatlantic relationship being a 
way forward for Europe in tacking climate change. 
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PROGRESS IN US-CHINA 
CLIMATE ENGAGEMENT
According to the Director of Chatham 
House, Robin Niblett, the slow-moving 
international climate negotiations, 
particularly the Copenhagen summit 
in 2009, exposed the limitations of 
European influence on domestic 
American politics as well as “the limits 
of US influence on the world’s emerging 
powers in this area”.11 This has led to 
much speculation as to whether or not 
multilateralism is dead. Whereas some 
argued that the multilateral approach 
is deadlocked and there was an urgent 
need to rethink climate governance 
altogether,12 others outlined scenarios 
of a multilateral climate process which 
had turned into a zombie “staggering on 
but never quite dying.”13 Two decades 
of intergovernmental multilateralism 
under the UNFCCC had resulted in only 
one internationally binding treaty, the 
Kyoto protocol. In this context, the 
stance of the Bush administration had 
come under intense scrutiny. The failure 
of the then biggest GHG emitter to sign 
on to the Kyoto protocol was interpreted 
as a sign of how weak multilateralism 
was. In 1997 however, the role of China 
and calls for drastic emission reductions 
from an emerging but still developing 
country were less common than today. 
Some of the multilateralism-critical 
literature concentrated on calling for 
a rebirth of the multilateral approach14 
and multilateral innovation for climate 
stabilisation.15 Concerns for the future 
of a multilateral way forward grew 
when China replaced the US as the 
biggest GHG polluter in 2006. Due to 
their pollution contributions, China and 
the US together are said to be the chief 
climate negotiators – the “two gorillas 
in the room”.16 This added to European 
fears that bilateral US-China relations 
would override relations between 
the EU and US and wider multilateral 
efforts. China and the US could then 
force the rest of the world to accept a 
“lower common denominator” through 
a bilateral deal.17 
In the most part, recent developments 
have run contrary to this interpretation. 
The US-China climate agreement of 
November 2014 has not resulted in 
lower environmental denominators, 
but an increased momentum in global 
commitment. The November agreement 
and the September 2015 joint 
presidential statement of Xi Jinping and 
Barack Obama shortly before the climate 
conference were of great significance for 
the international contributions to the 
Paris Agreement (PA). The Paris climate 
summit in 2015 gained traction through 
the submission of Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs). 
INDCs reflect a country’s ambition 
for reducing their GHG emissions 
besides committing to other national 
contributions. Although non-legally 
binding, 160 INDCs were submitted 
to the UNFCCC, representing 187 
countries and covering 98.6% of global 
GHG emissions, thereby breaking with 
former dynamics and threat scenarios.18 
Aside from scepticism regarding how 
ambitious the submitted targets are, or 
how realistic their implementation will 
be in the different national contexts, 
the PA was welcomed as “a landmark 
in international climate policy”.19 It was 
the first time that almost all countries, 
independent of their historical 
emissions and current development 
status, submitted reduction targets and 
made a contribution to the international 
climate negotiations. 
The bilateral agreement hit most climate 
watchers and the general public by 
surprise due to its ambitious energy 
cooperation and reduction targets. 
In essence, both countries delivered 
more ambitious climate pledges: the 
US doubled its emission reductions by 
committing to reduce carbon pollution 
by 26-28% by 2025, compared to 2005 
levels. China announced that it intends 
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CO2 emissions to peak around 2030 
(potentially earlier), and to increase 
the share of renewable energy by 20% 
by 2030.20 In addition to the national 
pledges and emission reduction targets, 
Xi and Obama announced their plan 
to expand the US-China climate and 
energy cooperation in six major areas. 
The US-China Clean Energy Research 
Center (CERC) and the Climate Change 
Working Group (CCWG) are to be 
bilateral state bodies that will partially 
administer the expanded cooperation. 
CCWG for example is responsible for 
launching a new Climate-Smart/Low-
Carbon Cities initiative.
Less than a year later in September 
2015, the US and China released a 
Joint Presidential Statement on Climate 
Change.21 The statement builds on 
the previous bilateral agreement and 
addresses further areas of cooperation. 
Joshua P. Meltzer of Brookings singles 
out four announcements that were 
of particular significance: China will 
launch its nationwide Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) by 2017; China is to 
prioritise renewable energy sources; 
an ‘Obama-Xi Paris Call’ for an ambitious 
multilateral agreement was scheduled 
for December 2015 ; and in the field 
of climate finance China will provide 
$3.1 billion for developing countries, 
thereby breaking with calls for such 
financial and technological support 
from developed countries only. [2]In 
light of China’s contribution, the US 
reaffirmed their $3 billion pledge to 
the Green Climate Fund – described 
by Meltzer as “positively inadequate”.22
The November 2014 cl imate 
agreement and September 2015 
announcement broke with former 
tendencies of inertia and turned out 
to be precursors that led to a rather 
successful PA in December 2015. 
Until then, a majority of policy-makers 
had emphasised the different priorities 
between the US and EU vis-à-vis US-
China. Most climate watchers and 
policy-makers failed to predict the 
newly emerging consensus. Others 
continued to argue that consensus 
still does not exist, with both countries 
following their own ambitions in order 
to not fall behind. However, Li Mingjiang 
argues that China’s attitude of rivalry 
has changed toward an attitude of 
pragmatic burden-sharing through a 
more proactive approach to multilateral 
diplomacy. Based on Shambaugh’s 
remarks, Li presents China as a 
‘selective multilateralist’, that is engaged 
diplomatically on specific issues:
“China now understands that 
many of the newly-emerging 
transnational externalities 
such as climate change, global 
financial instability, resource 
depletion,  international 
terrorism, environmental 
degradation and pandemics 
cannot be tackled effectively 
by any single country but 
have to be dealt with through 
multilateral cooperation with 
other states.”23
EUROPEAN REACTIONS 
In the past decade, the proliferation 
of social media has opened up new 
channels of communication with 
great opportunities to influence and 
communicate global environmental 
politics. One such example is Twitter, 
the social networking service that has 
enjoyed increased prominence among 
political leaders and has changed their 
relationship with the public.24 Parmelee 
and Bichard have shown that messages 
sent through Twitter can crucially 
influence political discourses on a wide 
range of topics. They can also provide 
helpful insights into underlying politics 
and political narratives of debates. 
Although measuring the impact of 140 
character tweets is a bold venture, tweets 
have changed political communication 
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NAME & 
TWITTER 
ACCOUNT
POSITION FOLLOWERS 
(as of March 18, 
2016)
NOVEMBER 2014 AGREEMENT 
Donald Tusk, 
@eucopresident
President of the 
European Council
342,000 3:48 AM – 12 Nov 2014:  
We welcome today’s US-China 
#climate announcement, answering 
EU leaders’ call to put forward targets 
for cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
3:51 AM – 12 Nov 2014: 
Joint Statement with @JunckerEU on the 
US-China #climate announcement: http://
ow.ly/E9Pkl. #COP20 #COP21 #Paris2015
12:48 PM – 12 Nov 2014:  
Announcements so far cover +/- half 
of global emissions. We urge other 
#G20 members to announce targets 
in 1st half of 2015- transparently.
Connie Hedegaard, 
@CoHedegaard
Former EU 
Commissioner for 
Climate Action
49,700 8:19 AM – 12 Nov 2014: 
Positive and timely that the US doubles 
its reduction pace – and very much 
needed in order for US to come on 
the right trajectory. Good news
8:21 AM – 12 Nov 2014: 
Also positive that China is ready to commit 
to a peak year. BUT “around 2030” is very 
late – will the 2 degrees still be possible?
Miguel Arias 
Cañete,  
@MAC_europa
EU Climate 
Action and 
Energy4Europe 
Commissioner
31,700 3:54 AM – 12 Nov 2014: 
The EU’s reaction to the US-China 
climate announcement http://goo.
gl/qqoZ8m #COP21 #climate
4:13 AM – 12 Nov 2014 
US-China #climate announcement: 
positive, timely, important step in 
the right direction. Now we need 
other #G20 countries to play ball
Marcin Korolec, 
@MarcinKorolec
Former State 
Secretary for the 
Environment 
responsible for 
Climate Policy
3,197 3:33 AM – 12 Nov 2014 
Glad that #COP19 #Warsaw decision on 
new agreement gives countries base to 
come up with declarations so soon!  
Congratulations #US #China
Thomas Wyns,  
@TomasWyns
Researcher at 
the Institute for 
European Studies  
@IES_brussels
3,032 6:27 AM – 12 Nov 2014  
So while the #EU was sleeping (literally), 
#US and #China agreed on post 2020 joint 
#climate action This is good news!  
#EU2030 #paris2015
Table 1: Comparison of European Twitter reactions to the US-China Climate Agreement
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through simplification and downsizing of content. 
To examine European reactions to and perceptions 
of the November 2014 climate agreement between 
China and the US, we can look at the first tweets of 
five different influential European actors (see Table 1). 
Each actor was in a position to provide political 
orientation for a broader public as well as decision-
makers, and to varying degrees enjoy great political 
influence. 
The initial tweets indicated an optimistic outlook: all 
five European policy actors and analysts welcomed 
the US-China agreement. They sought to emphasise 
Europe’s significance for the bilateral agreement 
between China and the US as a way to re-establish 
Europe’s political weight and role model function in 
international climate politics. That the world’s two 
major GHG emitters had reached agreement was used 
as an argument for increased political pressure for more 
ambitious climate policies from other G20 members. 
That they all raised past and upcoming climate summits 
served as a reminder of the European concern to create 
consensus for increased international ambition on 
climate action.
Although the political impact that tweets might have 
and how they mobilise a variety of actors has been 
well-researched, less has been written about how the 
perceptions they create match reality. Do the tweets 
portray the true European stance? Closely linked with 
this is the question of whether it actually matters if 
the tweets’ portrayal is in line with reality. Through 
tweeting, certain frames are used that thematically 
reinforce certain positions. Thus, through welcoming 
the climate agreement, European leaders send an 
important signal to US and Chinese leaders. The use of 
tweets is of strong symbolic character and an important 
element of climate diplomacy. Through backing up the 
agreement while formulating their own demands, the 
underlying political process is pushed forward. This is 
in line with the work of Paul G. Harris, who has shown 
that social media can significantly influence global 
environmental politics.25 
The tweets also shed light on the European desire 
for continued geopolitical significance in the climate 
negotiations, but must not be confused with the fear 
over a bilateral US-China agreement and a decline 
of European influence. As discussed earlier, fears of 
US-China domination contrast with the reality and 
needs for drastic action on emission reductions and 
transatlantic climate cooperation. Thus, EU proposals 
continue to have a decisive impact simultaneous to 
China moving to the centre stage of international 
climate negotiations. Given their population sizes 
and related emissions, the activities of China and 
the US will continue to be of particular importance. 
In this context, more flexible and creative forms of 
multilateralism are needed in the field of climate policy, 
as different countries have different priorities as well 
as capacities. Whereas Chinese concerns relate to 
energy security (energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sources), the US and EU have more room to 
concentrate on energy efficient building standards, 
to name one example. This could lead climate change 
diplomacy and future summits to be shaped by 
“multiple bilateralisms.”26 Overall, there seems to be 
a consensus emerging that it would be wrong to pin 
a single partnership to negotiations or exclude certain 
actors, as no multilateral agreement will be effective 
without rising powers such as China.27 As Jones argues, 
“The transatlantic relationship will simply be one strand 
of global policy, not the strand of global policy, in 
Obama’s multilateralism”.28
FUTURE COOPERATION 
Just as Twitter has changed political communication, 
so too can readjusted visions of environmental 
engagement and cooperation change the thinking 
about and structure of multilateralism. Most 
transatlantic relations analysts mention coordination 
on climate change as a primary area of concern.29 
In the context of the failed 2009 Copenhagen summit, 
Egenhofer and Georgiev formulated a passionate call 
for “why the transatlantic climate change partnership 
matters more than ever” and why there is a need to 
develop a climate strategy with the US.30 The authors 
stated that a joint transatlantic climate change agenda 
and/or partnership is critical for implementing a global 
agreement. Overall, there seems to be consensus 
that US inertia on environmental issues negatively 
influenced the transatlantic relationship in the past 
decades, but chances are high that this US-European 
climate trauma can be overcome in light of the recent 
developments.
From an environmental European perspective, 
collective action in addressing climate change 
inclusively on a multilateral level remains a major 
challenge for the transatlantic relationship. Europe 
expects the US to raise its climate ambitions further. 
In light of the deadlocked political system and 
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widespread climate scepticism within the US, a major 
domestic challenge will be to address the political and 
public divide on this issue in order to move the climate 
agenda forward internationally as well as bilaterally. 
Perpetual visions of economic growth based on cheap 
and dirty energy are a further barrier. The outcome 
of the 2016 US presidential election will be a crucial 
determinant in shaping future transatlantic relations 
and in finding common ground for environmental 
cooperation in a multipolar world. Based on a continued 
Obama legacy scenario under Hillary Clinton, the 
transatlantic relationship could push further climate 
change cooperation at multilateral, bilateral, as well 
as subnational levels.
There is a case, however, to be made for a future which 
sees strengthened trilateral climate cooperation that 
involves China.31 China’s interest does not rest with 
exclusive bilateral climate deals with the second 
biggest GHG emitter. Rather, China seeks pragmatic 
cooperation with a variety of countries. The China-
EU-US dynamic is being transformed by increasingly 
forward-looking Chinese interactions with both the 
USA and EU. A basis for greater consensus in the 
environmental arena was created within the last 
two years thanks to the gradual shift of American, 
Chinese as well as European visions of multilateralism. 
The transatlantic relationship could find itself 
reinvigorated by the growing opportunities for a 
strengthened trilateral relationship in such areas as 
renewable technologies. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1.  Build on the annual meetings of the EU-US Energy 
Council (established in 2009) by holding a US-EU 
climate summit after this November’s US presidential 
election, with an aim to reaffirm the positions and 
expectations of both sides in order to build a solid 
base for raised global ambitions. 
2.  Pursue further trust-building measures, especially 
ones aimed at creating greater transparency and 
accountability on all sides, but especially so as to 
ensure the US follows through with its domestic 
commitments to tackle climate change. The Paris 
Agreement contains a ‘facilitative dialogue’ through 
which the EU is an important actor in reminding 
the US of its responsibilities for collective progress 
and a review of the initial Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs).
3.  The China-EU-US relationship should be enhanced 
through establishing a knowledge hub on emissions 
trading schemes. This knowledge hub would be 
responsible for exchanging best-practices and 
reflecting on experiences at the regional, national 
as well as subnational level. ■
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Conclusion:  
A Fundamental Relationship In Flux
Tim Oliver 
This next generation of authors have outlined a transatlantic relationship in a state of flux. Some of the strengths and weaknesses they have outlined are familiar ones that have long defined 
the relationship. As many of the authors made clear, the relationship remains a fundamentally important 
one to both sides. But over the course of eight chapters they also outlined four series of challenges 
to it: shifting attentions; uncertainties over Europe’s security; Europe’s wider failings in politics and 
economics; and doubts as to the future of liberalism in both Europe and the United States (US). 
That many of the challenges are faced by Europe shows how it is likely to be Europe’s actions that make 
or break the relationship. 
FUNDAMENTAL LINKS
It is worth recalling how important and strong the 
relationship is for both sides. The end of the Cold War 
brought with it many predictions that the relationship 
was doomed. This was despite a historical relationship 
that had bound the US and Europe together. 
Shared experiences of war, common political ideas in 
values and economics, strong economic and trading 
relations, to say nothing of the cultural and ethnic links, 
provided foundations on which the relationship has 
weathered many storms. 
Today the military and economic relationships 
remain the world’s most preeminent. The attempts 
to create a US-European Union (EU) free trade deal 
– the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – might have run into substantial problems on 
both sides, but efforts to create it reflect the fact that 
together, the US and EU represent roughly 35-40% of 
global GDP, with the values of trade in goods, services 
and (often overlooked) investments having long ago 
entered the realm of trillions as opposed to billions 
of dollars. While the growth of markets such as China 
and Brazil have been incredible and transformative 
experiences for the world (and will remain so for the 
foreseeable future), they have somewhat distracted 
attention from the remarkable scale of deepening in 
the economic interconnectedness that binds Europe 
and the US together. In some fields it now makes sense 
to talk of a transatlantic market. 
The economic links can also be overlooked because of a 
focus on the military side of the relationship, especially 
that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
The alliance has rarely been out of the headlines, 
with doubts – both in public and private – about 
its purpose and abilities after its experiences in the 
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and now in the face 
of Russian actions in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, 
it remains the world’s preeminent military alliance, 
with combined US-European defence spending 
in NATO at $893 billion. The ginormous scale of 
US defence spending alone means the alliance 
immediately dwarfs the defence spending of Russia 
and China. While spending and size of military force 
is not everything, NATO forces also remain amongst 
the world’s best trained, educated and motivated. 
This geopolitical relationship was not only essential 
to building European cooperation, integration and 
peace. It remains central to the ways both sides have 
approached global politics and reached agreements 
such as the recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
with Iran and the Minsk II agreement over Ukraine. 
Atlanticism has been a defining part of the outlooks 
of generations of leaders on both sides of the North 
Atlantic. Whether it will remain so depends on how 
both sides face four interrelated challenges, many of 
which focus on Europe more than the US. 
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SHIFTING ATTENTIONS
As several authors noted, the US is looking away from 
Europe towards emerging powers, especially China 
and the challenge it poses to US security in the Pacific. 
Debate in Europe can overlook that this shift is not out 
of choice or as a direct snub to Europeans. It is also not 
undertaken purely out of US national interest but is 
intended to try and preserve stability in regions of vital 
economic and political importance to both the US and 
Europe and, crucially, to the liberal world order they 
have sought to create. This is not to argue that the US is 
not conscious of the challenge these emerging powers 
pose to its power and the revisionist policies they may 
pursue. Efforts such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and TTIP are US-led, but are intended to bolster 
the wider system the US leads. For all the criticisms of 
TTIP and TPP emerging from Europe, the EU and its 
member states have yet to offer any viable alternative. 
The US – including its Millennial generation – will not 
wait for Europeans as they struggle to adapt to a fast 
changing world order. 
UNCERTAINTIES OVER 
EUROPEAN SECURITY
US complaints about European defence spending have 
been around since the start of the military relationship. 
Those complaints are, however, now at a point where the 
US’s willingness to commit to Europe’s security has been 
thrown into doubt as never before. Europeans should 
not overlook the fact that NATO’s future existence is 
openly debated in US presidential elections. The USA’s 
recent decision to increase defence spending in Europe 
should not be confused with a sign that all is okay. 
The presidential debates show that the vital emotional 
investment is not as forthcoming. Europe’s repeated 
failure to cooperate on defence cannot be excused 
as some special European post-modern problem. 
There are realist reasons why European states have 
failed to cooperate. How long this is sustainable, 
not least in the defence industries, is open to doubt. 
Today, it is the US that is most enthusiastic to see 
European states cooperate on defence. 
EUROPE’S FAILURE
That Europe – and especially the EU – can struggle as 
it does to cooperate on defence is one of a series of 
problems that make for something of an existential 
crisis facing the EU. The EU has faced many crises in the 
past, and has a history of moving forward as a result of 
them. Nevertheless, crises in the Eurozone have led to 
significant social and economic consequences; Russian 
aggression in Ukraine has shown the EU incapable 
of thinking geopolitically and understanding the 
continued relevance in global politics of hard power; 
refugees from Syria and the Middle East have caused 
such political unease that some of the world’s most 
vulnerable people have been portrayed as a threat, a 
portrayal which has only served to weaken and divide 
the EU; scepticism is on the rise across the EU, with the 
possibility of a British EU-exit carrying with it the risk 
the whole Union could unravel. 
WESTERN ILLIBERALISM 
The problems facing the EU’s unity are in no small 
part thanks to growing nationalist, inward-looking 
and populist agendas. Such agendas are also to be 
found in the US. The success of authoritarian states 
either economically or in exhibiting political stability 
(compared to a weak EU, and a US prone to government 
shutdowns) have raised questions and doubts as to the 
viability of European, US or Western models and hopes 
for some form of liberal internationalist world order. 
The failings (real or perceived) of this global order for 
large numbers of Europeans and Americans have also 
fuelled scepticism of traditional institutions and sources 
of authority domestically, regionally and globally. 
Too many see integration and globalisation as arranged 
by elites for elites. This has helped political agendas 
that have turned politics inwards in the US and inwards 
nationally (and to a lesser extent on a European level) in 
the EU. The idea of sovereignty has taken on an almost 
mythical quality. Another driver behind this have been 
the changing demographics of the US and Europe. 
The millennial generation might lack the negative 
views and be more comfortable with living in a 
more diverse US or Europe, but mistrust of the US by 
European millennials, and indifference towards Europe 
by US millennials, do not suggest strong foundations 
for the future of US-European relations. 
PROPOSALS 
We asked the authors of each chapter to outline 
three policy recommendations to help address the 
problems they identified in their areas. The following 
are summaries of the proposals. Please refer to the 
end of each chapter for full details. 
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DEFENCE AND SECURITY
US:
1.  The next US President must make a political and 
military commitment to lead a stronger, more robust, 
and nimble NATO alliance. 
2.  The US must move beyond its recent commitments 
to Europe and the concept of ‘reassurance’ to focus 
on the presence and posture necessary to establish 
‘deterrence’ of Russia. But only on condition European 
countries match increased US funding.
3.  The new US president must put behind them the 
negative messages of the presidential campaign 
in order to renew US political engagement and 
leadership. 
EUROPE:
1.  European states should re-double their efforts 
to maintain military capabilities with greater 
efficiency through deeper industrial and operational 
cooperation.
2.  The US should give strong support to European 
defence cooperation initiatives aimed at maintaining 
and improving military capabilities at the bilateral, 
small group, NATO and EU level.
3.  As a priority, the EU and NATO should focus on 
ensuring that both organisations are able to deploy 
mutually reinforcing strategies towards security 
threats, both in the East and South.
ECONOMICS AND TRADE
US:
1.  Complete TTIP as quickly and thoroughly as possible, 
especially for the political signal it will give to each 
partner about the value of the relationship. 
2.  A successful TTIP should lead to a regular 
institutionalised trade and economic forum.
3.  US and EU politicians should avoid impractical 
populist approaches which would undermine the 
relationship. 
EUROPE:
1.  The leaders of EU member states need to explain and 
defend TTIP and stop blaming the EU. The European 
Commission should better coordinate its work with 
national ministries. 
2.  The European Parliament and national parliaments 
should use their increased access to negotiating texts 
to inform their voters about the costs and benefits 
of TTIP rather than using it for political turf wars. 
3.  All of Europe’s political actors should encourage an 
informed debate on the geopolitical aspects of TTIP 
and the consequences for Europe if TTIP was to fail.
POLITICS AND VALUES
US:
1.  Top-tier European and American studies courses 
and policy institutions should more rigorously 
incorporate the perspectives of younger scholars 
in their publications and events. 
2.  Parliaments and grant-giving institutions should 
sustain funding for professional exchange 
programmes, especially those that prove they serve 
a diverse pool of applicants.
3.  Political leadership should shift from ad-hoc 
crisis management to creating sustained, inter-
governmental policy dialogues on a full range of 
issues relevant to the transatlantic relationship. 
EUROPE:
1.  Establish a Mediterranean ferry ticket system for 
refugees so as to disrupt the people smuggling 
market and allow refugees to claim asylum safely. 
2.  Stop relying on volunteers and NGOs to carry out 
humanitarian work the EU is funded to do, and air-
lift all those languishing at closed borders to safety, 
using the EU’s existing quota distribution system. 
3.  Urgently end and investigate the prison-like living 
conditions at the ‘Vial hotspot’ detention centre on 
the Greek island of Chios, and the ‘hotspot’ system 
as a whole. 
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EMERGING POWERS
US:
1.  Frame the challenges from authoritarian states as 
being to the rules-based liberal order, rather than 
to American hegemony. A relatively weaker US will 
have to rely on diplomacy and the interests it shares 
with allies.
2.  Provide idea leadership and promote a liberal 
approach to the future of the international order 
among like-minded states and show its own 
commitment by acts such as ratifying UNCLOS1.
3.  Welcome newly empowered responsible 
stakeholders into the system, and seek to impose 
collective costs on those who resort to the use of 
force in their international disputes. 
EUROPE:
1.  Hold an US-EU climate summit after the November 
2016 US presidential election, in order to reaffirm the 
expectations of both sides and build a solid ground 
for raised global ambitions. 
2.  Pursue further trust-building measures such as a 
‘facilitative dialogue’ to create greater transparency 
and accountability on all sides, to ensure they follow 
through with domestic commitments to tackle 
climate change. 
3.  Enhance the China-EU-US relationship through 
establishing a knowledge hub on emissions trading 
schemes so as to exchange best-practices and reflect 
on experiences at the regional, national as well as 
subnational level.
NOTES
1  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).
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ACE Mobile Allied Command Europe Mobile
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
AFL-CIO  The American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations
AIIB Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China 
CCP Common Commercial Policy
CCWG Climate Change Working Group 
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CELAC  Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States
CERC US-China Clean Energy Research Center
CJEF Combined Joint Expeditinoary Force 
COTRA  European Council’s Trade Policy 
Committee’s working group 
on Transatlantic Relations. 
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DSG Defence Strategic Guidelines 
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme 
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
G7  Global 7: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, USA, UK.
G20  Global 20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, UK, USA
GAMM  Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility framework
GHG Greenhouse gases
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICS Investment Court System
INDC  Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions 
ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MINT Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
MP Member of Parliament
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA National Security Agency
RCEP  Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership 
SAIS  School of Advanced International 
Studies (Johns Hopkins University)
SWIFT  The Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication
TPA  Trade Promotion Authority 
TPC  European Council’s Trade 
Policy Committee
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP  Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership
UNAUSUR Union of South American Nations
UNFCCC  United Framework Convention 
on Climate Change
VTJF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
List of abbreviations
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LSE IDEAS, a Centre for the study of international affairs, brings 
together academics and policy-makers to think strategically 
about world events. 
This one year EXECUTIVE MASTERS PROGRAMME is at the 
heart of that endeavour. While studying in a world-leading 
university you will be able to learn from top LSE academics  
and senior policy practitioners. 
 
The programme will sharpen your ability to challenge 
conventional thinking, explore new techniques for addressing 
risk and threats, and coach you in devising effective strategies 
to address them. 
 
The course has been especially tailored so that you can 
accelerate your career while holding a demanding position  
in the public or private sector. 
 
 ‘Right from the first week 
 I was able to apply the lessons  
 I had learnt to our operational  
 and policy work and to coach  
 my teams to look at  
 issues differently.’
 
 - Karen Pierce
 UK’s Permanent Representative 
 to the UN and WTO in Geneva
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 lse.ac.uk/ideas/strategy
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY
EXECUTIVE MASTERS PROGRAMME  
]
international 
 affairs 
 diplomacy 
 strategy 
